

Steven C. McCraw
Director
Texas Department of Public Safety

March 23, 2016

House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform

Subcommittee on National Security
Subcommittee on Government Operations

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Good morning, Chairman Meadows, Chairman DeSantis and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on National Security and Subcommittee on Government Operations. My name is Steven McCraw – I am the director of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the critically important issue of assessing the opportunity that individuals, including criminal organizations and terrorists, have to exploit the security gaps along the U.S.-Mexico border – and the consequences it has had, and will have, for the state of Texas and communities throughout the country.

In an ever-changing threat environment, where crime is increasingly transitory, transnational, organized, and discreet, and where terrorism has become more disaggregated, an insecure border with Mexico represents a significant national security vulnerability. The porous border with Mexico provides cartels a reliable means to infiltrate this country allowing them to smuggle and traffic marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine and people into and throughout the United States. In Mexico, the cartels engage in petroleum theft, kidnappings, robberies, human trafficking, extortions and murders for profit. Cartels employ terrorism tactics, strategies and corruption to protect their criminal operations, and they pose a serious threat to Texas and the United States as well as to the domestic security of Mexico, one of our nation's most important economic trading partners.

Texas Governor Greg Abbott and the Texas Legislature understand that securing our nation's border with Mexico is the sovereign responsibility of the federal government, they recognize that the federal government has failed to adequately provide the appropriate resources to secure our international border with Mexico. That failure has forced the State of Texas to spend millions of dollars of state money to fulfill what is a federal responsibility.

Governor Abbott has long-recognized the gravity of this situation and in his first year in office, he signed into law the toughest border security program in the nation. As part of that plan, more than \$800 million has been appropriated over the next two years to add more resources, more manpower and more assets toward securing our border. This includes state-of-the-art aerial assets, enhanced land and maritime patrols, advanced monitoring technology, enhanced communication capabilities, 250 new state troopers, a new company of Texas Rangers, pilots, additional support personnel, increased overtime and funding to conduct sustained surge operations in high threat areas.

In fact, in response to federal inaction dating back to June 2014, the DPS was then directed by state leadership to launch Operation Strong Safety, and most recently, Operation Secure Texas, as a multi-agency collaborative effort to deny Mexican cartels and their associates unfettered entry into Texas, and their ability to commit border-related crimes, as well as reduce the power of these organizations, whose success depends on their ability to operate on both sides of the border. In total, Texas has designated roughly \$1.7 billion in state funds since 2005 to amplify

border security efforts. With the increased funding authorized by our state leaders, Texas is further intensifying its border security operations by providing direct assistance to the U.S. Border Patrol to deter, detect and interdict smuggling along the Texas/Mexico border through the deployment of an integrated network of detection and communication technologies and an increase in ground, air and marine interdiction assets.

These additional resources allows DPS to expand current efforts with other state law enforcement agencies as well as our local partners, as well as federal partners and the Texas Border Prosecution Unit to degrade the smuggling infrastructure used by the cartel plaza bosses to smuggle drugs and people into Texas. And the number of public corruption investigations along the border will increase with the additional Texas Rangers working with the FBI's Public Corruption Task Force. Additionally, this also increases the funding for local law enforcement and border county prosecutors, and expands the Texas Anti-Gang program to crack down on the gangs who support Mexican cartel smuggling and trafficking operations throughout the state. Again, these increased efforts would not be possible without additional resources provided by Governor Abbott's Office and the Texas Legislature.

As a state that puts such a high priority and resource focus on protecting its people and property, these kinds of threats manifest themselves in a variety of ways. Most recently, Texas has found itself at odds with the Obama administrations attempt to resettle tens of thousands of Syrian refugees in communities across the U.S. Make no mistake, Texas has been active in providing refugee asylum to thousands from across the globe. In fact, according to the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Texas accepts approximately ten-percent of all refugees resettled in the United States.

The difference now is the insistence that Texas resettle refugees whose background and threat to our state can't be quantified. Governor Abbott has been very clear that we cannot allow charity for some to compromise security for all. To that end, our Governor continues to work with Congress to increase states role in the refugee resettlement process. In fact, last week language was inserted in the Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act of 2016 that is before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee. Language in that act would add states a layer of protection and prerogative.

In relation to this committee's focus today – *National Security: Threats at Our Borders* – I would like to present you with information contained in a study produced by a Texas DPS Senior Analyst as part of his graduate research at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) for Homeland Security and Defense – <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=788177> – as well as findings from several U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies.

First, I'd like to reference the general scope and volume of Special Interest Alien (SIA) smuggling as outlined in the NPS study, which indicates that several thousand SIAs – that is, migrants from 35 – 40 countries of interest where Islamic terrorist organizations operate – have been apprehended reaching the southwest land border each year since 9/11 (pp. 16-17 of the NPS

study), smuggled through Latin America and Mexico, at a relatively consistent annual average volume.

Also according to the study, an example of what's happening in Texas alone can be illustrated by a report citing U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, asserted that more than 740 encounters with SIAs just in Texas reflected a 15 percent increase over the same period in 2014, among them migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, and Turkey. These are just the individuals who were apprehended. As indicated in the study, unknown numbers of SIAs slip over the border, and some may or may not be caught at some future point in the interior of the country.

Many are believed to apply for U.S. political asylum after their apprehensions in the brush between ports of entry or upon turning themselves in to an immigration officer at a port of entry, according to the study.

According Congressional research reporting cited in the study (p. 80), Middle Eastern and South Asia migrants consistently ranked among the top 20 approved asylum seekers from 2000 through 2009, long raising national security concerns that these SIA migrants from countries of interest are committing asylum fraud.

The study also highlights an asylum fraud loophole and the U.S. inability to detect and prosecute asylum fraud. (pp. 80-85) For instance, the study refers to SIA smugglers and their clients from 35 "countries of interest," arriving through Mexico at a U.S. Port of Entry, depend heavily on fraud vulnerabilities in the U.S., primarily the lack of political asylum fraud detection and prosecution capability.

The study notes that the probability of achieving access to the American asylum process is critical to migrant recruitment and business continuity of the smuggling organization, since asylum mitigates the risk of deportation, which migrants and smugglers understand would entail the loss of significant once-in-a-lifetime sums for smuggling fees and suppress new-client recruitment. Therefore, SIA smugglers have incorporated into their operations advice on how to achieve U.S. asylum (pp. 80-85).

The study also references court records showing that four of 19 prosecuted SIA smugglers addressed in the NPS study knowingly abused vulnerabilities in asylum vetting processes by claiming fraudulent persecution stories that authorities and systems are unable to verify, and by omitting disqualifying personal histories such as terrorism associations and criminality. The smugglers were highly knowledgeable in U.S. asylum law and processes, taking pains to instruct their clients how to file fraudulent petitions, and coaching their stories in ways that were likely to ring well with asylum officers, as part of their smuggling services.

The NPS study also cites government reporting dating from 2002 to recently consistently pointing out lack of progress in detecting and deterring this kind of asylum fraud. It presents a 2002 GAO report, which concluded that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) did not know the extent of immigration benefit fraud, to include asylum fraud. The NPS

study references a 2008 GAO survey of asylum officers that showed that 75 percent believed they needed additional training to help them detect fraud, conduct security checks and assess the credibility of asylum seekers. The problem apparently has not been addressed in any of the years since, according to information cited by the NPS study. In 2014, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report showed that up to 70 percent of asylum cases contained proven or possible fraud.

The latest GAO assessment of this problem, released in December 2015 – <http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673941.pdf> - concluded that “DHS and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have limited capabilities to detect and prevent asylum fraud” despite dedicated antifraud entities. It said asylum officers in seven of eight asylum offices conceded they had granted asylum in cases in which they suspected fraud.

To date, the GAO assessment stated that a mere 35 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officers are deployed across all eight asylum offices conducting background checks to resolve national security “hits” and fraud concerns. Another finding was that USCIS still provides limited fraud training for asylum officers and has no plan for determining how much training is needed.

Adding to the concern that threats and vulnerabilities are not being adequately addressed, according to GAO, DHS and DOJ rarely prosecute asylum fraud. Federal law enforcement agencies, such as ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), rarely investigate the asylum fraud referrals they receive. Four of the eight USCIS offices only referred 0 or 1 asylum fraud case to HSI from 2010 to 2014. One office reported HSI had not accepted a referral since 2010. Another office reported that HSI had not accepted a referral in the previous two years and that the local U.S. Attorney’s office does not accept referrals. The 2015 GAO study also found that USCIS has never assessed fraud risks, and still has no approach for assessing fraud risk.

The 2015 NPS study noted media reporting to the effect that when hundreds of Syrian war refugees began crossing the Mexico-California border in 2012 after traveling on Mexican tourist visas, and claimed asylum, concerns were expressed about whether or not the security vetting process was capable of identifying Islamic extremists who might be among them.

Lastly, the NPS study concluded that research had uncovered “a surprising number of terrorism reference points associated with SIAs and their smugglers.” (p.135) Among the more prevalent of these were Somalis, who crossed the southern border and were later accused in court proceedings of terrorism involvements while half way through or all the way through the asylum process. (p. 1, and pp. 135-136). Other public information the NPS study found during research included crossings by members of Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, and two purported members of a Bangladesh terrorist organization. (p. 84)

This information is worthy of attention and consideration by our nation’s leaders and policymakers, because if these vulnerabilities are left unchecked, it will allow opportunities for heinous criminals, including potential terrorist organizations and lone wolf actors, to exploit our international border, unlawfully enter the country and carry out their illicit activities.

In Texas, we see the exploitation of the security gaps along our border by Mexican cartels and their counterparts on a daily basis. The current epicenter of human and drug smuggling activity is the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, which is further complicated by the recent surge of migrants from Central America and Cuba along the Southern border. As mentioned previously, the state of Texas leadership has repeatedly called upon the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for additional assets and resources for the U.S. Border Patrol and the Office of Field Operations to strengthen our border defenses and combat transnational criminal activity along the Texas-Mexico border. Unfortunately, even the September 2015 request from Governor Abbott to DHS for additional aerial observation and other resources has gone unfulfilled. As a result, in December 2015, Governor Abbott directed the following actions:

- Extend the deployment of the National Guard troops at strategic locations on the border intended to reduce illegal entry;
- Instruct the Texas Department of Public Safety to coordinate with the Texas Parks & Wildlife Department to increase the number of boats and tactical officers at strategic locations on the Rio Grande River;
- Instruct the Department of Public Safety to increase aerial observation missions to aid interdiction efforts;
- Provide Grants to Ellis and Rockwall counties to aid their efforts to respond to the unexpected relocation of unaccompanied minors to their counties.
- Re-urge the Department of Homeland Security to increase border patrol agents in Texas.

Most recently, DHS requested a 50 percent reduction of persistent aerial detection, situational awareness, and monitoring support for Operation Phalanx from the Department of Defense. This request is troubling, given the additional resources requested by Governor Abbott last September. Any decrease in aerial observation is not only imprudent, but contradicts the very mission of comprehensive border security enforcement. Just last month, Governor Abbott joined Texas Congressman Henry Cuellar, whose district is losing 50 percent of the aerial surveillance referenced above, in requesting that DHS explain why the federal government is pulling back on border enforcement. Texas provides extensive manpower, resources and oversight in support of Operation Phalanx, and expects the federal government to similarly fulfill its obligation to secure the border.

Despite this setback caused by the federal government – the very entity responsible for securing our nation's border – with the support from our state's leadership, DPS will continue working with its local and federal partners to target transnational criminal activity including drug trafficking, labor trafficking, sex trafficking and money laundering in key Texas transshipment and trafficking centers and other impacted areas throughout the state. As discussed, Governor Abbott and the Texas Legislature have invested a substantial amount of state resources in border security at a time when the state has many other vital priorities such as education, transportation and public health; however, there is an understanding in Texas that protecting our citizens is a fundamental duty of the government, and they have committed to doing whatever is necessary to protect the people of Texas. That said, make no mistake that Governor Abbott and the Texas

Legislature fully expect to be reimbursed by the federal government as this action would not be necessary if the federal government fulfilled its obligation to secure our nation's border.

In Texas, we understand the importance of close partnerships and unity of effort in combating crime and terrorism. It is important to note that it is our local law enforcement community along the Texas/Mexico border also serves on the front line in protecting our citizens from transnational crime. To that end, we have combined the capabilities and expertise of border sheriffs, chiefs of police, Texas Military Forces, and other essential state and local law enforcement agencies, including constables and state game wardens, to provide direct assistance to the U.S. Border Patrol with their vitally important mission.

In addition, the type and amount of resources that DPS has committed to this critical federal mission does not adequately reflect the substantial additional resources provided by local law enforcement, Texas Military Forces and Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. Texas employs a unified command structure to coordinate ground, marine, and air resources around-the-clock, and we have developed contingency plans to address myriad transnational threats. Importantly, we enhance the impact of border security operations by degrading the smuggling structure operating within our border communities through multiagency investigations and prosecutions that target key drug and human smuggling networks essential to cartel operations.

The impact of Operation Secure Texas reaches far beyond the immediate border area, because as we know, human and drug trafficking impact the entire country and represents a threat to both public safety and national security.

For instance, if a community in this country has a drug problem – such as the current heroin addiction epidemic and substantial increase of heroin-related deaths in the northeast region of United States – they have a Mexican Cartel and unsecure border problem; and if a community is plagued by transnational gangs such as MS-13 and MS-18, they have an unsecure border problem.

Rather than waiting for the effects of Mexican cartel activity to further penetrate Texas communities and other states, Texas has chosen to fight the problem at the source – the porous border with Mexico. The foremost priority of Texas Sheriffs, Chiefs of Police and other local and state law enforcement agencies in the Texas border region has been and will continue to be the protection of its citizens from all threats including transnational crime, and our second priority is to assist the U.S. Border Patrol in securing the Texas-Mexico border, which directly relates to our first priority.

I would also like to recognize and commend the brave men and women of the U. S. Border Patrol for their laudable actions in addressing their formidable responsibilities with the limited resources they have been provided. We are grateful for their dedication to keeping our nation safe from an array of public safety and homeland security threats, while facing incredible challenges every day.

Lastly, I would like to thank you, Chairman Meadows, Chairman DeSantis and the other distinguished members for your unwavering commitment to addressing the security vulnerabilities at our nation's borders, which underscore the need for immediate federal action to ensure the safety of all Americans.

[Attached is the strategic intent, activity and the current level of DPS resources dedicated to the ongoing surge operation in Texas.]

[INSERT FEB 2016 DASHBOARD HERE]

Texas Border Security

February 2016

Strategic Intent

The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) will work with its local and state partners to provide direct assistance to U.S. Customs and Border Protection to deter, detect and interdict smuggling along the Texas/Mexico border through the deployment of an integrated network of detection and communication technologies and an increase in ground, air and marine interdiction assets.

DPS will work with its local and federal partners and the Border Prosecution Unit to degrade the smuggling infrastructure used by the cartel plaza bosses to smuggle drugs and people into Texas.

The Texas Rangers will work with the Border Prosecution Unit and our federal partners to deter smuggling related corruption along the border by increasing the number of public corruption investigations, arrests and prosecutions.

DPS will work with its local and federal partners to target transnational criminal activity including drug trafficking, labor trafficking, sex trafficking and money laundering in key Texas transshipment and trafficking centers and other impacted areas throughout the state.

(I) DPS Deterrence and Detection Assets Deployed

DPS continues to enhance the level of detection coverage directly on the border with increases in tactical boats, the deployment of motion detection cameras, increases in camera installation capacity, increases in the number of helicopters capable of using FLIR day and night, assessing the viability of contracting for Aerostat coverage, acquisition of a high-altitude border surveillance aircraft, and the integration of all essential detection, tracking and communication technologies.

A. DPS Maritime Assets

The State of Texas has deployed DPS and TPWD boats on the Rio Grande River to deter and detect smuggling activity.

DPS Boats Assigned to the Border:

Tactical Boats	Deployed	Pending	Totals
Medium and Deep Water	6	--	6
Shallow Water	2	2	4
Extreme Shallow Jet	1	2	3
Total	9	4	13

Full-time Personnel:	22
Personnel Temporarily Deployed to OST:	18
Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents from working OT:	30
DPS Officers temporarily deployed to the border work 12-14 hour shifts with no days off to increase coverage.	
Total Personnel Strength:	70

B. Ground Sensors

The State of Texas does not have motion-detection ground sensors; however, U.S. Border Patrol sensors are monitored by DPS Aircraft that receive direct alerts when activated, and DPS Aircraft provide confirmation and coordinate interdiction efforts.

C. Detection Cameras

The State of Texas has implemented a camera detection program leveraging low-cost, high-capability motion-detection and low-light camera technology. Through this program, detections are immediately relayed to U.S. Border Patrol and DPS Command Posts, and directly to interdiction assets on the ground and DPS surveillance aircraft. The Texas Rangers and the U.S. Border Patrol work closely together to dramatically expand the ability to detect smuggling events in real time through this program.

i. DPS Installation Team

U.S. Border Patrol Technical Agents have installed and provided maintenance service for the vast majority of these cameras to date. Most recently, the DPS Special Operations Group has provided installation support to U.S. Border Patrol. To further increase capacity, DPS has established an installation team using Texas State Guard personnel.

Number of New Installations in January 2016:	386
Texas State Guard Personnel Assigned:	7

ii. Detection Cameras Deployed*

Cameras Deployed	Last 60 Days	Last 12 Months	Operation Total
Rio Grande Valley Sector	267	1,284	1,507
Laredo Sector	184	618	677
Del Rio Sector	106	307	341
Marfa Sector	44	114	145
El Paso Sector	13	19	26
Totals	614	2,342	2,696

**1,015 cameras were deployed prior to operational period beginning June 2014 for a total of 3,711 detection cameras.*

D. Aerostats

Aerostats are buoyant balloons that remain tethered to the ground and are used to provide fixed long distance visual and radar coverage of an area. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently operate five Aerostats on the border in the Rio Grande Valley. Texas Gov. Greg Abbott has requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security provide CBP with five additional Aerostats to operate on the Texas-Mexico border.

	Deployed	Pending	Totals
Aerostats	5 (CBP)	(DPS)*	5
Total	5	--	5

**DPS' Request for Information to assess viability of the state contracting for increased Aerostat coverage is pending.*

E. Aviation Assets

The State of Texas has deployed DPS and Texas Military Forces aircraft to detect smuggling attempts along the Texas-Mexico border and to assist in interdicting those attempts. The fixed-wing aircraft receive direct alerts from U.S. Border Patrol ground sensors and DPS motion-detection camera activations, and the helicopters receive the DPS motion-detection camera alerts. All DPS aircraft can communicate directly with U.S. Border Patrol Agents and Troopers on the ground.

DPS Aircraft with Advanced Detection and Communications	Deployed	Pending	Totals
Helicopters	9*	--	9
Mid-Altitude Fixed Wing	2	--	2
High-Altitude Fixed Wing	1	1**	2
Total	12	1	13

**DPS helicopters in Longview and Waco have been reassigned to the border.*

***An additional high-altitude aircraft for DPS was approved by the Texas Legislature and is in the procurement process.*

Pilots and Tactical Flight Officers Permanently Assigned:	25
Pilots and TFOs Temporarily Deployed to OST:	8
Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents from working OT:	4
Total Personnel Strength:	37

(II) Interdiction

Once detected, it is important the smugglers either be interdicted or denied entry, which requires a well-coordinated and timely law enforcement response that can only be achieved with a sufficient number of personnel staffed around the clock.

A. Troopers

Troopers Currently Permanently Assigned:	563
New Permanent Trooper Positions Hired and Deployed:	124
Troopers Temporarily Deployed to OST from other areas:	230
Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents from working OT:	313
Total Trooper Strength:	1,230

B. Cortina Units

Cortina Units are joint DPS and U.S. Border Patrol interdiction teams.

Total Cortina Units	30
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C. Tactical Operations

DPS Special Operations Group and U.S. Border Patrol Special Operations conduct joint tactical operations in remote and high-threat areas. The Texas Rangers oversee DPS tactical operations, which include Ranger Recon teams, the DPS Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, and six Regional Special Response Teams (SRT).

D. Logistics and Planning

Logistical and Planning Experts Permanently Assigned:	4
Logistical and Planning Experts Temporarily Deployed to OST:	4
Total Personnel Strength:	8

E. Intelligence and Information Sharing

The Joint Operations Intelligence Centers (JOIC) centralize all of the border incident data across 53 counties and 171 law enforcements agencies to provide a shared view of the threat picture and trending patterns.

Joint Operations Intelligence Centers:	6
Texas Rangers:	2
DPS Border Liaison Officers:	6
State Guard Personnel:	35
HQ Intelligence Analysts Permanently Assigned:	10
Border Region Intelligence Analysts Permanently Assigned:	11
Intelligence Analysts Temporarily Deployed to OST:	4

Total Personnel Strength: **68**

F. Communications

Communications Operators Permanently Assigned: 24

Communications Operators Temporarily Deployed to OST: 4

Total Personnel Strength: **28**

(III) Targeting the Smuggling Infrastructure

The arrests of members and associates of smuggling groups and criminal networks operating in the border region, such as cartel operatives, statewide and regional gangs, transnational criminal gangs, wanted and convicted felons, and criminal aliens, degrades the smuggling infrastructure and increases community safety.

Special Agents Permanently Assigned: 167

Special Agents Temporarily Deployed to OST: 25

Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents: 61

Total Agent Strength: **253**

Inter-Agency Targeting Team (ITT): 5 U.S. Border Patrol Agents, 2 DPS Special Agents, 1 Trooper, 1 DPS Intelligence Analyst

(IV) Targeting Border Corruption

The Mexican cartels seek to corrupt individuals and institutions on both sides of the border to support their smuggling operations. Successful investigations degrade the cartels' smuggling ability and serves as an important deterrent to those who would betray public trust and the rule of law.

Texas Rangers Permanently Assigned*: 45

Texas Rangers Temporarily Deployed to OST: 7

Additional Overtime FTE Equivalents: 17

Total Personnel Strength: **69**

**Texas Rangers also assist local law enforcement agencies in the investigation of major crimes such as homicides, kidnappings, robberies and sexual assaults.*

1,214 FTE assigned personnel plus 425 additional overtime FTE equivalents. DPS Officers temporarily deployed to the border work 12-14 hour shifts with no days off to increase coverage.

Total DPS FTE support to OST Operations: **1,763**

**Does not include the number of DPS Special Operations Group Personnel assigned to border tactical missions.*

DPS Operational Activities

Criminal/High Threat Criminal Arrests in the Border Region

		Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	Operation total (6/14-01/16)
Texas Highway Patrol	High Threat Criminal Arrests*	272	1,722	2,639
	Total Criminal Arrests	2,073	12,371	18,523
DPS Special Agents	High Threat Criminal Arrests*	104	767	1,127
	Total Criminal Arrests	381	2,224	3,427
Texas Rangers	High Threat Criminal Arrests*	37	272	411
DPS Total	High Threat Criminal Arrests*	413	2,761	4,177
	Total Criminal Arrests	2,491	14,867	22,361

**Felony DWI, intoxication manslaughter and other serious traffic offenses, as well as Illegal Alien detentions and referrals to U.S. Border Patrol are not included in the arrest statistics above.*

Public Corruption Arrests in the Border Region

	Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	Operation total (6/14-01/16)
Texas Rangers	13	50	57

DPS Marine Unit Operations

Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	244
Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	1,460
Operation total (6/14-01/16)	2,232

DPS Aviation Operations

Hours Flown Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	634
Hours Flown Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	5,664
Hours Flown Operation total (6/14-01/16)	9,369

DPS Tactical Operations

Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	434
Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	1,646
Operation total (6/14-01/16)	2,542

DPS Apprehension Support to U.S. Border Patrol

	Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	Operation total (6/14-01/16)
Illegal Alien Detections and Interdiction Assistance			
Cameras	12,078	61,259	86,105
Aviation	497	5,009	8,527
Tactical Marine Unit	87	448	656
Illegal Alien Detentions and Referrals			
Tactical Marine Unit	207	1,335	2,234
Texas Highway Patrol*	187	187	187
Total Apprehension Support to U.S. Border Patrol	13,056	68,238	97,709

**DPS did not capture Texas Highway Patrol Illegal Alien Detections and Referrals prior to December 1, 2015 and is now being captured state-wide.*

Value of Drugs Seized by DPS in the Border Region*

	DPS Only
Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	\$97,152,365
Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	\$643,128,389
Operation total (6/14-01/16)	\$1,162,730,501

**These totals do not include seizures where DPS provided direct support to another agency.*

Value of Drugs by Type by DPS in the Border Region* (6/14 – Present)

	Marijuana	Cocaine	Methamphetamine	Heroin
DPS Only	\$954,750,773	\$125,574,955	\$60,129,845	\$22,274,927

**These totals do not include seizures where DPS provided direct support to another agency.*


Currency Seized by DPS in the Border Region*

	DPS Only
Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	\$3,109,553
Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	\$18,744,757
Operation total (6/14-01/16)	\$24,429,715

**These totals do not include seizures where DPS provided direct support to another agency.*

Smuggling Trends

The Texas Legislature provides funding to centralize the collection and sharing of border incident data across all jurisdictions in the border region, which comprises local, state, and federal agencies across 53 counties and more than 171 separate law enforcement agencies in the border region.



U.S. Border Patrol IA Apprehensions in the Border Region

FY 2016 (10/15-01/16)*	89,147
FY 2015**	221,684
FY 2014**	341,132

**Unofficial U.S. Border Patrol statistics. **CBP reconciled apprehensions. Data includes El Paso Sector, which comprises parts of TX and NM.*

U.S. Border Patrol Family Unit Apprehensions in the Border Region

FY 2016 (10/15-01/16)*	20,428
FY 2015**	32,949
FY 2014**	61,605


**Unofficial U.S. Border Patrol statistics. **CBP reconciled apprehensions. Data includes El Paso Sector, which comprises parts of TX and NM.*

U.S. Border Patrol Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions in the Border Region

FY 2016 (10/15-01/16)*	15,962
FY 2015**	31,109
FY 2014**	58,312

**Unofficial U.S. Border Patrol statistics. **CBP reconciled apprehensions. Data includes El Paso Sector, which comprises parts of TX and NM.*

Value of Drugs Seized - Last 24 Months Feb 2014 - Jan 2016




Value of Drugs Seized in the Border Region

Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	\$1,154,506,373
Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	\$6,779,361,001
Operation total (6/14-01/16)	\$11,573,706,775

Note: The above border region statistics represent local, state and federal seizures.

Currency Seized - Last 24 Months Feb 2014 - Jan 2016



Currency Seized in the Border Region

Last 60 days (12/15-01/16)	\$3,776,160
Last 12 months (02/15-01/16)	\$28,886,206
Operation total (6/14-01/16)	\$38,821,097

Note: The above border region statistics represent local, state and federal seizures.



Director - Steven C. McCraw

Steven C. McCraw became the Executive Director and Colonel of the Texas Department of Public Safety in August 2009. He began his law enforcement career with DPS in 1977 as a Trooper in the Texas Highway Patrol and later as a DPS Narcotics Agent until 1983 when he became a Special Agent with the FBI. He served in Dallas, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, Tucson, San Antonio and Washington, DC.

His promotions included Supervisory Special Agent, Unit Chief, Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Tucson, Inspector, Inspector-In-Charge of the South East Bomb Task Force, Deputy Assistant Director, Director of the Foreign Terrorism Tracking Task Force, Special Agent in Charge in San Antonio, Assistant Director of the Office of Intelligence for which he was tasked to establish after the attacks on 9/11. He also served as the Assistant Director of Inspections overseeing the internal inspection process, internal investigations, reengineering , strategic planning and audits.

In 2004, McCraw retired from the FBI to become the Texas Homeland Security Director in the Office of the Governor where he served for five years.

A native of El Paso, McCraw has Bachelor of Science and Master of Arts degrees from West Texas State University.