

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

November 2, 2023

The Honorable Xavier Becerra
Secretary
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, DC 20201

Dear Secretary Becerra:

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, Committee on Oversight and Accountability, and Committee on Energy and Commerce (together “the Committees”), have already made significant accommodations to the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS” or “the Department”) in its September 14, 2023, joint request letter [hereinafter “September 14 Letter”]. At the request of the Department, we are now making additional accommodations. These accommodations include increasing specificity, providing priority search terms for, limiting the time frame of, and removing completed requests from the Committees’ September 14 Letter. As such, please see the updated requests, follow the updated production schedule, and use the priority search terms as outlined in Appendixes (I)-(III).

As a further accommodation, the Committees have accepted every proposed transcribed interview date proposed by the Department. For your ready reference, the transcribed interviews currently scheduled are:

1. Dr. Michael Lauer: November 2, 2023
2. Dr. Erik Stemmy: November 13, 2023
3. Dr. Emily Erbelding: November 28, 2023
4. Mr. Gray Handley: December 8, 2023
5. Mr. Greg Folkers: December 12, 2023
6. Dr. Hugh Auchincloss: December 20, 2023

The Committees continue to have serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the Department’s efforts to comply with our legitimate oversight requests. At the request of the Department, the Committees deferred a transcribed interview with Assistant Secretary Melanie Egorin to accommodate a meeting requested by the Department to discuss its oversight compliance efforts—including its response to our September 14 Letter. As outlined below, the Department’s explanations were insufficient and did not address the Committees’ outstanding questions. Accordingly, attached to this letter please find a subpoena for Assistant Secretary Melanie Egorin to appear for a deposition on **November 16, 2023**.¹

¹ While the Committee on Oversight and Accountability is serving the Department with a testimonial subpoena, this deposition will be conducted jointly. If necessary, the Committee on Energy and Commerce will issue a separate testimonial subpoena pursuant to Rule 16 of the Committee’s Rules.

I. Background

The Committees have a Constitutional duty to conduct oversight to inform legislative solutions that address deficiencies and ingrain proficiencies within the federal government. Since early 2020, House Republicans have been investigating the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and the resulting COVID-19 pandemic, which has killed more than one million Americans. Regrettably, House Democrats have not joined us in these efforts.² This investigation will inform potential legislation to improve pandemic preparedness, strengthen grant processes and oversight, enhance biosafety and biosecurity of laboratory and field research, and amend or strengthen current criminal laws regarding defrauding the United States, among other issues.

At the beginning of the 118th Congress, on February 2 and 13, 2023, respectively, the Committees sent the Department requests for documents and communications relevant to this investigation.³ The Select Subcommittee's letter also included requests for 29 voluntary transcribed interviews.⁴

As part of our duty to conduct oversight of the Executive Branch, we recognize our obligation to participate in the constitutionally mandated accommodations process. To that end, the Committees have endeavored to work in good faith with the Department. Between February and September 2023, the Committees have: (1) identified priority categories of document requests as well as discrete documents of interest, (2) deprioritized or withdrawn certain document requests, (3) freely granted extensions of time, and (4), at the request of the Department, reviewed certain documents *in camera*.

Our accommodations have not been met with reciprocal actions from the Department, and its efforts to produce documents are deficient. For example, the Department has: (1) produced documents with more substantial redactions than those in documents that are publicly available, (2) redacted the names of non-governmental employees and foreign nationals without legitimate reasons, (3) missed numerous production deadlines, often without explanation, (4) withheld requested documents, again often without explanation, and, as the Congress has gone on, (5) made productions at a slower and slower cadence.

On September 14, 2023, as a further accommodation to the Department and to facilitate its compliance with investigative requests regarding the origins of COVID-19, the Committees jointly consolidated our previous requests. The September 14 Letter deferred certain earlier requests, increased the specificity of others, reduced the scope of previous requests, and, again, prioritized requests for documents and information determined to be most important to the

² Letter from Hon. James Clyburn, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to Hon. Steve Scalise, Ranking Member, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, & Hon. James Comer, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (June 11, 2021).

³ Letter from Hon. Cathy McMorris Rogers, et. al., Chair, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to Lawrence Tabak, D.D.S, Ph.D., Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, Nat'l Insts. Of Health (Feb. 2, 2023); Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability (Feb. 13, 2023).

⁴ *Id.*

Committees.⁵ Critically, the letter tabled 21 of the 29 previously requested transcribed interviews. Finally, the letter clearly delineated the Committees' expected production timeline.

Because the Department's good-faith compliance is in question the September 14 Letter also requested readily available data that would help verify that the Department was, in fact, cooperating with Congress "in good faith," as it routinely claims.⁶ The requested data included: (1) how many new or unique searches or pulls of information were conducted by the Department, (2) the dates of these searches or pulls of information, (3) a list of search terms used for these pulls, and (4) a list of custodial inboxes searched. If the Department failed to produce this data by September 21, the Committees reiterated the Select Subcommittee's request, from six months earlier, for Assistant Secretary Egorin to participate in a transcribed interview on September 28, 2023.

On September 18, 2023, Select Subcommittee staff reminded the Department that the requested information was expected and that, if the Department failed to comply, the Committees expected Assistant Secretary Egorin's appearance and testimony on September 28.⁷ On September 21, the Department sent a letter to the Committees attempting to defend its record of compliance with oversight requests.⁸ Unfortunately, the Department's response did not address our concerns, and—tellingly—the letter did not include any of the documents or data requested by the Committees.

On September 25, Select Subcommittee staff informed the Department that its response in the September 21 letter "did not satisfy the Chairs' requests" and that the interview of Assistant Secretary Egorin would proceed as requested.⁹ Select Subcommittee staff also reiterated that the Department had yet to indicate whether Assistant Secretary Egorin would not cooperate. The Department did not immediately respond.

On September 27—the day before the scheduled interview—Department staff informed the Committees that Assistant Secretary Egorin tested positive for COVID-19 and would not be available to testify.¹⁰ At no point did the Department indicate that Assistant Secretary Egorin was refusing to testify, but instead simply requested an extension. The Committees granted an

⁵ Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to Hon. Xavier Becerra, Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 14, 2023) [hereinafter "September 14 Letter"].

⁶ Letter from Hon. Melanie Anne Egorin, Ass't Sec'y for Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability (Oct. 11, 2023) [hereinafter "October 11 Letter"].

⁷ E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 18, 2023).

⁸ Letter from Hon. Melanie Anne Egorin, Ass't Sec'y for Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability (Sept. 21, 2023).

⁹ E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 25, 2023).

¹⁰ E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Sept. 27, 2023).

extension—to October 5—pending a negative test. Again, at no time after the extension was granted did the Department indicate that Assistant Secretary Egorin would refuse to cooperate.

On October 2, Select Subcommittee staff followed up regarding Assistant Secretary Egorin’s status and availability for an interview on October 5.¹¹ That same day, Department staff informed the Committees that Assistant Secretary Egorin was still testing positive for COVID-19.¹² The Committees, once again, granted an extension—to October 12—pending a negative test.¹³ Again, the Department gave no indication that Assistant Secretary Egorin would refuse to cooperate.

On October 10, Select Subcommittee staff reminded the Department of Assistant Secretary Egorin’s upcoming transcribed interview.¹⁴ The Department did not immediately respond, but again, gave no indication that the Assistant Secretary was refusing to cooperate.

On October 11, Select Subcommittee staff notified the Department of the logistical details for the interview.¹⁵ The Department’s response gave no indication that Assistant Secretary Egorin would refuse to cooperate.¹⁶ Later that day, Committee and Department staff discussed the scheduled interview via a phone call. The Department stated that the Committees would receive a substantive response that day, but never indicated that Assistant Secretary Egorin would refuse to cooperate.

II. The Committees’ Response to the Department’s October 11, 2023 Letter

On October 11, the Department sent the Committees a letter.¹⁷ This letter included minimal information responsive to the Committees’ outstanding questions. The September 14 Letter requested answers to four questions:

1. *How many new or unique searches or pulls of information were conducted by the Department?*

The Department failed to answer.

2. *What were the dates of these searches or pulls of information?*

¹¹ E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 2, 2023).

¹² E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Oct. 2, 2023).

¹³ E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 2, 2023).

¹⁴ E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 10, 2023).

¹⁵ E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 11, 2023).

¹⁶ E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Oct. 11, 2023).

¹⁷ October 11 Letter, *supra* note 6.

The Department failed to answer.

3. *What was the list of search terms used for these pulls?*

The Department provided the Committees with six search terms but stated that additional unspecified terms were also used. Unfortunately, one of the six search terms disclosed, “2R01AI110964-06,” is arbitrarily limiting. Instead of searching for the original grant number, the Department evidently only searched for the grant renewal, thus cutting off five years of responsive documents. Regardless, the list of search terms provided by the Department is incomplete.

4. *What was the list of custodial inboxes searched?*

The Department provided the Committees with the names of seven custodians who had in some manner had their email accounts searched. Again, the Department promised there would be additional unspecified custodians. Regardless, the list provided by the Department is incomplete.

Why the Department chose to only provide an admittedly incomplete list of custodians and search terms is unknown.

Moreover, instead of answering the Committees’ questions, the Department erroneously stated that the Committees have no “reasonable basis” to ask these questions—which is false—and that the Committees have no “specific informational need” to ask these questions—which is also false.

A. *The Committees have a reasonable basis to suspect the Department is not making a sufficient effort to address legitimate oversight requests.*

As outlined below, the Department is not addressing our legitimate oversight requests and is withholding information and documents without a legal basis:

- The Department redacted information in productions to the Committees that was not redacted in related Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) productions.¹⁸ FOIA does not apply to Congress. There is no legal basis for a Congressional Committee to receive *less* information than a FOIA requestor.
- The Department redacted the names of non-governmental employees and foreign nationals, including members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under the guise of a “concerning escalation of threats and harassment, particularly towards public health professionals and scientists.”¹⁹ The Committees condemn unequivocally any such threats,

¹⁸ See e.g., SSCP_NIH002640 – 2967 where all names of individuals are redacted versus documents obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. where names are, largely, unredacted.

¹⁹ E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic (June 27, 2023).

however, when asked to provide the Committees with information on how the Department ascertained these threats, especially those regarding foreign nationals, the Department failed to answer.

- The Department missed numerous deadlines and, in some cases, simply failed to produce any of the requested documents in response to legitimate oversight requests.
- As discussed above, despite the Committees coordinating schedules, booking rooms, and preparing questions and exhibits, the Department misled the Committees regarding Assistant Secretary Egorin's intent to refuse a voluntary transcribed interview and only informed the Committees of her refusal less than 24 hours prior to her scheduled interview.

These actions reflect bad faith and form a reasonable basis for the Committees' skepticism regarding the Department's compliance efforts.

B. The Committees have a specific informational need to request data responding to the questions outlined in the September 14 Letter.

We have a Constitutional obligation to conduct thorough and vigorous oversight to inform legislation and improve the performance of the Department and its operating divisions. The Department exists because Congress created it and continues to fund it. It is incumbent upon the Department to cooperate with this legitimate oversight, not obstruct it.

Anticipating the possibility that the Biden Administration would obstruct efforts to investigate the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, the House specifically granted the Select Subcommittee the power and authority to investigate:

cooperation by the executive branch and others with Congress, the Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, and others in connection with oversight of the preparedness for and response to the coronavirus pandemic.²⁰

We have explicit jurisdiction, as voted on and passed by the whole of the House, to investigate how the Department is responding, or not, to Congress.

Notwithstanding this explicit jurisdiction, the Committees have a legitimate need to understand how and to what extent the Department is cooperating with its investigations. The Committees must ensure the Department is retaining, securing, and producing all relevant information. This is especially important considering the revelations that at least one senior Department employee intentionally used a personal e-mail address to avoid FOIA and possibly

²⁰ H. Res. 5, 118th Cong. §(4)(a)(2)(ix) (2023) (*emphasis added*).

deleted government records.²¹ Platitudes professing the Department's "good faith" and assurances that political appointees are "work[ing] diligently" on requests without providing corroborative evidence is not sufficient.²²

III. Bipartisan October 20, 2023 Meeting

On October 20, 2023, at the request of and as a further accommodation to the Department, the Committees, again, deferred the transcribed interview of Assistant Secretary Egorin in exchange for a staff-level meeting to address our concerns. Unfortunately, that meeting demonstrated that the Department is not making a sufficient effort to remedy its self-imposed restraints on its ability to respond adequately to Congressional oversight.

The attendees included bipartisan Committee staff, Assistant Secretary Egorin, and two other Department representatives. Despite the promise of a substantive discussion, the Department representatives only had one copy of the September 14 Letter amongst them and brought no other documents. The lack of seriousness and preparation was insulting.

Reflecting the minimal resources the Department dedicates to congressional oversight, the Department informed the Committees that: (1) it would take months to gather answers to the questions posed in the September 14 Letter, (2) while collecting these answers, the Department would have to cease all other cooperation with the Committees, (3) the Department has no way of easily retrieving the search terms used to gather responsive documents because it did not keep track of search terms it used, (4) the Department would not tell the Committees if it had conducted custodial interviews of the individuals identified in the September 14 Letter, (5) the Department does not employ the Department's Office of General Counsel to assist with oversight requests as was the practice in past administrations, and (6) the Department no longer uses a document review or e-discovery software to assist with document productions to Congress.

At the Department's insistence, the meeting ended before the Committees could ask all their questions. It is now clear that the Department, under the Biden Administration, has made a deliberate decision to create a system that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to respond to Congressional oversight requests. In addition, in prior administrations, the Department and/or its operating divisions have detailed or hired additional staff as needed to respond adequately to a high volume of Congressional oversight requests.

The only conceivable explanation for why the Department would deliberately cripple its ability to respond to oversight requests is that its political leadership wants to obstruct Congress. The Department's continued assertions that it is working in "good faith" with Congress are outrageous when compared to how it actually responds to oversight requests. The Department's course of conduct over several months in response to our oversight requests is not reasonable and

²¹ Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to David Morens, M.D., Senior Scientific Advisor, Office of the Dir., Nat'l Inst. Of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (June 29, 2023).

²² October 11 Letter, *supra* note 6.

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lacks a legal basis. There is no evidence that the Department is willing to take steps to address the Committees' concerns.

The above facts and unanswered questions necessitate and support this subpoena for testimony. We look forward to Assistant Secretary Egorin's cooperation.

Pursuant to clause 2(m)(1)(B) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives authorizes committees "to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it considers necessary." Clause 2(m)(3)(A)(i) further provides that the power to authorize and issue such subpoenas "may be delegated to the chair of the committee." Rule 12(g) of the Rule of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability delegates such authority to that Committee's chair. Section 4(a)(3)(A)(ii) of H. Res. 5 also authorizes the chair of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability to authorize and issue subpoenas to be returned to the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic.

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic is authorized to investigate "the origins of the Coronavirus pandemic, including but not limited to the Federal Government's funding of gain-of function research," "executive branch policies, deliberations, decisions, activities, and internal and external communications related to the coronavirus pandemic," and "cooperation by the executive branch and others with Congress, the Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, and others in connection with oversight of the preparedness for and response to the coronavirus pandemic" under H. Res. 5.

The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is authorized to investigate "any matter" at "any time" pursuant to House Rule X.

The Committee on Energy and Commerce is the authorizing committee with jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for public health service agencies, including the National Institutes of Health and the entities it funds, as well as federal biomedical research and development.

Sincerely,



Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M.
Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Pandemic




James Comer
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and
Accountability


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Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Chair
Committee on Energy and
Commerce



H. Morgan Griffith
Chair
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations



Brett Guthrie
Chair
Subcommittee on Health

cc: The Honorable Raul Ruiz, M.D., Ranking Member
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Accountability

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr. Ranking Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Kathy Castor, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

The Honorable Anna Eshoo, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Health

Appendix I

As an accommodation to the Department, the Committees are willing to table some Requests in exchange for production of certain documents already collected and produced to other entities, further limit the responsive time frame for Request (6), further scope Request (4), provide priority search terms for each request in this section (Appendix III), and stagger production based on priority custodians (Appendix II). However, considering the already very limited scope of Request (7), the Committees are unwilling to amend that request. Finally, the Committees are also committed to continuing to work with the Department to protect its interests while serving the Committees' interests in information pertaining to unfunded grant proposals. These are all significant accommodations to the Department and have been provided at the request of the Department.

THE COMMITTEES' FEBRUARY 2 AND 13, 2023 LETTERS

I. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

1. As NIH provided to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General in approximately October or November 2021, the 32 GB production, totaling more than 20,000 emails, no later than **November 8, 2023**.
2. All documents and communications between and among NIH, NIAID, and/or HHS employees and EcoHealth employees, or affiliated individuals, regarding the letter in *The Lancet* entitled "Statement in support of the scientists, public health professionals, and medical professionals of China combatting COVID-19."

II. The February 1, 2020, Teleconference and Proximal Origin

3. All documents and communications regarding, referring to, or relating to the February 1, 2020 teleconference regarding COVID-19.

This request should be construed broadly to include documents and communications including but not limited to other government agencies and non-governmental individuals.

4. All documents and communications regarding the drafting, publication, and critical reception of "The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2" published in *Nature Medicine* on March 17, 2020.

This request should be construed broadly to include documents and communications including but not limited to other government agencies and non-governmental individuals.

It should also be construed to include documents and communications regarding the drafting, preparation, and critical reception of “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” published in *Virological* on February 16, 2020.

III. The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)

5. All documents and communications between and among NIH, NIAID, and/or HHS employees regarding the WIV from November 1, 2019 through present.
6. All documents and communications between and among NIH and/or NIAID employees and employees of the WIV from January 1, 2014, through present. The likely responsive e-mail addresses would end with “@wh.iov.cn.”

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE’S JULY 13, 2023 LETTER

7. All notes in the custody and control of the Department or any of its sub-agencies resulting from the February 1, 2020, conference call.

The existence of contemporaneous notes regarding the February 1 conference call was confirmed to the Select Subcommittee by [REDACTED], who was on the call.

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE’S AUGUST 3, 2023 LETTER

On October 19, 2023, the Department provided the Committees with the unfunded application numbers, titles, received by dates, and locations of research for two proposals that were responsive to our previous requests.

Understanding the Department’s concerns regarding proprietary and business confidential information and as an accommodation to the Department, the Committees are willing to view the full proposals *in camera*. Accordingly, the Committees will contact the Department to schedule the review.

Appendix II

For the Requests (2)-(7) in Appendix I, the Department should prioritize the following custodians and follow the corresponding production schedule:

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the following custodians as soon as possible but no later than **November 9, 2023**:

1. Dr. Michael Lauer;
2. Dr. Emily Erbelding; and
3. Dr. Erik Stemmy.

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the following custodians as soon as possible but no later than **November 16, 2023**:

1. Dr. Hugh Auchincloss;
2. Mr. Greg Folkers; and
3. Mr. Gray Handley.

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the following custodians as soon as possible but no later than **November 23, 2023**:

1. Dr. David Morens;
2. Dr. Cliff Lane; and
3. Dr. Ping Chen.

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the following custodians as soon as possible but no later than **November 30, 2023**:

1. Dr. Anthony Fauci;
2. Dr. Francis Collins; and
3. Dr. Lawrence Tabak.

Appendix III

For the Requests (2)-(7) in Appendix I, the Department should prioritize the following search terms, names, and entities to include any iterations thereof:

Terms

1. Coronavirus;
2. Novel;
3. CoV;
4. Novel bat-CoV;
5. SARS;
6. SARS-like;
7. SARS-related;
8. Zoonotic;
9. Market;
10. Lab;
11. Origin;
12. Outbreak;
13. Pangolin;
14. Pneumonia;
15. Conspiracy;
16. Genome;
17. Sequence;
18. Backbone;
19. Furin Cleavage Site;
20. Polybasic Cleavage Site;
21. Codon;
22. ACE2;
23. Spike Protein;
24. S1;
25. S2;
26. O-linked Glycans;
27. Receptor Binding Domain;
28. Serial Passage;
29. Cell Culture;
30. Tissue Culture;
31. Gain of Function;
32. Manipulated;
33. Modified;
34. Recombination;
35. Weapon;
36. P3CO;
37. Potential Pandemic Pathogen;
38. Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogen;
39. Dual Use;

40. COVID-19;
41. SARS-CoV-2;
42. China;
43. Wuhan;
44. Hubei;
45. Huanan;
46. R01AI110964;
47. Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence;
48. DUNS Number: 077090066;
49. Lancet;
50. Statement in support of the scientists, public health professionals, and medical professionals of China combatting COVID-19;
51. Teleconference;
52. Nature;
53. Nature Medicine;
54. Virological;
55. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2

Names

1. Dr. Francis Collins;
2. Dr. Anthony Fauci;
3. Dr. Lawrence Tabak;
4. Dr. Hugh Auchincloss;
5. Mr. Greg Folkers;
6. Dr. Cliff Lane;
7. Dr. Ping Chen;
8. Mr. Gray Handley;
9. Dr. Erik Stemmy;
10. Dr. Michael Lauer;
11. Dr. Emily Erbelding;
12. Dr. David Morens;
13. Dr. Jeremy Farrar;
14. Dr. Kristian Andersen;
15. Dr. Robert Garry;
16. Dr. W. Ian Lipkin;
17. Dr. Edward Holmes;
18. Dr. Michael Farzan;
19. Dr. Christian Drosten;
20. Dr. Ron Fouchier;
21. Dr. Marion Koopmans;
22. Dr. Ralph Baric;
23. Dr. Peter Daszak;
24. Dr. James LeDuc;
25. Dr. Charles Calisher;
26. Dr. Dennis Carroll;

27. Dr. Rita Colwell;
28. Dr. Ronald B. Corley;
29. Dr. Luis Enjuanes;
30. Dr. Hume Field;
31. Dr. Josei Golding;
32. Dr. Alexander Gorbalenya;
33. Dr. Bart Haagmans;
34. Dr. James M. Hughes;
35. Dr. William B. Karesh;
36. Dr. Gerlad T. Keusch;
37. Dr. Sai Kit Lam;
38. Dr. Juan Lubroth;
39. Dr. John S. Mackenzie;
40. Dr. Larry Madoff;
41. Dr. Jonna Mazet;
42. Dr. Peter Palese;
43. Dr. Stanley Perlman;
44. Dr. Leo Poon;
45. Dr. Bernard Roizman;
46. Dr. Linda Siau;
47. Dr. Kanta Subbatao;
48. Dr. Mike Turner;
49. Dr. Victor Dzau;
50. Dr. David Asher;
51. Ms. Adrienne Hallett;
52. Dr. Lanying Du;
53. Dr. Zhang Yongzhen;
54. Dr. Shi Zhengli;
55. Dr. Ben Hu;
56. Dr. Yu Ping;
57. Dr. Yan Zhu; and
58. Dr. Zhou Yusen.

Entities

1. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc;
2. New York Blood Center;
3. Georgia State University;
4. Wuhan Institute of Virology;
5. Wuhan Center for Disease Control;
6. Wuhan University;
7. Chinese Academy of Sciences;
8. People's Liberation Army; and
9. Academy of Military Medical Sciences;