

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

MAJORITY (202) 225-5074

MINORITY (202) 225-5051

<https://oversight.house.gov>

May 6, 2024

The Honorable Avril Haines
Director
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2201 C St. NW
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Director Haines:

As the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence-related national security issues,¹ the Director of National Intelligence must ensure that the Intelligence Community (IC) is well prepared to identify and address political warfare² from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the Party). As the leader of the seventeen other members of the IC,³ the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) must effectively shepherd the IC to ensure that each member is appropriately addressing CCP warfare against America. As part of a broad investigation into the work federal agencies are doing to protect Americans from the CCP's influence operations, the Committee on Oversight and Accountability (Committee) is investigating CCP interference and what ODNI is doing to synchronize the IC to protect American communities from the threat.

¹ Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence, *Who We Are*, <https://www.odni.gov/index.php/who-we-are> (last visited April 1, 2024).

² "Political warfare seeks to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to one's own political-military objectives." Mark Stokes, *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics*, Project 2049 Inst., at 2 (Oct. 14, 2013).

³ Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence, *Members of the IC*, <https://www.odni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic> (last visited April 1, 2024) (The IC is comprised of 18 organizations, including: (1) ODNI; (2) the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); (4) the National Security Agency (NSA); (5) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); (6) the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the intelligence offices within the (7) Army, (8) Navy, (9) Marine Corps, (10) Air Force, and (11) Space Force; (12) the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence; (13) the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis and (14) U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of Justice's (15) Federal Bureau of Investigation and (16) the Drug Enforcement Administration's Office of National Security Intelligence; (17) the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and (18) the Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis).

Broader Committee Investigation

The Committee is conducting oversight of the federal government’s work to protect the American people from CCP political warfare and nefarious influence operations. For decades, the CCP has sought to infiltrate and influence every aspect of American society.⁴ The CCP’s goal is plain: defeat the “main enemy,” which counterintelligence officials have identified as America.⁵ The fronts are multiple; according to the CCP itself: “[t]he battlefield will be everywhere.”⁶ And the tools are myriad, with the “united front”⁷ leading as one of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC)⁸ “magic weapons,”⁹ as described by General Secretary Xi Jinping,¹⁰ to advance the Party’s aim of global domination.¹¹ United front work (UFW), which may be executed by the United Front Work Department (UFWD) or elsewhere in the Party, is a “unique blend of engagement, influence activities, and intelligence operations” that the CCP uses to “influence other countries’ policy toward the PRC and to gain access to advanced foreign technology.”¹² UFW “generally involves covert activity and is a form of interference that aids the CCP’s rise.”¹³ United front “networks” are used “to carry out relationship-focused influence campaigns through a multitude of proxies.”¹⁴

Despite years of false promises to the West, the CCP openly seeks to achieve its destructive ambition. In 1999, two People’s Liberation Army Air Force colonels authored *Unrestricted Warfare*, which has been described as a strategic military vision for the PRC to defeat America through political warfare.¹⁵ Retired Brig. Gen. Robert Spalding, who has served in senior positions in strategy and diplomacy with the U.S. Departments of Defense and State for decades, characterizes the book as “the main blueprint for China’s efforts to unseat America as

⁴ See generally Constantine C. Menges, *China The Gathering Threat* (2005); H.R. Rep. No. 105-851 (1999) (“Cox Report”); Robert Spalding, *War Without Rules* (2022); Col. Grant Newsham, *When China Attacks: A Warning to America* (2023); Kerry K. Gershaneck, *Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting”* (2020); see also Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, *China’s Influence & America’s Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance*, Hoover Inst. (2019).

⁵ Menges, *supra* note 4; Gershaneck, *supra* note 4 (“The PRC is engaged in war against the United States. It is not mere competition or malign influence, but war by PRC definition.”); Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 60 (The CCP “seeks global domination” and “will fight its main enemy, the United States, to achieve it.”).

⁶ Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsu, *Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America* (PLA Lit. & Arts Pub. House 1999) (China) (military colonels describing twenty-four varieties of warfare).

⁷ “While the CCP’s United Front Work Department has functional responsibility for these [warfare] operations and activities, PRC united front work is a task of all CCP agencies and members.” Gershaneck, *supra* note 4, at 22.

⁸ It is essential to understand that Xi Jinping has removed any “veneer of separation between the [CCP] and the Chinese state.” Gershaneck, *supra* note 4, at 43 (quoting Ann-Marie Brady, *Exploit Every Rift: United Front Work Goes Global*, in David Gitter et al., *Party Watch Annual Report*, Ctr. for Adv. China Res. (2018)).

⁹ Ann-Marie Brady, *Magic Weapons: China’s political influence activities under Xi Jinping*, Wilson Ctr. (Sept. 18, 2017); see also Sel. Comm. on the Chinese Communist Party, *Memorandum: United Front 101*, at 7 (“United Front 101 Memo”).

¹⁰ Alex Joske, *The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system*, Austl. Strategic Pol’y Inst. (Jun. 09, 2020) (quoting Xi Jinping at 2015 Central United Front Work Meeting).

¹¹ See, e.g., Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 43 (“The People’s Republic of China may settle for dominance rather than occupation, but it does indeed aim to rule us all.”).

¹² United Front 101 Memo, *supra* note 9, at 1.

¹³ Joske, *The party speaks for you*, *supra* note 10, at 19.

¹⁴ Alex Joske, *Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World*, at 63 (2022).

¹⁵ Gershaneck, *supra* note 4.

the world's economy, political, and ideological leader," which "shows exactly how a totalitarian nation set out to dominate the West through a comprehensive, long-term strategy that includes everything from corporate sabotage to cyberwarfare to dishonest diplomacy; from violations of international trade law and intellectual property law to calculated abuses of the global financial system."¹⁶ Kerry Gershaneck, former counterintelligence officer who wrote a seminal book on combatting PRC Political Warfare, has explained that *Unrestricted Warfare* details CCP use of "any methods" where "the boundaries between war and non-war and between military and non-military affairs [have] systemically broken down."¹⁷ To successfully combat these highly organized and pervasive warfares spawned by China, federal agencies must first recognize and understand them.

The CCP "know[s] the strength of the American people, of the American idea, and that's why China has launched so many warfares to try to weaken us, divide us, and get us to hate ourselves and each other."¹⁸ Retired Col. Grant Newsham, former U.S. Marine Liaison Officer to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and U.S. Foreign Service Officer, has advised that "the way out of this is to rediscover why we are an exceptional country, get to know each other better, and fight side by side."¹⁹

As all Americans are targets of the PRC's warfare,²⁰ federal agencies have responsibilities to (1) conduct outreach to citizens about the dangers they may encounter, and (2) provide appropriate incentives for Americans to proactively protect themselves—their communities, schools, houses of worship, businesses, finances, food, and more—from the threat. Federal agencies must prepare Americans to "take action."²¹ To stop the CCP's "destructive actions," retired Brig. Gen. Spalding advises that it will "take macrolevel strategic changes by our government, but also microlevel actions by individuals, businesses and other civic institutions."²² The Committee is surveying each agency's role to secure Americans and their communities.

¹⁶ Spalding, *War Without Rules*, *supra* note 4, at xii; *see also* Robert Spalding, *Stealth War*, at 12-13 (2019) (*Unrestricted Warfare* "should be required reading for all branches of the US government and for business leaders, because it outlines, in no uncertain terms, the strategy behind China's policies," including stating that the "new principles of war" are "no longer 'using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will,' but rather are 'using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests.'").

¹⁷ Gershaneck, *supra* note 4, at 16 (quoting Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangu, *supra* note 6, at 6-7).

¹⁸ Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 341.

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ "The Three Warfares, the traditional foundation of PRC political warfare, include public opinion/media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare." Gershaneck, *supra* note 4. It "requires efforts to unify military and civilian thinking, divide the enemy into factions, weaken the enemy's combat power, and organize legal offensives." Elsa Kania, *China Brief: The PLA's Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares*, Jamestown Found. (Aug. 22, 2016).

²¹ Spalding, *War Without Rules*, *supra* note 4, at 214.

²² *Id.*; *see also* Peter Mattis & Matt Schrader, *America Can't Beat Beijing's Tech Theft With Racial Profiling*, War on the Rocks (July 23, 2019) ("The U.S. government's difficulties in telling a convincing story about the Chinese Communist Party point to a[n] important step: addressing a serious lack of 'China literacy,' both within the enforcement portions of the federal bureaucracy, and in U.S. society as a whole.").

Congress has recognized the threat posed by the PRC for some time. Notably, in 1999, the U.S. House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China concluded that in the preceding decade, the PRC used a "variety of techniques including espionage, controlled commercial entities, and a network of individuals that engage in contact with scientists, business people and academics" as part of its warfare operations.²³

With varying degrees of effort and success, federal agencies have sought to address the CCP's attack on what Col. Newsham has aptly described as "[t]he core of America."²⁴ However, the threat is grave and work must be done across agencies to protect America.²⁵ Peter Mattis, former staff director of the Congressional-Executive Commission of China and counterintelligence analyst at the CIA counsels that

Only by being clear in public about the actions and intentions of the Chinese party-state, and being publicly accountable for the actions the U.S. government takes in response, will the United States be able to address Beijing's challenges while upholding our democratic commitment to fair, transparent justice for all Americans.²⁶

To this end, the Committee is conducting this investigation and implores each federal agency to uphold its duty to the American communities for whom they are responsible.

The Intelligence Community Must Step Up

The CCP is waging a non-kinetic war against the U.S.—and the U.S. is falling behind. As described herein, ODNI appears aware of this fact. The question remains whether ODNI is effectively conveying the message to the IC and other federal agencies to establish a cohesive government-wide strategy to defeat CCP political warfare.

China is using a multitude of tactics to destroy the U.S. from within, including political warfare, psychological warfare, economic warfare, media warfare, lawfare, and many other forms of warfare.²⁷ To reverse the infiltration, the IC must follow its "clear charge" to

²³ Cox Report, *supra* note 4, at xxxiii; *see generally* Menges, *supra* note 4.

²⁴ Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 33.

²⁵ *See* Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 309 ("We need to know, value, protect and build the strengths of the United States of America, and shed the light of truth on the corruption, in every sense of the word," of the CCP. "That could mean in discussions with family, community, at school or wherever that understanding needs bolstering." Education courses on PRC political warfare would benefit "[a]ny decision-makers who work with China."); *see* Gershaneck, *supra* note 4, at 153 (outlining such courses to "build[] internal defenses").

²⁶ Mattis & Schrader, *supra* note 22.

²⁷ Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 49; *see generally* Peter Mattis & Matthew Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer, 4 (2019) (The CCP definitions for intelligence and security "began to blend in Chinese party and state organizations," following events in the PRC that threatened to destroy communism in China; intelligence is "defined as useful information and analytic products to guide decisions regarding an enemy," and security as "protective measures against hostile acts.").

“[i]ntegrate the domestic and foreign dimensions of U.S. intelligence so that there are no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security.”²⁸

If all of the members of the IC do not recognize the threat the CCP poses, it cannot effectively protect America from these warfare operations. And according to James Fanell, a retired U.S. Navy Captain and the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the IC has not properly understood and addressed the threat for some time. Fanell has advised that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed to adequately recognize the threat posed by the PRC and has failed to balance against it to defeat the threat.²⁹ This continued through “a long period” of “‘threat deflation,’ where US dominance and post 9/11 diversion of attention toward the War on Terror, as well as the PRC’s masterful political warfare campaign, prevented the US national security community from meeting the peer competitive threat of the PRC and the requirements of high intensity warfare.”³⁰ According to Fanell and Bradley Thayer, a founding member of the Committee on Present Danger China, “the failure of the US intelligence community to identify the PRC as an existential threat greatly weakened the ability of national security decision-makers to identify and act against the threat.”³¹

In 1999, during a period of threat deflation in the U.S., the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China determined “that the Intelligence Community is insufficiently focused on the threat posed by PRC intelligence and the targeted effort to obtain militarily useful technology from the United States.”³² Concerningly, that sentiment has remained true for many years but for a few recent exceptions.

Between 2016 and 2020, as described by Col. Newsham, the United States “got Beijing’s attention with tariffs, intellectual property theft prosecutions, and pressure on major Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE.”³³ Additionally, the Government “tightened Committee on Foreign Investment in U.S. (CFIUS) restrictions on Chinese investment in the United States.”³⁴ More broadly, the Trump Administration successfully acknowledged and confronted CCP political warfare tactics. The Trump Administration was persuasively outspoken on, among other things, “maintaining dominance in space and the U.S. Space Force; forming a global coalition against technology transfer threats; reducing U.S. dependence on critical materials; rebuilding the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific,” and “rejecting China’s Belt and Road

²⁸ Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, *National Intelligence Strategy*, at 2 (Aug. 10, 2023).

²⁹ James E. Fanell & Bradley A. Thayer, *Embracing Communist China: America’s Greatest Strategic Failure*, at xix (2024) (The authors assert that these two failures are causing the U.S. to be “at risk of losing its dominant position in global politics.”).

³⁰ *Id.* at xix, 16 (“Threat deflation is a rare condition for states as they have a tendency to accurately identify and assess threats or to overestimate them. Threat deflation is the consistent underestimation of the threat one state poses to another.”).

³¹ *Id.* at xxii.

³² Cox Report, *supra* note 4, at xxxiv.

³³ Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 169.

³⁴ *Id.*

Initiative.”³⁵ These notable exceptions prioritized and enhanced American security from CCP political and economic warfare—and they were echoed across party lines. These successes and lessons need to be institutionalized and applied to the IC. Otherwise, the CCP will continue to utilize non-kinetic warfare tactics—because they’ve been successful—until the IC coalesces to identify gaps in U.S. national security to protect America.

Notably, while he was Director of National Intelligence, John Ratcliffe authored an op-ed in the *Wall Street Journal*, entitled “China Is National Security Threat No. 1,” sharing with the public that if he “could communicate one thing to the American people from [his] unique vantage point, [overseeing the intelligence agencies,] it is that the People’s Republic of China poses the greatest threat to America today, and the greatest threat to democracy and freedom world-wide since World War II.”³⁶ This kind of direct and honest messaging about the CCP is exactly what the American people deserve from their leaders in identifying and countering the threat.

Recognizing the Specific CCP Threat

Since Director Ratcliffe’s tenure, ODNI appears to recognize China presents one of the greatest risks to U.S. national security. In March 2023, you testified “the CCP presents both the leading and most consequential threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally, and its intelligence-specific ambitions and capabilities make it for us our most serious and consequential intelligence rival.”³⁷ In August 2023, ODNI released the “2023 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS),” which “provides strategic direction” for the IC over a four-year period.³⁸ As stated in the NIS, “[t]he PRC is the only U.S. competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.”³⁹

³⁵ Michael Pillsbury, *A Guide to the Trump Administration’s China Policy Statements*, Hudson Institute, Introduction (Aug. 2020).

³⁶ John Ratcliffe, *China Is National Security Threat No. 1: Resisting Beijing’s attempt to reshape and dominate the world is the challenge of our generation*, *Wall Street Journal* (Dec. 3, 2020).

³⁷ Olivia Gazis & Caitlin Yilek, *China “most consequential threat” to U.S. national security, top intelligence official says*, *CBS News* (Mar. 8, 2023).

³⁸ Press Release, Office of the Director of Nat’l Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence Avril D. Haines Releases the 2023 National Intelligence Strategy for the Intelligence Community (Aug. 10, 2023); National Intelligence Strategy, *supra* note 28, at 1 (The 2023 NIS has several general goals: (1) “position the IC for intensifying strategic competition” which specifically mentions the PRC; (2) “recruit, develop, and retain a talented and diverse workforce that operates as a United Community”; (3) “define interoperable and innovative solutions at scale”; (4) “diversify, expand, and strengthen partnerships”; (5) “expand IC capabilities and expertise on transnational challenges”; (6) and “enhance resilience.”).

³⁹ National Intelligence Strategy, *supra* note 28, at 5.

In March 2024, ODNI released to the public the “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” (ATA).⁴⁰ In fewer than 40 pages, “China” is referenced 90 times.⁴¹ The ATA acknowledges the increasing competitiveness of the PRC in a variety of capacities: technology, nuclear capabilities, military, space, the cyber realm, and influence and intelligence operations.⁴² ODNI has warned that the PRC seeks to become a technological superpower to achieve economic, political, and military benefits.⁴³ This includes cyber “intrusions” targeting U.S. citizens and non-citizens outside of the PRC, including journalists, dissidents, and others that may be critical of CCP ideology and actions.⁴⁴ The CCP’s sophisticated influence operations also extend to the Internet, and the CCP has begun experimenting with generative artificial intelligence (AI) and social media to engage in psychological warfare against the U.S.⁴⁵ As stated in the ATA, the CCP “will attempt to preempt challenges to its reputation and legitimacy, undercutting U.S. influence, driving wedges between Washington and its partners, and fostering global norms that favor its authoritarian system.”⁴⁶

ODNI’s warning that the CCP is the “most consequential threat” to the U.S. is critical and should be heeded by the entire IC and all federal agencies. Yet the IC has not yet adapted to address and defeat the CCP’s contemporary reconnaissance tactics. As explained by former China-focused intelligence official Anna Puglisi, “Our system is really set up to fight a nation-state. It focuses on things that are illegal, things that are a direct military application. What we’re seeing now, and especially the focus in academic, in commerce,” is “a very, very different threat than we had in the past.”⁴⁷ Accordingly, ODNI must lead not only the IC, but all federal agencies in identifying and combatting CCP warfare.

To prevent CCP warfare against American communities, the IC and other federal agencies must organize to effectively engage with Americans and defend American interests. ODNI must proactively communicate the threat posed by the CCP to the IC, federal agencies,

⁴⁰ Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, ODNI Releases 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Mar. 11, 2024); Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Feb. 5, 2024) (ODNI’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community states that “[t]his annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 116-260).” Section 617 of FY21 Act, titled “Annual Reports on Worldwide Threats,” only requires that the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the IC, submit the annual report to the “appropriate congressional committees.”).

⁴¹ See Annual Threat Assessment, *supra* note 40 (With the exclusion of the table of contents, a keyword cite reveals that “China” was referenced in the report 90 times.).

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ *Id.*, at 9.

⁴⁴ *Id.*, at 11.

⁴⁵ *Id.*, at 12. Col. Newsham has explained that “[u]ltimately, psychological warfare is the most important of the political warfare techniques.” Newsham, *supra* note 4, at 64. Specifically, it “seeks to change an opponent’s thinking and behavior in a way that is favorable to PRC interests and objectives. Through non-kinetic means, it aims to weaken the opponent’s will and ability to resist. Successful Chinese psychological warfare makes the other side more accommodating and less willing or able to resist.” *Id.*

⁴⁶ Annual Threat Assessment, *supra* note 40, at 7.

⁴⁷ Greg Myre, *As U.S. spies look to the future, one target stands out: China*, NPR (Nov. 16, 2021).


and the public. To assist the Committee in investigating this matter, we request a briefing from ODNI with Committee staff. Please contact Committee staff as soon as possible, but no later than May 13, 2024. This briefing should address the following:

1. How ODNI strives to inspire and equip Americans to strengthen their communities, innovate, and create the technologies and phenomena that will secure a strong and prosperous future for our nation;
2. How ODNI leadership ensures from the top down that all Department employees are aware of CCP warfare and influence operations against America and are equipped to address them wherever they arise;
3. ODNI efforts to promote greater interoperability among the IC to address CCP political warfare against America;
4. ODNI efforts to establish and implement a cohesive government-wide strategy to identify and defeat CCP warfare against America;
5. An update on ODNI's push to establish unified IC procurement authorities, centralized solicitation systems, and a community-wide contrasting system – as it relates to Chinese influence in procurement;
6. How ODNI and members of the IC plan to exchange information with non-state actors to prevent cyber threats to critical infrastructure, while simultaneously protecting Americans, and their personal data, and avoiding the inadvertent passing of secure information possessed by the IC to the CCP;
7. IC efforts to ascertain threats and vulnerabilities to supply chains, mitigate risks to government and industry partners' infrastructure, and protect supply chains from CCP interference;
8. A list of federal agencies and entities that receive the National Intelligence Strategy, how the National Intelligence Strategy is transmitted to these organizations, and whether any response or further engagement is received or required by ODNI or the IC;
9. A list of federal agencies and entities that receive the Annual Threat Assessment, how the Annual Threat Assessment is transmitted to these organizations, and whether any response or further engagement is received or required by ODNI or the IC;
10. The role of the National Intelligence Officer for China, and information pertaining to communication, trainings, or briefings with members of the IC or federal agencies regarding CCP political warfare;

11. IC engagement with communities throughout America affected by CCP political warfare through communication, trainings, or briefings;
12. Section 7318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 established a counterintelligence office within the Department of Agriculture. The Committee seeks to ascertain:
 - a. ODNI's rationale for establishing a counterintelligence office within the Department of Agriculture;
 - b. Whether ODNI has considered implementing counterintelligence offices within other federal agencies;
13. ODNI recommendations of how federal agencies can harmonize existing national security tools to better defeat CCP warfare against America;
14. ODNI recommendations of how federal agencies can support programs and employees with PRC and CCP expertise to protect America;
15. ODNI's assessment of the importance in specifically identifying the CCP threat and its unique characteristics as distinct from the threats posed by other foreign adversaries;
16. ODNI efforts to ensure that members of the IC and other federal agencies are not themselves influenced by the CCP; and
17. A list of trainings, briefings, and other forms of outreach by ODNI to educate government, cultural, and business leaders regarding CCP political warfare between January 2023 and May 2024.

Please contact the Committee on Oversight and Accountability staff at (202) 225-5074 to schedule the staff briefing. The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is the principal oversight committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate "any matter" at "any time" under House Rule X. Thank you for your prompt attention to this important investigation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "James Comer". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

James Comer
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Accountability

The Honorable Avril Haines
May 6, 2024
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cc: The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Accountability