

BOSTON UNIVERSITY CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED

From: [Hotez, Peter Jay](#)
To: [Morens, David \(NIH/NIAID\) \[E\]](#)
Cc: [Roberts, Rich](#); [Peter Daszak](#); [Keusch, Gerald T.](#); [Robert Kessler](#); [Jeffrey Sturchio](#)
Subject: Re: Jeff Sachs.
Date: Monday, June 28, 2021 6:14:49 PM

Such a crazy world, I've all sent many emails to Tony over the years, but I don't think anything incriminating

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, FASTMH, FAAP

Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)
Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology
Co-Head, Section of Pediatric Tropical Medicine
Health Policy Scholar
Baylor College of Medicine

Texas Children's Hospital Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics
Co-Director, [Texas Children's Hospital Center for Vaccine Development](#)

University Professor
Department of Biology, Baylor University

Faculty Fellow, Hagler Institute for Advanced Study
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
Texas A&M University

Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty and Adjunct Professor of Bioengineering, Rice University
Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of Public Health

Founding Editor-in-Chief, PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases

E-mail: [REDACTED]@bcm.edu

Twitter: [@peterhotez](#)

Skype: [REDACTED]

LinkedIn [Peter Hotez](#)

Amazon Author Center: <https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48>


Like us on Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/BCMNationalSchoolOfTropicalMedicine/>

Executive Assistant: [Douglas Soriano](#)

[REDACTED]@bcm.edu

Phone: [REDACTED]

cid:image002.png@01D2BDA5.C66E3310



Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 28, 2021, at 4:10 PM, Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]@gmail.com> wrote:

Sorry! On 18 April 2020, Peter Daszak emailed me and Tony, congratulating Tony on standing up for science. That email somehow fell into the hands of the Congressman, probably via a FOIA of someone who didn't delete it, as I did (delete all of Peter's emails and others relating to origin) when the shit

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started hitting the fan.

Anyway the Congressman got a copy of Peter D's email from someone at NIH, and he now wants to get any reply Tony and I or anyone else may have sent back to Peter. Mine was erased long ago (I verified that today) and I feel pretty sure Tony's was too. The best way to avoid FOIA hassles is to delete all emails when you learn a subject is getting sensitive... In any case, there is nothing here except opportunities to hassle, harrass, and huff and puff....

d

On 6/28/2021 4:56 PM, Hotez, Peter Jay wrote:

Which Peter? From April 18?

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, FASTMH, FAAP

Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)

Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology

Co-Head, Section of Pediatric Tropical Medicine

Health Policy Scholar

Baylor College of Medicine

Texas Children's Hospital Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics

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Department of Biology, Baylor University

Faculty Fellow, Hagler Institute for Advanced Study

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Texas A&M University

Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty and Adjunct Professor of Bioengineering,
Rice University

Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of Public Health

Founding Editor-in-Chief, PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases

E-mail: [REDACTED] [@bcm.edu](#)

Twitter: [@peterhotez](#)

Skype: [REDACTED]

LinkedIn [Peter Hotez](#)

Amazon Author Center: <https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48>

Like us on Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/BCMNationalSchoolOfTropicalMedicine/>

Executive Assistant: [Douglas Soriano](#)

[REDACTED] [bcm.edu](#)

Phone: [REDACTED]

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cid:image002.png@01D2BDA5.C66E3310

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 28, 2021, at 12:48 PM, Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED]@gmail.com> wrote:

PS, I forgot to mention it was from CVongressman Steube.... d

On 6/28/2021 1:42 PM, Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] wrote:

Peter, FYI, Tony and I just a minute ago got FOIA'd regarding an email of yours from 18 April 2020, sent from you to Tony and me, thanking Tony for standing up for you. He wants to get any follow up emails. Not sure what I have but I am sure nothing of any great interest. I am sure same for Tony. Just FYI and for your own records management practices, if you catch my drift. david

On 6/28/2021 11:29 AM, Hotez, Peter Jay wrote:

Podcast I think out tomorrow

This from Bloomberg

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-06-27/did-covid-come-from-a-lab-scientist-at-wuhan-institute-speaks-out>

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, FASTMH, FAAP
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Faculty Fellow, Hagler Institute for Advanced Study
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
Texas A&M University

Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty and
Adjunct Professor of Bioengineering, Rice University

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Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of
Public Health

Founding Editor-in-Chief, PLoS Neglected Tropical
Diseases

E-mail: [REDACTED]@bcm.edu

Twitter: @peterhotez

Skype: [REDACTED]

Linkedin [Peter Hotez](#)

Amazon Author

Center: [https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-
Hotez/e/B001HPIC48](https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48)

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Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/BCMNationalSchoolOfTropicalMedicine/>

Executive Assistant: [Douglas Soriano](#)

[REDACTED]@bcm.edu

Phone: [REDACTED]

cid:image002.png@01D2BDA5.C66E3310



Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 28, 2021, at 10:16 AM, Roberts,
Rich [REDACTED]@neb.com> wrote:

Peter:

Could you send a link please?

Rich

Richard J. Roberts
New England Biolabs
240 County Road
Ipswich, MA 01938-2723
USA
Tel: [REDACTED]
Fax: [REDACTED]
email: [REDACTED]@neb.com

From: Hotez, Peter Jay <[REDACTED]@bcm.edu>

Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 11:15 AM

To: Peter Daszak

[REDACTED]@ecohealthalliance.org>

Cc: Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]@neb.com>;

Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]@bu.edu>; David

Morens [REDACTED]@gmail.com>; Robert

Kessler [REDACTED]@ecohealthalliance.org>;

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Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]@msn.com>

Subject: Re: Jeff Sachs.

EXTERNAL SENDER

I just did a "new abnormal" podcast with Molly Jong-Fast that throws cold water on GOF or lab leaks, and reinforces Dr Anderson's interview just out in Bloomberg. So maybe change the tide in that way

**Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, FASTMH,
FAAP**

Dean, [National School of Tropical
Medicine](#)

Professor, Departments of Pediatrics,
Molecular Virology & Microbiology
Co-Head, Section of Pediatric Tropical
Medicine
Health Policy Scholar
Baylor College of Medicine

Texas Children's Hospital Endowed
Chair of Tropical Pediatrics
Co-Director, [Texas Children's Hospital
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University Professor
Department of Biology, Baylor
University

Faculty Fellow, Hagler Institute for
Advanced Study
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of
International Affairs
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Poverty and Adjunct Professor of
Bioengineering, Rice University
Adjunct Professor, University of Texas,
School of Public Health

Founding Editor-in-Chief, PLoS
Neglected Tropical Diseases

E-mail: [REDACTED]@bcm.edu

Twitter: @peterhotez

Skype: [REDACTED]

LinkedIn [Peter Hotez](#)

Amazon Author

Center: [https://www.amazon.com/Peter-
J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48](https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48)

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Executive Assistant: [Douglas Soriano](#)

[REDACTED]@bcm.edu

Phone: [REDACTED]



Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 28, 2021, at 10:12 AM,
Peter Daszak
[REDACTED]@ecohealthalliance.org>
wrote:

*****CAUTION:*** This email is not
from a BCM Source. Only click
links or open attachments you
know are safe.**

I agree Rich and look forward
to working with you on this.

I will send back the document
re. an NASEM "Attacks on
science" meeting later today
with a couple of extra names
and the edits others have sent.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
(Sent from my iPhone)

President
EcoHealth Alliance

460 West 34th Street, New
York, NY10001, USA

www.EcoHealthAlliance.org

On Jun 28, 2021,
at 9:22 AM,
Roberts, Rich
[REDACTED]@neb.com>
wrote:

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Peter:

I have been following all of the emails racing back and forth, but find myself overwhelmed by the vitriol that is playing out though the media, including what might have been once considered reliable sources. At this point I do not see a clear path forward that would not just invite further polarization and more attacks.

As for Jeff Sachs, my own reaction would be to tell him to go to hell and just recuse yourself from any role in his commission. After all, it seems unlikely they are going to get any closer to finding out what really happened, especially in terms of getting evidence for a natural origin.

I'm happy to continue to find solutions, but would prefer a route that supported science generally rather than continuing to fan the flames of the lab leak.

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Rich

Richard J.
Roberts
New England
Biolabs
240 County Road
Ipswich, MA
01938-2723
USA
Tel: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Fax: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
email:
[REDACTED]@neb.com

From: Peter
Daszak
[REDACTED]@ecohealthalliance.org>
Sent: Sunday,
June 27, 2021
2:41 PM
To: Keusch,
Gerald T
[REDACTED]@bu.edu>;
Hotez, Peter Jay
<[REDACTED]@bcm.edu>
Cc: David Morens
[REDACTED]@gmail.com>;
Roberts, Rich
[REDACTED]@neb.com>;
Robert Kessler
[REDACTED]@ecohealthalliance.org>;
Jeffrey Sturchio
[REDACTED]@msn.com>
Subject: Jeff
Sachs.



Please see his
email to me
below, just now.

He's proposing I
step off as a
commissioner,
recuse myself
from the origins
work and then
am put on the
one health part

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of the taskforce.
He will also bring
on biosafety
people.

This would be
seen widely as a
further step
down for me and
is not acceptable
in my opinion.

He's trying to
bully me into a
quick response.

I think he's trying
to line this up as
a done deal
before his
Wednesday
morning call with
the rest of the
Commissioners.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth
Alliance
520 Eighth
Avenue, Suite
1200
New York, NY
10018-6507
USA

Tel.: [REDACTED]

Website:
www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter:
[@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

BU04549

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*EcoHealth
Alliance develops
science-based
solutions to
prevent
pandemics and
promote
conservation*

From: Jeffrey
Sachs
[REDACTED]@ei.columbia.edu>
Sent: Sunday,
June 27, 2021
2:24 PM
To: Peter Daszak
[REDACTED]@ecohealthalliance.org>
Cc: Ozge Karadag
[REDACTED]@gmail.com>;
Bagenal, Jessamy
(ELS-LOW)
[REDACTED]@lancet.com>;
Yanis Ben Amor
[REDACTED]@columbia.edu>
Subject:
Continued work
on the task force

Dear Peter,

I would like to
pursue a way
forward in which
you would
continue as a
member of the
task force to
provide expertise
and inputs on the
One Health
approach to
pandemics, while
you would step
away from being
a commissioner
and would recuse
yourself from the
task force's work
on the question
of origins of
SARS-CoV-2.

Hume similarly
would recuse
himself from any
work on the

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origins question. I will appoint a new acting chair or co-chairs of the task force following consultations with the task force.

I am proposing this two-track approach so that the controversies and issues surrounding your work do not envelope the Commission's work and its final report, while at the same time enabling you to contribute your considerable expertise and experience to the important issues of One Health and the ecology of emerging infectious diseases.

I hope that you find this approach to be satisfactory and reasonable under the circumstances. It is my deeply considered view on how to achieve several important objectives going forward.

I will move forward expeditiously on these issues one way or another, so I would deeply

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appreciate your
timely response.

With best wishes,

Jeff

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From: [redacted] [redacted] (OS/OGA)
Sent: Fri, 13 Mar 2020 11:49:38 +0000
To: [redacted] [redacted] (STATE.GOV)
Cc: [redacted] [redacted] (HHS/OS/OGA); [redacted] (OS/OGA) (CTR); [redacted] (OS/OGA); [redacted] (HHS/OS/OGA); [redacted] (HHS/OS/OGA); [redacted] (HHS/OS/OGA); [redacted] (HHS/OS/OGA)
Subject: Re: China (Coronavirus): WHO Report Offers Insights but Also Missed Opportunities

Thank you! Might I suggest that someone shared this with the secretary prior to his 1015 meeting with Cliff Lane?

[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted]
Office of Global Affairs, HHS
Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 13, 2020, at 3:26 AM, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] (Beijing) wrote:

□
FYSA


Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S8, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (Beijing)" [redacted]
Date: 3/13/20 2:30 PM (GMT+08:00)
To: [redacted] (Beijing); [redacted]; [redacted]

[redacted]





Subject: China (Coronavirus): WHO Report Offers Insights but Also Missed Opportunities

Colleagues,

Cable sent.

Best regards,

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

<image001.gif>

Action Office: IMO, RSO, POL, ECON, MGT, PAS, SCIENCE, TSA, MED, CDC
Info Office: IMO_INFO, RSO_INFO, EXEC_INFO, DAO_INFO, MGT_INFO, SCIENCE_INFO, ECON_INFO, POL_INFO

MRN: 20 BEIJING 494
Date/DTG: Mar 13, 2020 / 130624Z MAR 20
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: SHLH, CDC, HHS, NIH, PGOV, PREL, CN, SENV, AMED, KPAO, KMDR, KHIV, KFLU, KGHI, KHLS, KSCA, KTBT
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 20 BEIJING 74
B) 20 BEIJING 108
C) 20 Beijing 454
Subject: China (Coronavirus): WHO Report Offers Insights but Also Missed Opportunities

1. (SBU) **SUMMARY AND COMMENT:** The *Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)* released February 28 presented a highly positive assessment of the actions taken by the PRC in its COVID-19 response. The report concluded that the PRC's containment measures changed the course of the outbreak while "buying the world time." Although the report provided the most comprehensive collection of information and data to-date on the PRC's COVID-19 response, Post assesses the report lacked a description of the way the review was conducted, had several omissions, failed to acknowledge key limitations of the eight-day mission, and did not provide critical evaluation of the PRC's actions. The lack of a follow-on plan for addressing knowledge gaps, analysis of the PRC's evolving case definitions, discussion of the unique circumstances in China that allowed implementation of the most severe measures, along with no assessment of the suppression of whistleblowers or the "human costs" of the response, limits the report's ability to provide a complete assessment of China's response and lessons learned to inform efforts for responding to COVID-19 domestically and internationally. PRC authorities and state-run media have used the report to widely characterize WHO praise and support of the Chinese response. Embassy Beijing will continue to seek information from the WHO China Office, the National Health Commission (NHC), the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), and other health contacts to address these topics, and Post will report substantive information in subsequent cables. **END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.**

Methods

2. (U) The February 16 to 24 WHO-China Joint Mission traveled to Beijing, Shenzhen, Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Wuhan. The team was comprised of 12 Chinese experts and 13 international experts, including two from the United States. The stated goal of the Joint Mission "was to rapidly inform national (China) and international planning on next steps in the response to the ongoing outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and on next steps in readiness and preparedness for geographic areas not yet affected. The major objectives of the Joint Mission were as follows:

- To enhance understanding of the evolving COVID-19 outbreak in China and the nature and impact of ongoing containment measures;
- To share knowledge on COVID-19 response and preparedness measures being implemented in countries affected by or at risk of importations of COVID-19;
- To generate recommendations for adjusting COVID-19 containment and response measures in China and internationally; and
- To establish priorities for a collaborative programme of work, research and development to address critical gaps in knowledge and response and readiness tools and activities."

Key Findings and Value of the Report

3. (SBU) The report provided an enhanced understanding of the PRC's COVID-19

response in the largest and most comprehensive collection of information and data to-date. The major findings described in the report included information about the virus, the outbreak, transmission dynamics, disease progression and severity, China's response, and knowledge gaps. Notable findings from the report included information on whole-genome sequencing analysis of 104 strains the COVID-19 virus isolated from patients in different localities between the end of December 2019 and mid-February 2020, results from post-mortem samples from a patient, a description of the outbreak including epidemic curves with symptom onset dates, demographic characteristics of patients and descriptions of household transmission, contact transmission, and community surveillance in fever clinics and ILI/SARI (influenza like illness and severe acute respiratory infections) surveillance. The report also highlighted transmission dynamics in Wuhan and outside of Wuhan, described special populations such as children and health care workers (HCW), and provided information about illness severity and China's response, which are divided into three stages. The report concluded that "China has rolled out perhaps the most ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history." [Note: U.S. experts assigned to the mission told Embassy Beijing CDC after the mission concluded, but prior to the publication of the report, that they were impressed by the amount of data that was presented to them and felt that the overall Joint Mission had achieved its stated objectives. End Note]. The report appropriately mentioned the high economic cost of the control measures and noted the costs will not be sustainable indefinitely. The report also appropriately acknowledged the risk that there may be a rise in cases as the control measures are relaxed and the population is able to return to work and engage in social interaction.

Limitations and Missed Opportunities

4. (SBU) However, Post has identified shortcomings in the Joint Mission report which hinder its effectiveness as an intended guide for global COVID-19 responses.

- **Failure to Acknowledge Limitations:** The report does not meaningfully acknowledge limitations in the interpretation of their findings resulting from the short duration and scope of the joint mission. Such information would help a reader to be aware of issues to consider when interpreting the report's findings.
- Given the mission had only one week to thoroughly assess an epidemic situation throughout a country the size of China, greater detail on why the Joint Mission believed the information it obtained warranted such conclusive statements would be useful.
- **No Follow-on Plan:** The report does not describe a path forward for how to address lingering knowledge gaps.
- **Limited Data Quality and Case Definition Assessment:** The report does not include a critical assessment of the data provided, such as an analysis of the unexplained February 1 peak on the epicurve. These gaps could have been addressed in a more thorough methods section that described what data were collected and how the data were assessed.
- The report lacks discussion of the PRC's rationale for case definitions, which changed throughout the outbreak. There was also no discussion of how China was

finding cases and whether it was applying different case definitions in different locations.

- The report does not include an assessment of laboratory data. Despite WHO guidelines for COVID-19 asking for weekly aggregate “Total number of lab tests conducted” and “Total number of tests that are positive for COVID-19,” the report did not include this information. Additionally, the report lacks a description of the laboratory testing used and the clinical performance of the test kits.
- **Missing Lessons Learned on Control Measures, Preparedness:** There is a lack of detail on why the PRC chose and implemented specific control measures and how authorities decided to apply the control strategy that they used. This misses an opportunity to provide lessons learned to help guide other countries in their outbreak preparations and response. The report does not mention whether authorities undertook any actions that failed.
- The report makes sweeping statements about the preparedness situation of other countries without having adequately assessed those.
- **Limited Surveillance, Contact Tracing, and Case Fatality Info:** Greater details on differences in surveillance methods in different regions if any, as well as a detailed explanation of how the PRC chose methods for and conducted contact tracing would be beneficial for other countries as they address growing case counts.
- The report misses an opportunity to provide information on how China conducted contact tracing so effectively. Data on how many people were involved in contact tracing, how they were trained, what tools were used for the task, what changes occurred over time, and how data sharing and patient privacy were handled were not described.
- The report does not explain or attempt to explain differences in case fatality by geography. It is unclear if the different fatality rates that have been reported are a result of differences in how cases were defined, standards for reporting deaths, or a result of different standards of care in an overburdened health system.
- **Short on HCW Infection Specifics:** More information on infected HCW, particularly in Hubei would have been helpful. The report states that there were 2,055 COVID-19 cases among HCWs from 476 hospitals across China and that 88 percent of the infected HCW were from Hubei. Although the report notes that most infections among HCW occurred early in the outbreak in Wuhan when personnel had limited supplies and experience to cope with the new disease, it also states that many HCW (number not specified) may have been infected in the household rather than healthcare setting. Additional information on how investigators reached their surprising conclusion regarding HCW infections would be useful. Additionally, the report omits information on the types of HCWs who were infected, as well as any discussion of which medical procedures may have placed HCW at greater risk.
- **Different Surveillance for Children?:** The report fails to address lingering questions as to why a small percentage of children have been infected or whether PRC surveillance case definitions were specific to adult presentation, which may have caused them to miss infected children.
- **Technological Innovations and Clinical Trials:** The report should have provided

more explanation on which technological solutions were used and how those solutions could be applied in varying global responses.

- The report does not address lingering issues, such as pending clinical trials, and next steps for China in its effort to combat the virus. [**Note:** The report does state that given declining case numbers, there are increased difficulties in enrolling patients in clinical trials. **End Note.**]
- The report does not include a detailed discussion of the investigation of the animal source of the virus or of environmental samples collected at the Huanan market in December. Answering these questions was not included as a mission objective.
- **Language Hinders Credibility:** The tenor of the report reads as an advocacy piece rather than a critical scientific assessment. The uncompromisingly positive tone and language choice, along with the omission of lessons learned, diminishes the credibility of the report and perceptions of its independence.

5. (SBU) [**Note:** Separate studies and reports from Chinese research institutions and hospitals have published extensive data on the virus. Those reports do address some of the questions and concerns not covered by the WHO report. **End Note.**]

Neglecting the “Human Costs”

6. (SBU) The report notably fails to critically address PRC efforts to control information and silence whistleblowers during the outbreak, particularly in the early stages when public awareness was crucial. The deaths of frontline medical responders, including whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang, and the reaction to hospital management and local official efforts to silence a group of doctors who first noticed and discussed the outbreak in December has captured online discussion.

7. (SBU) As reported in the Mission’s January 7 and 10 cables, local medical contacts in Wuhan reported PRC authorities had prohibited them from providing information about the outbreak (Refs A-B). The health contacts said the limits on sharing information went beyond the “normal” government controls. They expressed frustration at the lack of internal communication permitted among the medical community and said they had to rely on international media for information. Separate media reports have confirmed such restrictions.

8. (SBU) Embassy Beijing health and aid organization contacts have also expressed strong concerns over PRC authorities’ lack of transparency about the “human costs” of the PRC response, including the number of Chinese citizens requiring urgent medical, food, and financial assistance after the Wuhan lockdown.

9. (SBU) The joint mission also did not examine the impact the response measures had on the overall health care system in Wuhan and other parts of China or how the response affected the care and mortality rate of non-COVID-19 patients with life-threatening diseases, such as cancer.

Issues Affecting the Report

10. (SBU) The report does not address limitations placed on the Joint Mission by the PRC during terms of reference negotiation. The report also does not address the nearly one-month delay between the first discussion of the joint mission on January 23—between PRC National Health Commission (NHC) Minister Ma and WHO Director General Tedros—and the February 16 arrival of the WHO team as the PRC negotiated the terms of reference and composition of the mission members. [**Note:** It would not be expected for this information to be included in the report. **End note.**]


Report Becomes Part of Propaganda Machine

11. (SBU) The report praises the PRC response and state-run media cited the report as WHO experts hailed China’s unprecedented responses to COVID-19 and acknowledged China’s role in protecting the international community and buying time for other countries to prepare for the outbreak (Ref C)

12. (SBU) PRC propaganda authorities widely amplified the report and its glowing assessment of PRC response – with many media outlets claiming the report also demonstrated the effectiveness of the PRC response and the “significant advantages of the CPC’s leadership and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Signature: Branstad



[REDACTED]

XMT: CARACAS, AMEMBASSY; ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL

Action Post: NONE

Dissemination Rule: IMO, RSO, POL, IMO_INFO, RSO_INFO, ECON, MGT_ACTION,
POL_INFO, PAS, SCIENCE, DAO_INFO, TSA, MED, CDC,
SCIENCE_INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

SBU

Subject: Re: NH report
Date: Saturday, June 27, 2020 at 11:00:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Attachments: image001.png

It was a q from MDR and reason for this morning's call.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 27, 2020, at 10:58 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:

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And just so there is clarity here. The 10,000 deaths number should not be a surprise, shock, or anything to folks. It came from earlier drafts and analysis provide from you all to me that you worked on with McKinsey. On the briefing call going thru this data it was stated we needed to use the presumed and confirmed or the curve wouldn't work for the broader community spread argument, given testing was spotty at the beginning. I'm happy to remove that argument, which came from folks.

Below is the chart from the original McKinsey deck and was in the original draft provided by NYSDOH.

<image001.png.secure>

On 6/27/20, 10:13 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:

Privileged and confidential
Attorney Work product

I'm getting more info but here's what I know so far:

1- on Re admissions we told doh to get the data for about 113 NH that hadn't responded to the survey. (I cleared with you MDR at the time). Instead of doing that, DOH reopened the survey for two days to ALL homes. We are getting who responded or Re-responded.

2- this proposed report includes the number of NH residents who died in hospitals. This number is not public. Instead of 6,500 deaths it would show 10,000 deaths.

3- Apparently latest draft (I haven't seen yet) says 30 percent antibodies in staff according to Bioreference. We need to make sure that's real and robust and defensible. DOH did not put that in and doesn't know anything about it.

4. "Causation" and "cause" are terms of art meaning proved by the data. Latest drafts use those terms incorrectly and we would be scoffed at. Requires edits.

5. If staff was sick it raises questions about providing PPE to nursing homes. We did a few large

provisions but apparently we have never prioritized NHs for this and STILL do not. This is problematic. Adding Larry on this issue. We need to fix that. Megan has details.

Sent from my iPhone

Subject: Fw: CONFIDENTIAL

Date: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 at 4:32:24 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

From: Dowling, Michael [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 4:31 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

Overall – a good document. A few suggestions, however:

1. The Exec Summary needs to be redone with a clear statement of the problem/issue and the conclusion. That is, in effect, your press release. I would suggest something like the following.

There has been much discussion of the number of nursing home patient deaths in NY and the causal relationship between nursing home admission policy and resident mortality. The DOH completed an independent analysis etc. and concluded:

- NY State has a lower percentage of deaths in nursing homes than most states – ranking 46th.
- Admission policies were not the factor in nursing home fatalities.
- Mortality rate transmission is strongly correlated to employees entering the facilities.

Ken Raske's staff and mine can do a complete rewrite if you wish.

2. Don't overly rush to get this out – not until there is a rewrite. It will get criticized and opponents will argue – even if they buy the argument – that we should have done more earlier to test the staff. This is political.
3. I am working with Ken to line up some physicians to be available to support the Commissioner – this will take a day or so.

I am waiting for my physician to get back to me. She is reviewing the report. Once I do, I will follow up with you.

Michael

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From: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]@gmail.com]
Sent: 8/11/2021 12:49:15 PM
To: dasz >> Peter Daszak [REDACTED] Keusch, Jerry [REDACTED] Robert Kessler
Subject: Fwd: FW: For Review by 2 PM Tomorrow (8/12): Letter to Dr. Fauci from Sens Graham and Paul
Attachments: 2021-06-10 Graham Paul to Fauci.pdf; WSJ: The Science Suggests a Wuhan Lab Leak ; Draft Graham Paul WSJ Response_NIAIDreview.docx
Flag: Follow up

strictly CONFIDENTIAL, please. I fixed a few things in this but it seems like Tony is conveying the right message here.... d

----- Forwarded Message -----

Subject:FW: For Review by 2 PM Tomorrow (8/12): Letter to Dr. Fauci from Sens Graham and Paul
Date:Wed, 11 Aug 2021 15:28:18 +0000
From:Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
To:David Morens [REDACTED]@gmail.com) [REDACTED]@gmail.com>

David

David M. Morens, M.D.
CAPT, United States Public Health Service
Senior Advisor to the Director
Office of the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institutes of Health
Building 31, Room 7A-03
31 Center Drive, MSC 2520
Bethesda, MD 20892-2520

[REDACTED] (assistant: Whitney Robinson)
[REDACTED]

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From: Hastings, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2021 8:52 AM
To: Erbelding, Emily (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] Hauguel, Teresa (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED] Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] Ford, Andrew (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED] Mulach, Barbara (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] Fenton, Matthew (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED] Linde, Emily (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED] NIAID DIR-OCGR [REDACTED] NIAID BUGS [REDACTED]
Cc: Harper, Jill (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] Billet, Courtney (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] Embry,
Alan (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] NIAID OCGR Leg [REDACTED]
Subject: For Review by 2 PM Tomorrow (8/12): Letter to Dr. Fauci from Sens Graham and Paul

Good morning,

Background:

Dr. Fauci received the attached Exec Sec letter on June 10th from Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Rand Paul (R-KY) regarding COVID-19 origins and, specifically, assertions raised in a *Wall Street Journal* commentary by Drs. Steven Quay and Richard Muller (the article is attached here for your reference). OCGR-Leg has used previously cleared documents to draft the attached response letter. We would appreciate your review and input.

Action:

By 2 PM Tomorrow, Thursday, August 12th, please review the attached draft response letter and provide any edits in tracked changes.

Please note that the audience for this letter are non-scientists and explanations of scientific concepts should be very high-level.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,
Drew

Cell #: [REDACTED]

Andrew K. Hastings, Ph.D.
Public Health Analyst
Legislative Affairs and Correspondence Management Branch
Office of Communications and Government Relations
NIAID/NIH/DHHS
Bldg. 31, Room 7A17, MSC 2520
Bethesda, MD 20892-2520
[REDACTED]

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United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 10, 2021

Dr. Anthony S. Fauci
Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
5601 Fishes Lane
Bethesda, MD 20892

Dear Dr. Fauci:

A recent report from the media regarding the origins of Covid-19 has come to our attention. This report presents compelling scientific evidence that Covid-19 resulted from a laboratory leak. As the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) we would like for you to answer the questions below.

In a recent Wall Street Journal commentary, titled *The Science Suggests a Wuhan Lab Leak*, Steven Quay, MD, PhD and Richard Muller point out two strong arguments for COVID-19 being the result of gain-of-function research. First, CoV-2, which is the novel coronavirus that leads to the COVID-19 disease, contains a special genome sequence which is not only the least likely to be found in nature but also the most likely to be created through gain-of-function experiments. This genome sequence which Dr. Quay and Mr. Muller refer to as “double CGG” has never been found in nature.

The authors also suggest that the double CGG sequence was omitted in an early analyst of the genome sequence of CoV-2 conducted by the Wuhan lab’s leading coronavirus researcher, Dr. Shi Zhengli.

Do you agree with the authors’ assertion, that the double CGG sequence is strong evidence that this virus originated in a lab? If not, what are the counter arguments to their conclusions?

Dr. Quay and Mr. Muller make a second argument: When MERS and SARS arose “they evolved rapidly as they spread through the human population, until the most contagious forms dominated. COVID-19 didn’t work that way. It appeared in humans already adapted into an extremely contagious version. No serious viral ‘improvement’ took place until a minor variation occurred many months later in England.”

They conclude: “Such early optimization is unprecedented, and it suggests a long period of adaption that predated its public spread. Science knows of only one way that could be achieved: simulated natural evolution, growing viruses on human cells until the optimum is achieved. That is precisely what is done in gain of function research.”

Do you agree with Dr. Quay and Mr. Muller that the unprecedented optimization of CoV-2, which lead to the disease's extreme spread suggest a laboratory origin?

Finding the true origins of Covid-19 are of the utmost importance. Over 3.7 million people have died across the globe from this virus. We must find the truth to ensure this never happens again. Furthermore, if this virus was engineered in a lab and released into the world, we must hold those responsible to account.

Sincerely,



Lindsey O. Graham
United States Senator

Rand Paul, M.D.
United States Senator

From: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Sent: 6/10/2020 8:56:43 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Guardian: Ignore the conspiracy theories: scientists know Covid-19 wasn't created in a lab

Number 2, we can try to change the world. Number 1, let's win this anti science battle, get you refunded and über funded, then settle scores and kick some ass. Hard. Rectal spikes not prohibited. D

Sent from my iPhone
David M Morens
OD, NIAID, NIH

On Jun 10, 2020, at 20:37, Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

My pleasure to pushback against these wackos, partly for your entertainment, but especially when one of them is the former head of UK's MI6 – the very people that managed 007, goddamnit!!

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1201
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2020 4:58 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Guardian: Ignore the conspiracy theories: scientists know Covid-19 wasn't created in a lab

Keep it up! I love this! d

From: Folkers, Greg (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2020 1:38 PM

Subject: Guardian: Ignore the conspiracy theories: scientists know Covid-19 wasn't created in a lab

[Coronavirus outbreak](#)

Ignore the conspiracy theories: scientists know Covid-19 wasn't created in a lab

[Peter Daszak](#)

Instead of following false claims, we should focus our efforts on the regions where the next pandemic is likely to emerge

- Peter Daszak is president of EcoHealth Alliance



The Wuhan Institute of Virology, the source, according to conspiracy theorists, of the Covid-19 virus. Photograph: Héctor Retamal/AFP/Getty Images

Published on Tue 9 Jun 2020 06.14 EDT

In a recent [interview with the Telegraph](#), the former head of MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove cited an “important” scientific report that suggested that the novel coronavirus had not emerged naturally, but had been created by Chinese scientists. Dearlove said he believed the pandemic had “started as an accident” after the virus escaped the lab. A month earlier, the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, had said he had “[enormous evidence](#)” that Covid-19 had originated in a lab in China, only to backtrack from this claim on [live TV](#) in the same sentence.

Suggestions that Covid-19 is a manmade virus are the latest chapter in a tale of blame, misinformation and finger-pointing. Cue the [conspiracy theorists](#), marching out their narrative about the high-security BSL-4 lab in Wuhan, where mysterious experiments to design “frankenviruses” led to the tragic global pandemic. Cue the genetic analyses pointing to “unexpected” insertions in the code of A, G, T, and C that explain how this virus could [not have evolved naturally](#). Cue political posturing against China, with calls for an inquiry, trade sanctions and even reparations.

Determining the origins and emergence of a pandemic is as messy and complex as studying a plane crash. Just as an air crash investigator pieces together fragments at a crash site, pinpointing the origins of a new virus is painstakingly difficult and time-consuming, and requires logic and reason. I know, because this is exactly what [our organisation](#), EcoHealth Alliance, does. We work around the world to identify the origins of pandemics, map them and analyse them,

and use these results to predict where the next pandemic will likely emerge. We then target these “hotspots” for enhanced surveillance, capacity-building and risk-reduction programmes to prevent diseases emerging.

We have spent the past 15 years working in China to analyse the group of viruses from which Sars and now Covid-19 have emerged. Sampling more than 16,000 bats, [we showed that Sars emerged from a cluster of coronaviruses carried by horseshoe bats](#) that are abundant across southern and central China and traded frequently in wet markets. We found Sars-related viruses that could infect human cells in the lab, cause diseases in lab animals, and evade drugs and vaccines designed to protect us. We worked with the scientists behind the breakthrough drug [Remdesivir](#) to show that it was effective against known human coronaviruses and the viruses we suspected might be the next to emerge. We raised the red flag on these viruses and pointed out their potential to cause the next pandemic.

Our 15 years of work in China now puts us in a unique position to identify, with a remarkable degree of confidence, the likely origin of Covid-19. We recently published a [peer-reviewed paper](#) reporting 781 genetic sequences of bat-origin coronaviruses previously unknown to scientists. These include the closest known relatives to Sars-CoV, Sars-CoV-2 and [Sads-CoV](#), a virus that killed more than 25,000 pigs in Guangdong in 2016 and 2017. All are carried by horseshoe bats that are found across southern China and neighbouring countries. Our report firmly concludes that Covid-19 originated in bats, in a hotspot of viral evolution along the border of Yunnan province in China, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.

Most people (including former heads of intelligence agencies) aren’t trained in how to decipher genetic codes, so we have to assess the rigour of competing research to determine the truth of claims that Covid-19 was manmade. Writing in the peer-reviewed journal [Nature Medicine](#), researchers strongly refuted the idea that the code had been purposefully manipulated. Whereas the article in Nature Medicine was written by senior virologists, one author, John Fredrik Moxnes, the chief scientific adviser to the Norwegian military, has already withdrawn his name from the [paper](#) cited by Dearlove – while scientists from the Francis Crick institute and Imperial College London also dismissed its conclusions.

And the claim in the earlier version of this paper to have proven “beyond reasonable doubt that the Covid-19 virus is engineered” was removed in the later version. This claim relied on an insertion in the genetic code for the spike protein of the virus, the place where the virus locks into our own cells. But the [discovery](#) of another novel bat coronavirus in southern China, very closely related to Sars-CoV-2, that includes a similar insertion shows this can evolve naturally.

Contrary to the idea that Chinese scientists deliberately released the virus, existing patterns of infection suggest that the wide spread of Covid-19 was a question of when, not if. Only a handful of people work on bat coronaviruses in labs in China, and they wear masks and gloves so as not to contaminate their laboratories. In 2018, we conducted a pilot survey of people living in rural Yunnan province and found nearly [3% had antibodies for bat coronaviruses](#). Expanding this data to cover the densely populated area in southeast Asia where there are bats known to harbour coronaviruses, we can safely estimate that between one and seven million people are infected with bat coronaviruses each year.

Unfortunately, this sort of logic will not deter conspiracy theorists. The dark power of the internet means that anyone, anywhere, can find evidence to echo even the most outlandish of claims. Theories that Sars originated from space or that HIV was manmade are readily available, but it doesn’t make them true. Such conspiracies play to our most base instincts and paranoias – fears that dissolve logic and reason. The details of how this virus emerged naturally are far less exciting. They’re about how humans and animals have interacted for millennia, now at an unprecedented rate. They’re about how human domination of the world’s ecosystems as we encroach on animal habitats is opening new pathways for viruses, once hidden in the depths of the forest, to be transmitted to humans.

Even as Covid-19 continues to spread across the world, analysing its origin is of critical importance for our species on this planet. If we allow myths and rumours to set our pandemic prevention agenda, we miss, quite literally, the forest for the trees. We estimate that there are [1.7m undiscovered viruses](#) in wildlife in emerging disease hotspots such as rural southeast Asia. Rather than chasing conspiracies, we should be focusing our efforts on these regions and the communities on their frontlines. A pandemic such as this one isn’t a once-in-a-lifetime tragedy. Ignoring the guidance of the global scientific community about how and why they emerge will come at a great cost to us all.

- Peter Daszak is president of EcoHealth Alliance, a non-profit dedicated to analysing and preventing pandemics

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From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: 7/13/2020 5:21:23 PM
To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]
CC: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: PRO/AH/EDR> COVID-19 update (312): China, SARS-CoV2 origin, animal reservoir, WHO mission

Yes, i am trying to catch these things, thanks. Some of these are intentional however, ss when the ajtmh paper comes out i will be publicly owning it, and safe to be foia'd. More important, i met with the head of our foia office and learned how to immunize myself from trouble. Ergo, when i mess up don't worry, i think i am safe.

D

Sent from my iPhone
David M Morens
OD, NIAID, NIH

> on Jul 13, 2020, at 17:04, Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] wrote:

>
> Just noted the last couple of emails, starting with one from David, have used his NIAID email. Its probably better to avoid that one until the new administration comes in next January. Not that I'm paranoid or anything...

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
> Sent: Monday, July 13, 2020 4:18 PM
> To: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]
> Subject: RE: PRO/AH/EDR> COVID-19 update (312): China, SARS-CoV2 origin, animal reservoir, WHO mission

> From the WHO press conference today: "WHO generally does not announce names of staff who go on mission in the field". Mike Ryan then said one is a leading expert on animal-human interface, other is UK academic epidemiologist who led analytics effort on Ebola N. Kivu DRC.

> I wonder if one is Pierre Formenty - he's a veterinarian who worked on Ebola, Lassa fever etc. and is senior. The epidemiologist could be any one of a number of people.

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
> Sent: Sunday, July 12, 2020 4:51 PM
> To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
> Subject: RE: PRO/AH/EDR> COVID-19 update (312): China, SARS-CoV2 origin, animal reservoir, WHO mission

> Yes, I meant the team members. No word here at NIH....

> david

>
>
> David M. Morens, M.D.
> CAPT, United States Public Health Service Senior Advisor to the Director Office of the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases National Institutes of Health Building 31, Room 7A-
03
> 31 Center Drive, MSC 2520
> Bethesda, MD 20892-2520
> [REDACTED]
> [REDACTED]

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>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]
> Sent: Sunday, July 12, 2020 1:25 PM
> To: Morens, David (NIH/NTATD) [E] [REDACTED] Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
> Subject: RE: PRO/AH/EDR> COVID-19 update (312): China, SARS-CoV2 origin, animal reservoir, WHO mission

> If you mean the two members of the team then no, have not heard anything about who they are. I have
been wondering about it.

> Jerry

>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Morens, David (NIH/NTATD) [E] [REDACTED]
> Sent: Sunday, July 12, 2020 12:17 PM
> To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]> Keusch, Gerald T
> Subject: FW: PRO/AH/EDR> COVID-19 update (312): China, SARS-CoV2 origin, animal reservoir, WHO mission

> Do you know who these people are? d

>
>
> David M. Morens, M.D.
> CAPT, United States Public Health Service Senior Advisor to the Director Office of the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases National Institutes of Health Building 31, Room 7A-
03
> 31 Center Drive, MSC 2520
> Bethesda, MD 20892-2520
> [REDACTED]
> [REDACTED]

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>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: promed-edr@promedmail.org <promed-edr@promedmail.org>
> Sent: Saturday, July 11, 2020 9:35 PM
> To: promed-post@promedmail.org; promed-edr-post@promedmail.org; promed-ahead-post@promedmail.org
> Subject: PRO/AH/EDR> COVID-19 update (312): China, SARS-CoV2 origin, animal reservoir, WHO mission

> CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 UPDATE (312): CHINA, SARS-COV-2 ORIGIN, ANIMAL RESERVOIR, WHO MISSION
> *****

> A PROMED-mail post
> <<http://www.promedmail.org>>
> PROMED-mail is a program of the
> International Society for Infectious Diseases <<http://www.isid.org>>

>
> Date: Fri 10 Jul 2020
> Source: Science Magazine - News [edited] <<https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/who-led-mission-may-investigate-pandemic-s-origin-here-are-key-questions-ask>>
>
>
> The 2-person team from the world Health Organization (WHO) traveling to China today [10 Jul 2020] to address the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to come home with answers. Rather, the duo -- an epidemiologist and an animal health expert whose names have not been released -- will discuss with Chinese officials the scope of a larger international mission later, according to a WHO statement.
>
> But this initial trip offers real hope that the mystery of the virus' origins, which has become a political powder keg and the subject of countless conspiracy theories, will finally be investigated more thoroughly and transparently. (A similar WHO-led mission to examine how China was handling its fight against the virus, launched after weeks of diplomatic wrangling, returned in February [2020] with a surprising wealth of information) [comment 1].
>
> "Science must stay open to all possibilities" about the pandemic's origins, Mike Ryan, executive director of WHO's Health Emergencies Programme, said at a press conference on 7 Jul [2020]. "We need to lay out a series of investigations that will get the answers that I'm sure the Chinese government, governments around the world, and ourselves really need in order to manage the risk going forward into the future."
>
> Questions range from hunting for animals that might harbor the virus to examining the possibility that it came from a laboratory. There are plenty of details to investigate, and it could be a long road. Origin riddles for other new infectious diseases often took years to solve, and the route to answers has involved wrong turns, surprising twists, technological advances, lawsuits, allegations of cover-ups, and high-level politics. Determining how a pathogen suddenly emerges in people requires a lot of sleuthing, but past successes offer clues of where to look for new insights, as do the few data points that now exist for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.
>
> The initial, tidy origin story told by health officials in wuhan during the 1st few weeks of January [2020] was that a cluster of people connected to a seafood market developed an unusual pneumonia, and that the outbreak stopped after the market was closed and disinfected. But confusion about the origin of the novel coronavirus identified in wuhan patients arose when researchers published the 1st epidemiologic studies of the city's outbreak: 4 of the 1st 5 cases confirmed to have SARS-CoV-2 infections had no link to the market.
>
> Soon, other theories emerged. Some believe it's no coincidence that the city is host to the Wuhan Institute of virology (WIV), home to leading bat coronavirus researcher Shi Zheng-Li. Her group, one of the 1st to isolate and sequence SARS-CoV-2, has trapped bats in the wild for 15 years, hunting for coronaviruses to help identify pandemic threats. In their 1st report about the new virus, the scientists described a bat coronavirus in their collection that was 96.2% similar to SARS-CoV-2 [comment 2].
>
> U.S. President Donald Trump early on endorsed speculation that the virus entered humans because of an accident at WIV. A more contentious theory is that the lab created the virus. (Researchers at the lab insist neither scenario has any merit, and evolutionary biologists elsewhere have argued the virus shows no evidence of having been
> engineered.)
>
> The most popular hypothesis is that SARS-CoV-2 spread into humans from an intermediate host, an animal species susceptible to the virus that acted as a bridge between bats and humans. In the case of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), civets turned out to play that role for the responsible coronavirus. For Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), also a coronavirus disease, it quickly became clear camels were the culprit because highly similar viruses were found in the animals and people caring for them.
>
> Chinese officials have reported conducting tests for SARS-CoV-2 at the wuhan seafood market, but what they found remains sketchy. China's state-run news agency, Xinhua, said "environmental samples" tested positive for the virus in a zone of the market that sold wildlife, but the report had no details about the results or even a list of the species for sale. Other studies have discovered similarities between
> SARS-CoV-2 and a coronavirus found in pangolins, an endangered species that eats ants, but the pangolin virus is more divergent genetically from SARS-CoV-2 than the closest bat virus, and there's no evidence pangolins or their scales -- used in traditional Chinese medicine -- were sold at the market.
>
> So, assuming WHO's team and the Chinese government work out a deal for an international mission to study the pandemic's origins, where would it start? Here are some key questions that need answers.
>
> - What, exactly, did the studies of the wuhan seafood market sample, and what did the researchers find? With SARS, which emerged in a person in China's Guangdong province in November 2002 -- but was not reported to WHO for 3 months -- extensive sampling of animals at marketplaces in the province found its virus in palm civets by October 2003.
>
> - Does more epidemiological data exist about the earliest cases than have been made public so far here and here? Where had they traveled?
> Were they in contact with any animals? What interactions did they have with each other? Have antibody tests been done on any of their contacts? Do stored blood or tissue samples for any of their contacts exist that could show earlier infections?
>

> For SARS, by June 2004, 14 months after the discovery of that virus, researchers had reported detailed epidemiological analyses of humans and animals: 39% of the earliest cases were food handlers, traders of live animals were 13 times more likely to have antibodies to the virus, and in that group, 72% handled civets. New interviews with the earliest COVID-19 cases could reveal surprising links between them.

> COVID-19 clusters, for example, have occurred among people who were dining and drinking together, gathering at religious services, and even playing mahjong.

>

> - How aggressively have Chinese researchers looked for SARS-CoV-2 in samples collected before the 1st known cases in Wuhan? Have they looked outside of Wuhan? How far back in time have they probed?

>

> Hospitals and diagnostic labs sometimes store blood, nasal swabs, and tissue samples from patients, especially if they die from unexplained illnesses. Just such samples led to the realization that MERS, 1st recognized in Saudi Arabia in June 2012, had killed 2 people in Jordan in April of that year [2012]. Analyses of stored samples from those 2 people and blood sampling of others who became ill but survived that outbreak confirmed that they all had MERS. Scientists realized camels were the source of Middle East respiratory syndrome when highly similar viruses were found in the animals and people caring for them.

>

> - Can widespread screens be done of bats and other wild animal species thought to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 and common in China, including primates, deer, and rodents? Animal feces or urine often contain genetic evidence of viruses. Shi's group at WIV has routinely found coronaviruses in fecal samples and nasal swabs of bats. The sampling of feces from chimpanzees in sub-Saharan Africa has greatly contributed to understandings of the origins of the HIV-1 epidemic, and the Nipah virus, which surfaced in Malaysian pig farmers in 1998, was found in flying bats 2 years later by sampling their urine and fruit that they had partially eaten.

>

> - Can widespread screening of susceptible domesticated animals provide clues to COVID-19's origin? AIDS researchers discovered that pet monkeys harbored a simian immunodeficiency virus that is closely linked to HIV-2, a less common variant that also infects people. Shi's group did a study of domesticated and feral cats in Wuhan and found

> SARS-CoV-2 antibodies in 15% of the 141 samples tested. No antibodies were found in samples taken before the Wuhan outbreak surfaced, but do veterinarians possibly have additional stored samples? Can more feral cats be tested? Cats, notably, have a thing for seafood, and the Wuhan market at least played a role in amplifying early spread.

>

> - Do stored samples from farmed animals exist? The genetic signature of the influenza virus that caused a pandemic in 2009 showed it clearly had a pig origin, but it wasn't until 2016 that researchers reported the likely location of farms in Mexico that raised the infected pigs. Their study found 58 influenza viruses in respiratory samples stored by a central lab that diagnosed sick pigs. In all, the samples came from 22 farms in 6 Mexican states taken between 2010 and 2014. Phylogenetic analyses allowed the researchers to work backward from the genetic sequences of the viruses they found and pinpoint 2 states that likely were the origin of the pandemic. The data further suggest the virus initially came to Mexico from pigs imported from Europe.

>

> - Can widespread screening take place of people in China who might come in contact with bats or other wildlife that harbor SARS-CoV-2?

> Peter Daszak of EcoHealth Alliance and Shi -- who had their funding from the National Institutes of Health cut in April [2020] after pressure from the White House -- published a study last year [2019] of blood taken from nearly 1500 people in Chinese provinces where bats carry SARS-related coronaviruses. They also interviewed people about their histories of illnesses and contact with animals. Only 9 people had evidence of being infected with a bat coronavirus, but as they noted, antibodies quickly wane. The team showed that spillovers from bats to humans occur routinely.

>

> - Do government health reports contain any information about possible

> COVID-19 cases that predate 1 Dec 2019, the 1st confirmed case of

> SARS-CoV-2 in the scientific literature? The South China Morning Post reported having seen "government data" that a 55-year-old person from Hubei province had COVID-19 on 17 Nov [2019]. The article says 8 other cases of the disease occurred that month [November 2019]. Wuhan is Hubei's capital, but the government records did not specify where these people lived, the newspaper noted. It's possible the virus was first isolated from patients in Wuhan but emerged outside the city.

> The influenza virus that caused the pandemic in 2009 first was isolated in San Diego, California, not in Mexico, where it originated.

>

> - Are there stored samples from sewage plants in China that can be probed? Studies of stored sewage samples in Italy described in a press release from that country's National Institute of Health suggest

> SARS-CoV-2 was circulating there in December 2019, even before doctors noticed the 1st case in Wuhan. A study from Barcelona, Spain, posted on medRxiv and not peer reviewed, claims to have found SARS-CoV-2 in sewage samples from March 2019. These reports have not been independently confirmed and have been subject to much criticism, but that does not undermine the potential value of studying archival sewage samples for SARS-CoV-2.

>

> - What experiments with bat coronaviruses took place at WIV? This is the mother of all questions for those who suspect SARS-CoV-2 came out of the facility. Accidental lab releases do happen, and one even triggered a pandemic: An influenza strain that surfaced in 1977 was linked to strains in Russian labs collected 2 decades earlier.

>

> - Is it possible that somebody at WIV became infected with the virus and then passed it on to others outside the lab? It's unknown which bat viruses WIV has in its collection of samples and whether any of them infect humans. And a controversy surrounds the closest bat virus to SARS-CoV-2, which is called

RaTG13. As Shi and co-workers reported, they only fully sequenced this virus after SARS-CoV-2 surfaced, and they looked through their database for potential relatives. (The group often sequences only one small region of bat coronaviruses genomes that mutates infrequently, so changes indicate distinct viruses.) A great deal of speculation has circled around the naming of the partial

> sequence: Shi's group earlier had reported a virus named BtCoV/4991 that exactly matches RaTG13 in that small region, but are they one and the same? Or could it be, as some assert, that BtCoV/4991 is

> SARS-CoV-2 itself? What other bat coronaviruses has the lab yet to fully sequence? Could any of them offer clues?

>

> Another outstanding question is whether Shi's team or other researchers in Wuhan manipulated bat viruses in "gain-of-function"

> experiments that can make a virus more transmissible between humans.

> In 2015, Shi co-authored a paper that made a chimeric SARS virus by combining one from bats with a strain that had been adapted to mice.

> But that work was done at the University of North Carolina, not in Wuhan, and in collaboration with Ralph Baric. Did Shi's group later carry out other gain-of-function studies in Wuhan, and if so, what did they find?

>

> Finally, diplomatic cables from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in 2018 warned that a new, ultra-high-security lab at WIV had "a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators." Did Shi's team ever work with coronaviruses in that lab, and, if so, why?

>

> If history repeats itself, it might take years -- or even decades -- to crack this case. Scientists haven't unequivocally identified Ebola's source 45 years after its discovery. But the key, time and again, to clarifying the origins of emerging infectious diseases is unearthing new data. WHO's push to organize the probe promises to, at the very least, accelerate what has been a plodding pursuit for answers.

>

> [Byline: Jon Cohen]

>

> --

> [REDACTED]

>

> [1. The report of the 1st WHO-China Joint Experts Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), 16-24 Feb 2020, was published on

> 28 Feb 2020. It included (p 8) the following segment, titled "Zoonotic

> origins": "COVID-19 is a zoonotic virus. From phylogenetics analyses undertaken with available full genome sequences, bats appear to be the reservoir of COVID-19 virus, but the intermediate host(s) has not yet been identified. However, 3 important areas of work are already underway in China to inform our understanding of the zoonotic origin of this outbreak. These include early investigations of cases with symptom onset in Wuhan throughout December 2019, environmental sampling from the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market and other area markets, and the collection of detailed records on the source and type of wildlife species sold at the Huanan market and the destination of those animals after the market was closed." A link to the report and the said text were reproduced in posting

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200312.7081842>, with the following

> commentary: "Wishfully, animal-health specialists were included among the members of the WHO Joint Mission." It is relieving to note this comment may have been acknowledged.

>

> 2. Zheng-Li Shi team's pre-print paper, "Discovery of a novel coronavirus associated with the recent pneumonia outbreak in humans and its potential bat origin," in which the virus strain RaTG13 was addressed publicly for the 1st time, was published on 23 Jan 2020 at

> <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.01.22.914952> and reviewed in the commentary of

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200201.6943858>. The paper's final version was published later in Nature (doi:

> 10.1038/s41586-020-2012-7).

>

> Hopefully, the current visit of the 2 experts will pave the road to a thorough, science-based, fully transparent investigation into the origin of the pandemic, in the spirit of One Health and One World. In view of the Dutch experience, China's mink farms should be included in the investigation. Industries of other farmed animal species deserve consideration as well (e.g., rabbits, boars). - Mod.AS

>

> HealthMap/Promed-mail map:

> China: <http://healthmap.org/promed/p/155>>

>

> [See Also:

> COVID -19 update (308): USA (TX) animal, dog conf.

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200708.7554832>

> COVID-19 update (299): USA (GA) animal, dog conf

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200703.7535112>

> COVID-19 update (284): Denmark (ND) animal, farmed mink, spread, dog

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200624.7506728>

> COVID-19 update (281): Netherlands (NB, LI) farmed mink, spread, animal, global

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200623.7502849>

> COVID-19 update (280): animal, pangolin, research

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200623.7502805>

> COVID-19 update (267): animal, domestic, wild, cat, research

> <http://promedmail.org/post/20200617.7480013>
 > COVID-19 update (266): Denmark (ND) animal, farmed mink, 1st rep
 > <http://promedmail.org/post/20200617.7479510>
 > COVID-19 update (251): Netherlands (NB, LI) animal, farmed mink, spread, culling
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200610.7453845>
 > COVID-19 update (248): Netherlands (NB, LI) animal, mink, spread, culling, cat
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200609.7446478>
 > COVID-19 update (238): USA (MN) animal, cat
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200605.7429133>
 > COVID-19 update (236): Netherlands (NB, LI) animal, farmed mink, spread, culling
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200604.7427849>
 > COVID-19 update (231): USA (NY) animal, dog conf.
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200602.7420541>
 > COVID-19 update (230): Netherlands (NB, LI) animal, farmed mink, spread, control
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200602.7420433>
 > COVID-19 update (227): animal, cat, dog, research, experimental infection
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200601.7416648>
 > COVID-19 update (215): Netherlands (NB) animal, mink-to-human, epidem., control
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200527.7385049>
 > COVID-19 update (212): Russia (Moskva) animal, cat, OIE
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200526.7379578>
 > COVID-19 update (209): Netherlands (NB) farmed mink, animal-to-human, cat, epid
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200525.7375359>
 > COVID-19 update (198): Netherlands (NB) farmed mink, animal-to-human infect susp
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200520.7359976>
 > COVID-19 update (189): Netherlands (NB) animal, farmed mink, research, cat, dog
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200517.7344274>
 > COVID-19 update (183): Japan/USA, animal, research, cat, experimental infection
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200514.7337185>
 > COVID-19 update (181): Germany (BY), France (AC), cat, OIE animal case definition
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200513.7332909>
 > COVID-19 update (177): Netherlands (NB) animal, farmed mink, Spain
 > (CT) cat susp <http://promedmail.org/post/20200512.732858>
 > COVID-19 update (174): Netherlands (NB) animal, farmed mink, comment
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200511.7323845>
 > COVID-19 update (169): Netherlands (NB) animal, farmed mink, spread, rabbit susp
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200509.7316646>
 > COVID-19 update (154): Netherlands (NB) animal, farmed mink, research
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200503.7294846>
 > COVID-19 update (146): Netherlands (NB) animal, farmed mink, epidemiology
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200501.7286113>
 > COVID-19 update (143): USA (NY) animal, zoo, tiger, lion, tests
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200430.7284183>
 > COVID-19 update (141): India, animal, wild tiger, susp, clarification, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200430.7281768>
 > COVID-19 update (138): India, animal, wild tiger, fatal
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200428.7275765>
 > COVID-19 update (135): Netherlands (NB) animal, farmed mink
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200427.7272289>
 > COVID-19 update (130): USA (NY) animal, zoo, tiger, lion, new cases
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200425.7266556>
 > COVID-19 update (124): USA (NY) animal, cat, lion, OIE
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200423.7259119>
 > COVID-19 update (123): USA (NY) animal, cat, conf
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200422.7256272>
 > COVID-19 update (113): USA (NY) cat, animal, susp, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200418.7240811>
 > COVID-19 update (88): Germany, animal, research, pig, chicken, bat, ferret
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200407.7196506>
 > COVID-19 update (85): USA (NY) animal, tiger, OIE
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200406.7191480>
 > COVID-19 update (84): USA animal, tiger
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200406.7191352>
 > COVID-19 update (76): China (HU) animal, cat, owned, stray, seropositive
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200403.7179946>
 > COVID-19 update (75): China (Hong Kong) animal, cat, OIE
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200403.7179945>
 > COVID-19 update (70): China (Hong Kong) animal, cat, pets & stock
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200402.7173286>
 > COVID-19 update (58): Belgium, animal, cat, clinical case, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200327.7151215>
 > COVID-19 update (56): China (Hong Kong) animal, dog, final serology positive
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200326.7146438>
 > COVID-19 update (50): China (Hong Kong) animal, dog, 2nd case PCR positive, OIE
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200323.7129951>
 > COVID-19 update (45): China (Hong Kong) animal, dog, 2nd case PCR positive
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200319.7112693>

> COVID-19 update (37): China (Hong Kong) animal, dog, prelim. serology negative
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200312.7081842>
> COVID-19 update (30): China (Hong Kong) animal, dog, susp, serology pending
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200306.7057595>
> COVID-19 update (25): China (Hong Kong) animal, dog, susp, OIE
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200302.7040373>
> COVID-19 update (22): companion animal, dog susp, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200229.7036661>
> COVID-19 update (17): China, animal reservoir, wildlife trade & consumption
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200225.7024245>
> COVID-19 update (11): animal reservoir, intermediate hosts, pangolin susp
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200220.7009213>
> COVID-19 update (08): companion animal, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200218.7002276>
> COVID-19 update (06): animal reservoir, intermediate hosts
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200217.6997782>
> Novel coronavirus (40): animal reservoir, pangolin poss intermediate host, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200210.6972104>
> Novel coronavirus (28): China (HU) animal reservoir
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200201.6943858>
> Novel coronavirus (22): reservoir suggested, bats
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200129.6930718>
> Novel coronavirus (20): China, wildlife trade ban
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200127.6922060>
> Novel coronavirus (18): China (HU) animal reservoir
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200125.6915411>
> Novel coronavirus (15): China (HU) wild animal sources
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200123.6909913>
> Novel coronavirus (03): China (HU) animal reservoir suggested, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200114.6887480>
> Novel coronavirus (01): China (HU) WHO, phylogenetic tree
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200112.6885385>
> Undiagnosed pneumonia - China (HU) (07): official confirmation of novel coronavirus
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200108.6878869>
> Undiagnosed pneumonia - China (05): (HU) novel coronavirus identified
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200108.6877694>
> Undiagnosed pneumonia - China (03): (HU) updates, SARS, MERS ruled out, WHO, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200105.6872267>
> Undiagnosed pneumonia - China (01): (HU) wildlife sales, market closed, RFI
<http://promedmail.org/post/20200102.6866757>
>arn/tw/jh
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> *****
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From: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Sent: 3/29/2021 1:08:20 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED] Keusch, Jerry [REDACTED] Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]
CC: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Response to Michael Lauer letters
Attachments: Response to NIH April 2021 re. reactivation and suspension of 2R01AI110964 dmm comments.docx

Peter, attached some edits for consideration. In general I think it makes the right points and presents a strong case. My comments are mostly minor word-smithing, plus clarifying and simplifying as much as possible, since this will probably be read by Lauer but will perhaps be leaked and read by many others. david

On 3/29/2021 2:10 AM, Peter Daszak wrote:

Hi Jerry, David, and Rich

I can't remember which of you offered to review our draft response to Michael Lauer at NIH, but it would be very helpful if one of you could. I'm sending it to my pro bono lawyers as well, and they'll rip into it, but your advice and edits (using track changes) would be most helpful...

By the way, the WHO report comes out Tuesday morning our time (I think).

I'll have a final draft version tomorrow that I'll try to get out to you early.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

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Reinstatement and immediate suspension of 2R01AI110964
"Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence"

~~Enter add Lauer's title and address here...~~

April 2nd 2021

Formatted: Highlight

Dear Dr. Lauer,

This is a response to your letters of 7/8/2020 and 10/3/2020 regarding the reinstatement and immediate suspension of NIH grant 2R01AI110964, "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence", ~~which that~~ was ~~previously~~ terminated "for convenience" on 4/24/2020. In particular, I wish to respond to the conditions you state would need to be addressed ~~in order for us to again have prior to allowing~~ access to the funds to ~~continue~~ this work.

As you know, immediately following NIH's request in the termination letter of 4/24/2020, we ~~had~~ ceased ~~all~~ contractual work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The ~~termination is lack~~ of a funded relationship with the ~~institute~~ makes it extraordinarily difficult or even impossible to provide the information requested about a foreign organization — ~~as would be the case for or even~~ a domestic one — that our organization neither works with currently nor ~~has~~ control ~~overs~~.

Additionally, our collaborative work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology prior to 4/24/2020, and that planned as part of the ~~currently~~ suspended grant, is wholly unrelated to some of the ~~NIH-stipulated~~ conditions listed below, and pertains to events ~~and situations~~ that in no way involve EcoHealth Alliance. ~~In short, feel, therefore, that~~ most of the conditions below ~~neither do not~~ relate directly to EcoHealth Alliance's planned research ~~as outlined~~ in our renewal application, nor to the biosafety of our ~~continued~~ research funded by the ~~suspended~~ grant when the grant is reinstated in full.

However, despite our ~~concerns about the relevance and fairness~~ ~~urrent difference in opinions regarding these of~~ conditions as set forth in detail below, I ~~ha~~'ve made extensive efforts to satisfy the proposed additional conditions, and have laid the details out after each condition below. This includes volunteering to ~~serve~~ as an expert on the WHO-China joint Mission on the Animal Origins of COVID-19, spending 1 month on the ground in China (including 2 weeks locked in quarantine), at great personal risk to me, to our organization, and to my family. I undertook this mission at a time when I have had increasing levels of personal attack and harassment, including ~~death threats and~~ a white-powder letter ~~sent~~ to my home ~~address a few weeks~~ after the details of our grant termination went public. This harassment continues to this day ~~and is a direct result of dangerous conspiracy theories inadvertently amplified by NIH's grant termination~~.

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520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018
212-380-4400
EcoHealthAlliance.org

Below, I have detailed our response to each of the conditions placed on our suspended grant, in an effort to provide as much information as possible and to explain any limitations on what we can do to respond at this time. I look forward to your reply and feel certain we may discuss these points without legal counsel and as scientists focused on our the important and worthy research goals of the grant, which are focused on research to protect us all against further coronavirus spillover—something that is central to the goal of our R01 grant.

1. Provide an aliquot of the actual SARS-CoV-2 virus that WIV used to determine the viral sequence.

EcoHealth Alliance scientists were not part of the work that WIV conducted to determine the viral sequence of SARS-CoV-2. Given that WIV is a government entity, and that we have no logical business in seeking an aliquot of SARS-CoV-2 as part of the goals of our proposed collaboration, we believe this condition is effectively impossible for us to fulfil. In any case Additionally, the full genome of this viral sequence was uploaded to a freely-accessible database on January 6th 2020, and has been used widely by scientists in the USA (included those funded by NIH) and around the world in their work, undermining any reasonable request from a US non-profit to a Chinese Govt lab for an active sample of a pathogenic human virus.

Commented [MD][1]: Peter, this is nnot clear

2. Explain the apparent disappearance of Huang Yanling, a scientist / technician who worked in the WIV lab but whose lab web presence has been deleted.

During the WHO mission to Chin, I asked about this directly to the staff at WIV, including the Director of the institute, the P4 Lab Director, Dr. Shi, and many others. The response given by was that: "Some reports identified one formed laboratory worker as "missing". This person according the WIV staff was an alumnus who graduated in 2015 and is now working in a city in another province. They had been contacted and tested, and ascertained to be healthy. They are not willing to be interviewed for the WHO mission". This information has been summarized in the WHO-China Joint Study report, published 3/30/20.

3. Provide the NIH with WIV's responses to the 2018 U.S. Department of State cables regarding safety concerns.

These cables were selectively leaked by a Washington Post reporter, who claimed that they indicate safety concerns, specifically that a scientist at the WIV spoke to a delegation from the US Embassy in Beijing and stated that the lab cannot function safely unless the number of laboratory technicians was increased. As part of EcoHealth Alliance's work in China over the past 15 years, including that funded by NIAID, I visited the US Embassy in Beijing regularly and was involved in discussions with these Embassy staff to set up a field visit to the WIV in order to generate goodwill between the US and China at a time when President Trump was planning a state visit. The trip described in these cables was a direct result of that. Prior to this newspaper article, I had been told by people privy to the cable's contents that the articles were positive and supportive of the work we were doing under NIAID funding, and that the trip was a success.

Commented [MD][2]: Peter, in this para you might say that the lab was built under international safety engineering standrads, adheres to international safety practice standards indicated in the BMBL, and the lead WIV staff were trained in safety in the United States by a known authority running the BSL-4 lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston. You might also say that despite the claim of one individual, no safety concerns are known to have been alleged by others including safety experts

A few months later, the full text of these cables was released with minor redactions. It is clear from reading the full details that 1) the request for more laboratory technician support was simply a request

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520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
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for the funding ~~of~~ for more laboratory technician support, rather than a statement that the lab was unsafe; and 2) the cables were extremely positive about the importance of the collaborative work we were doing with WIV under NIAID funding. Thus, there was never any evidence of a safety concern at WIV. I have attached the cables to this email, and excerpted the relevant statements here:

"REDACTED noted that the new lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory. University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston (UTMB), which has one of several well-established BSL-4 labs in the United States (supported by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID of NIH)), has scientific collaborations with WIV, which may help alleviate this talent gap over time. Reportedly, researchers from UTMB are helping train technicians who work in the WIV BSL-4 lab. Despite this they would welcome more help from U.S. and international organizations as they establish "gold standard" operating procedures and training courses for the first time in China."

"The ability of WIV scientists to undertake productive research despite limitations on the use of the new BSL-4 facility is demonstrated by a recent publication on the origins of SARS. Over a five-year study REDACTED (and their research team) widely sampled bats in Yunnan province with funding support from NIAID/NIH, USAID, and several Chinese funding agencies. The study results were published in PLoS Pathogens online on Nov. 30, 2017 (1), and ~~it~~ demonstrated that a SARS-like coronavirus isolated from horseshoe bats in a single cave contains all the building blocks of the pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak. These results strongly suggest that the highly pathogenic SARS-coronavirus originated in this bat population. Most importantly, the researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with ACE2, the human receptor identified for SARS coronavirus. This finding strongly suggests that SARS-like coronaviruses from bats can be transmitted to humans to cause SARS-like disease. From a public health perspective, this makes the continued surveillance of SARS-like corona viruses in bats and study of the animal-human interface critical to future emerging coronavirus outbreak prediction and prevention."

4. Disclose and explain out-of-ordinary restrictions on laboratory facilities, as suggested, for example, by diminished cell-phone traffic in October 2019, and the evidence that there may have been roadblocks surrounding the facility from October 14-19, 2019.

The WIV staff categorically stated to the WHO mission that the lab is audited annually and no unusual events have been identified. The reports of diminished cell-phone traffic and roadblocks have not been verified or published by reliable sources. Diminished cell-phone traffic and roadblocks could be explained by a series of routine issues such as technical problems with the cell-phone facilities, visiting dignitaries, etc.

5. Explain why WIV failed to note that the RaTG13 virus, the bat-derived coronavirus in its collection with the greatest similarity to SARS-CoV-2, was actually isolated from an abandoned mine where three men died in 2012 with an illness remarkably similar to COVID-19, and explain why this was not followed up.

Since the last letter was received from NIH, WIV scientists have published an addendum to their original paper in *Nature* that described SARS-CoV-2 and compared it phylogenetically to RaTG13. In this

Addendum, they explain the rationale for conducting work in this mine, and its connection to the miner's illnesses and deaths. Importantly, they explain that initial serological results did ~~NOT~~ show that these miners were positive for SARSr-CoVs as some media articles have suggested. Furthermore, they re-tested the miner samples using a range of assays, and found no evidence of SARS-related CoV, nor of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies or nucleic acid. During our meeting with WIV staff as part of the WHO mission I asked a series of questions about the miner's illnesses. Their response was that, while similar to COVID in that they had pneumonia, [a common occupational hazard for miners](#), symptoms were also similar to other bacterial or fungal pneumonias. This, and the lack evidence of SARSr-CoV infection [including absence of immune responses](#), led them to conclude that SARS or COVID infection [had been ruled out as was not](#) the cause of these miner's illnesses.

6. Additionally, EcoHealth Alliance must arrange for WIV to submit to an outside inspection team charged to review the lab facilities and lab records, with specific attention to addressing the question of whether WIV staff had SARS-CoV-2 in their possession prior to December 2019. The inspection team should be granted full access to review the processes and safety of procedures of all of the WIV field work (including but not limited to collection of animals and biospecimens in caves, abandoned man-made underground cavities, or outdoor sites). The inspection team could be organized by NIAID, or, if preferred, by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.

The WHO mission did exactly that, and while it was not a NIAID or U.S. National Academy of Sciences team, I am a member of the National Academy of Medicine and Chair of the US NASEM Forum on Microbial Threats. The 11 international expert members of the WHO team included leading authorities on epidemiology, animal-origin viral infections and One Health. Members of this team have extensive experience conducting lab audits (e.g. Peter Ben Embarek), running laboratories dealing with human clinical samples (e.g. Dominic Dwyer, Thea Fischer), and commissioning, managing and accrediting laboratories in foreign countries (myself, Fabian Leendertz). The WHO-China Joint Study report details the field site visits to multiple labs in Wuhan, including the WIV and summarizes our findings.

Additionally, after returning to the USA, and in the weeks prior to the publication of the report, I:

- Briefed Drs. Anthony Fauci and Clifford Lane of NIAID on the findings of the mission;
- Presented a full talk about the work to the NIAID COVID PI group that meets weekly
- Briefed FBI and other intelligence agency staff
- Briefed members of the US NASEM Forum on Microbial Threats
- Briefed staff on the White House National Security Council on the findings of this work
- Briefed staff on the House Committee for Science, Space, and Technology

7. Lastly, EcoHealth Alliance must ensure that all of its subawards are fully reported in the Federal Subaward Reporting System

This has been done, and all subawards fully reported as soon as we possibly could, once you notified us of this requirement in your letter of 7/8/2020.

8. Provide copies of all EcoHealth Alliance – WIV subrecipient agreements as well as any other documents and information describing how EcoHealth Alliance monitored WIV's compliance with the terms and conditions of award, including with respect to biosafety.

All subrecipient agreements are attached. As we ~~related to you~~ in response to your letter of 4/19/2020, ~~which that~~ asked us to suspend work with WIV, we had not yet set up a subcontract with WIV for the period of ~~the~~ award. Our plan was to monitor WIV's compliance as we had in the 5 years prior, by means of semi-annual meetings with the lead investigator and assessments of compliance against all conditions of the award. Additionally, following the NIH's termination, then reinstatement and suspension of our funding, we have contracted with a well-known leading lab biosafety consultant based in southeast Asia who has extensive experience commissioning, accrediting and auditing BSL-2, & -3 labs, and has worked for over a decade at the BSL-4 Australian Animal Health Lab. We will be using their services for all foreign lab subcontractees to assess lab biosafety procedures and conduct audits. Finally, we have hired a Senior Field Veterinarian to oversee all EcoHealth Alliance fieldwork in the region and ensure compliance with biosafety when conducting animal capture, sampling and sample handling. We have done this at EcoHealth Alliance's own expense, to pre-empt calls for further sanctions against our work given the continued daily attacks against EcoHealth Alliance in the press after the termination of our NIH grant.

Commented [MD(3)]: Peter, should name these persons?

9. Describe EcoHealth's efforts to evaluate WIV's risk of noncompliance with Federal statutes, regulations, and the terms and conditions of the subaward.

Over a 15 year period of collaboration with WIV, we have found no evidence to suggest that there was any element of noncompliance with any of the conditions of the grants we have worked together under. We deemed this laboratory to be extremely low risk, and continue to ~~believe~~ so.

10. Provide copies of all WIV biosafety reports from June 1, 2014 through May 31, 2019.

Given the intense geopolitical pressure around the accusations that WIV intentionally or accidentally released SARS-CoV-2 (something which the WHO mission deemed 'extremely unlikely'), requesting such information is not a plausible option at present.

Yours sincerely,



Dr. Peter Daszak

President

(t) +1 212-380-4462; (e) [[HYPERLINK "mailto:daszak@ecohealthalliance.org"](mailto:daszak@ecohealthalliance.org)]

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018
212.380.4460
EcoHealthAlliance.org

cc. Dr. Aleksei A. Chmura (Chief-of-Staff)

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018
212.380.4400
EcoHealthAlliance.org

From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: 8/1/2022 1:39:02 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
CC: Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: update...

This is all good news, thanks!

hopefully no problems with the emails that came to me at my nih address. I deleted them quickly and hopefully didn't reply to any (my phone doesn't show whether emails I get are to NIH or gmail, but when it's from you guys I assume it's to gmail).

d
David M. Morens, MD

IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 11:49 AM Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]> wrote:

....and I apologize David – I've just noticed that the last email chain also had your (!) NIH email address on it...

I'm catching up on emails this week, having been out of the office, giving a keynote at a conference in Colorado – first in-person conference for me since March 2020.

It's been great to see the two papers published in *Science*, which by the way use data that the 'Joint WHO-China Study of the Animal Origins of COVID-19' first published in our report in March 2021. Despite the rhetoric since our WHO Wuhan work, these data were new, and were freely proffered by the China team. These data point clearly to the industrial-scale trade in farmed and wild-caught wildlife in China as the origins, something which China first publicly stated in Jan 2020, then announcing its goal of closing the wildlife farming industry, and the 14 million jobs it involved. The point here is that, while the lab leak accusers point to China as covering up so they don't get blamed for the pandemic, they had already done the opposite with the wildlife trade.

On other news – we are now trying to stave off efforts to defund us by working with a bi-partisan request from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We first heard from last Fall, and the letter came from the Democrats, Sen. Ossoff’s staff, saying they were a bi-partisan group. However, it’s clearly being led by the Republicans (Senator Ron Johnson’s staff), and they’re pushing us to hand over emails and documents back to 2010 relating to any communications w/ federal agencies on a bunch of COVID and lab leak topics. Right now we’re trying to slow down their efforts, and narrow their search, but they’re harbingers of what we will likely see in November if the Republicans win the House – a bunch of requests to preserve documents, followed by Subpoenas in January/Feb, unless this topic becomes ‘old hat’.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200

New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, August 1, 2022 11:20 AM
To: 'Hotez, Peter Jay' <[REDACTED]> 'Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]' <[REDACTED]>
Cc: 'David Morens' <[REDACTED]> 'Keusch, Gerald T' <[REDACTED]> Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]> 'Roberts, Rich' <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Upcoming hearing from a Senate Subcommittee on gain of function research

Dear all (David – I didn’t cc Jeff Taubenberger because you’ve all been using his NIH address which would be subject to Congressional requests and to FoIA),

I just spotted this upcoming HSGAC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight hearing on Wednesday, on one of the lab leaker's social media feeds.

<https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/etso/hearings/revisiting-gain-of-function-research-what-the-pandemic-taught-us-and-where-do-we-go-from-here>

The three speakers are all non-virologists, and have been attacking all research that tries to get to the bottom of COVID origins, unless it's pushing a China lab leak agenda.

- Richard Ebright has been attacking EcoHealth's work ever since the pandemic as part of his long term criticism of recombinant virus technology. He was part of the Cambridge Group that ended up pausing recombinant viral research in the past, and is extremely vocal (and quite offensively) about our work, which he uses to try to leverage attacks against Dr. Fauci, NIAID, NIH in general.
- Stephen Quay is pretty much on the edge of being a quack at this point having made many public statements about HIV inserts in the virus etc.
- Kevin Esvelt is calling for research identifying viruses in wildlife as a way to get ahead of pandemics to be closed down, following his criticisms of CRISPR etc.

It looks like this is another effort by Rand Paul to drum up some public interest from his base, perhaps?

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

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520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

From: Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2022 11:51 AM
To: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Cc: David Morens [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Taubenberger, Jeffery (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re:

Oh ok

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP
Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)
Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology
Health Policy Scholar
Baylor College of Medicine

Texas Children's Hospital Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics
Co-Director, [Texas Children's Hospital Center for Vaccine Development](#)

University Professor, Baylor University

Faculty Fellow, Hagler Institute for Advanced Study
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
Texas A&M University

Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty and Adjunct Professor of Bioengineering, Rice University
Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of Public Health

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E-mail: hotez@bcm.edu
Twitter: [@peterhotez](#)
Skype: **p.hotez**
Linkedin [Peter Hotez](#)

Amazon Author Center: <https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48>
Daily Beast Contributor <https://www.thedailybeast.com/author/peter-j-hotez>
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iPhone

On Jul 26, 2022, at 11:22 AM, Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]  wrote:

Peter, I do not have a link. These pdfs came directly from the journal.



David M. Morens, M.D.

Senior Advisor to the Director
Office of the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institutes of Health
Building 31, Room 7A-03
31 Center Drive, MSC 2520
Bethesda, MD 20892-2520



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From: Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2022 5:20 PM
To: David Morens <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] Peter Daszak
[REDACTED] Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] Aleksei Chmura
[REDACTED] Roberts, Rich [REDACTED] Taubenberger, Jeffery (NIH/NIAID)
[E] <[REDACTED]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re:

Do you have the link so i can put it out on social media? I had trouble finding it

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP
Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)
Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology
Health Policy Scholar
Baylor College of Medicine

Texas Children's Hospital Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics
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University Professor, Baylor University

Faculty Fellow, Hagler Institute for Advanced Study
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
Texas A&M University

Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty and Adjunct Professor of Bioengineering, Rice University
Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of Public Health

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E-mail: hotez@bcm.edu
Twitter: [@peterhotez](#)
Skype: **p.hotez**
Linkedin [Peter Hotez](#)

Amazon Author Center: <https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48>
Daily Beast Contributor <https://www.thedailybeast.com/author/peter-j-hotez>
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iPhone

On Jul 25, 2022, at 5:07 PM, David Morens [REDACTED] wrote:

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Attempt no. 2, per Rich, the two attachments fell off.... dmm
David M. Morens, MD



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On Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 3:11 PM David Morens [REDACTED] wrote:
probably u have all seen these but just in case....d
David M. Morens, MD



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IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 3:08 PM Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]

[REDACTED] wrote:

[cid:18236c3bfd54cdccc1]

David M. Morens, M.D.

Senior Advisor to the Director

Office of the Director

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

National Institutes of Health

Building 31, Room 7A-03

31 Center Drive, MSC 2520

Bethesda, MD 20892-2520

[REDACTED]

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
[DMM Portrait B 12 29 15 P0923]

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From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: 8/1/2022 1:52:15 PM
To: Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]
CC: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Upcoming hearing from a Senate Subcommittee on gain of function research

Guys, you are still sending to my NIH email. Please delete any email for me EXCEPT [REDACTED]@gmail.com

TY, d
David M. Morens, MD



IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 1:47 PM Hotez, Peter Jay <[REDACTED]> wrote:
I'm surprised Research America is not on this helping? Or Victor Dzau?

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP
Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)
Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology
Health Policy Scholar
Baylor College of Medicine

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Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of Public Health

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E-mail: hotez@bcm.edu

Twitter: [@peterhotez](https://twitter.com/peterhotez)

Skype: **p.hotez**

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Amazon Author Center: <https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48>

Daily Beast Contributor <https://www.thedailybeast.com/author/peter-j-hotez>

Like us on Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/BCMNationalSchoolOfTropicalMedicine/>



iPhone

On Aug 1, 2022, at 12:40 PM, Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> wrote:

Yes. This is set up to disparage Tony Fauci and further the impact of disinformation in the Congress. We need to be getting out the people to contact their Senators and Congressmen and Women whether or not they are on any relevant committees.

Jerry

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 1, 2022, at 12:17 PM, Hotez, Peter Jay <[REDACTED]> wrote:

Ok

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP

Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)

Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology

Health Policy Scholar

Baylor College of Medicine

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
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
Texas A&M University

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Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of Public Health


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Daily Beast Contributor <https://www.thedailybeast.com/author/peter-j-hotez>
Like us on Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/BCMNationalSchoolOfTropicalMedicine/>



iPhone

On Aug 1, 2022, at 11:14 AM, Peter Daszak <

Re. commenting on this – I think you should wait to see if it gets any publicity first, otherwise you might inadvertently amplify their impact..

Re. November – I worry that our lives will be made miserable by constant harassment from what could be Republican-led Congressional committees. If this HSGAC group is any indication, they expect us to just dump all of our emails for the last dozen years or more so that they can go through them and find sentences that support their narrative when quoted out of context. It's not just utterly disingenuous, it's also dangerous because it drives the public hate campaigns and efforts to attack us in many other ways.

We've managed to avoid a couple of serious efforts to defund us so far, and are only working with this committee to try and avoid even more pressure, but we know they're talking to many other groups to build their 'case'. On our last call, they asked us for not only any emails to govt agencies, but emails between staff members. I pointed out that it's against our org's policy to snoop on staff conversations, and they smugly told us we should get used to requests for documents because we'll "soon be doing a lot more of them".

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200

New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, August 1, 2022 11:47 AM

To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Cc: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]

David Morens [REDACTED]

Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]

Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]>

Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Upcoming hearing from a Senate Subcommittee on gain of function research

Should I publicize this with my usual commentary?

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP

Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)

Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology

Health Policy Scholar

Baylor College of Medicine

Texas Children's Hospital Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics
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Daily Beast Contributor <https://www.thedailybeast.com/author/peter-j-hotez>
Like us on Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/BCMNationalSchoolOfTropicalMedicine/>



iPhone

On Aug 1, 2022, at 10:20 AM, Peter Daszak <[\[redacted\]](#)> wrote:

Dear all (David – I didn't cc Jeff Taubenberger because you've all been using his NIH address which would be subject to Congressional requests and to FoIA),

I just spotted this upcoming HSGAC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight hearing on Wednesday, on one of the lab leaker's social media feeds.

<https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/etso/hearings/revisiting-gain-of-function-research-what-the-pandemic-taught-us-and-where-do-we-go-from-here>

The three speakers are all non-virologists, and have been attacking all research that tries to get to the bottom of COVID origins, unless it's pushing a China lab leak agenda.

- Richard Ebright has been attacking EcoHealth's work ever since the pandemic as part of his long term criticism of recombinant virus technology. He was part of the Cambridge Group that ended up pausing recombinant viral research in the past, and is extremely vocal (and quite offensively) about our work, which he uses to try to leverage attacks against Dr. Fauci, NIAID, NIH in general.
- Stephen Quay is pretty much on the edge of being a quack at this point having made many public statements about HIV inserts in the virus etc.
- Kevin Esvelt is calling for research identifying viruses in wildlife as a way to get ahead of pandemics to be closed down, following his criticisms of CRISPR etc.

It looks like this is another effort by Rand Paul to drum up some public interest from his base, perhaps?

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

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Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Hotez, Peter Jay <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2022 11:51 AM
To: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED]>
Cc: David Morens <[REDACTED]>; Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>; Keusch, Gerald
T <[REDACTED]>; Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]>; Roberts, Rich <[REDACTED]>;
Taubenberger, Jeffery (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re:

Oh ok

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP
Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)
Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology
Health Policy Scholar
Baylor College of Medicine

Texas Children's Hospital Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics
Co-Director, [Texas Children's Hospital Center for Vaccine Development](#)

University Professor, Baylor University

Faculty Fellow, Hagler Institute for Advanced Study
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
Texas A&M University

Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty and Adjunct Professor of Bioengineering, Rice University
Adjunct Professor, University of Texas, School of Public Health

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E-mail: hotez@bcm.edu
Twitter: [@peterhotez](https://twitter.com/peterhotez)
Skype: **p.hotez**
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Amazon Author Center: <https://www.amazon.com/Peter-J.-Hotez/e/B001HPIC48>
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iPhone

On Jul 26, 2022, at 11:22 AM, Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] <[REDACTED]> wrote:

Peter, I do not have a link. These pdfs came directly from the journal.

David M. Morens, M.D.

Senior Advisor to the Director
Office of the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institutes of Health
Building 31, Room 7A-03
31 Center Drive, MSC 2520
Bethesda, MD 20892-2520



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From: Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2022 5:20 PM
To: David Morens <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak
[REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura
[REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Taubenberger, Jeffery (NIH/NIAID)
[E] <[REDACTED]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re:

Do you have the link so i can put it out on social media? I had trouble finding it

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP
Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#)
Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology
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E-mail: hotez@bcm.edu
Twitter: [@peterhotez](#)
Skype: **p.hotez**
Linkedin [Peter Hotez](#)

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iPhone

On Jul 25, 2022, at 5:07 PM, David Morens <[REDACTED]> wrote:

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Attempt no. 2, per Rich, the two attachments fell off..... dmm
David M. Morens, MD



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IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 3:11 PM David Morens <[REDACTED]> wrote:
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IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 3:08 PM Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]

[REDACTED] wrote:

[cid:18236c3bfd54cdccc1]

David M. Morens, M.D.

Senior Advisor to the Director

Office of the Director

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

National Institutes of Health

Building 31, Room 7A-03

31 Center Drive, MSC 2520

Bethesda, MD 20892-2520

[REDACTED]

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Message

From: Auchincloss, Hugh (NIH/NIAID) [E] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=9304C753BB9E422C977DDDAB54DA924B-AUCHINCLOSS]
Sent: 4/13/2020 7:33:21 PM
To: Fauci, Anthony (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
CC: Conrad, Patricia (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: China page?
Attachments: China Page 4 13 2020.docx

Vastly more information than you want. Don't even bother to open it.

*Produced to Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Pursuant to Oversight Request
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China

Intramural Projects	12
Extramural Projects	
• Grants – Direct Foreign	2
• Grants – Domestic w/ Foreign subcomponent	87
• Grants – Direct Foreign w/other Foreign subcomponent	
Contracts	
Total NIAID-funded Projects	101

Source: GRADS 4/13/2020

Total NIAID Investment in China (with RMS):

FY 2019	\$17,214,349
FY 2018	\$14,101,463

Source: RPAB 2/6/2020

China is located in Eastern Asia. It borders the East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, and South China Sea and is between North Korea and Vietnam. Its capital is Beijing. For centuries China stood as a leading civilization, outpacing the rest of the world in the arts and sciences, but in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the country was beset by civil unrest, major famines, military defeats, and foreign occupation. After World War II, the communists under Mao Zedong established an autocratic socialist system that, while ensuring China's sovereignty, imposed strict controls over everyday life. After 1978, Mao's successor Deng Xiaoping and other leaders moved from a closed centrally-planned system to focus on market-oriented economic development and by 2000 output had quadrupled. For much of the population, living standards have improved dramatically, and the room for personal choice has expanded, yet political controls remain tight. Since the early 1990s, China has increased its global outreach and participation in international organizations. In 2014 China stood as the largest economy in the world. However, per capita income is still below the world average, and the Chinese economy has slumped recently. China's GDP is \$25.36 trillion (CIA World Factbook, 3/7/2019).

General Health Information on China

China's population is 1.37 billion. The life expectancy at birth is 75.4 years (74 for men and 77 for women), and its median age is 36.8 years. The maternal mortality rate is 27 per 100,000 live births, and the less than five child mortality is 13 per 1,000 live births. Both have decreased from rates of 97 and 54, respectively since 2000. Health expenditure is 5.6% of GDP, and total per capita annual health expenditure is \$646. Incidence of and mortality due to communicable diseases have dropped, and China is working to eliminate malaria, measles, and various neglected tropical diseases. However, viral hepatitis, tuberculosis, and HIV (adult prevalence 0.1%) remain significant health problems as well as major outbreaks of communicable diseases and the importation of non-endemic diseases. Emerging and reemerging disease threats in China, while of a lower prevalence, carry enormous economic and political importance due to

Last updated 4/13/2020

[PAGE * MERGEFORMAT]

their potential for quick national and international spread, as experienced with SARS and significant avian influenza outbreaks.

The incidence of non-communicable diseases has risen sharply. Significant demographic changes include decreasing fertility rate, ageing population, and increased number of migrant workers. For example, in 2014 more than 274 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find work. While a remarkable decrease in poverty has occurred, industrialization and urbanization have led to severe air, water, and soil pollution, food safety concerns, and unmet needs in health care. Health disparities between urban and rural settings remain significant and are associated with differences in life expectancy. The top ten causes of death in China are stroke, ischemic heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, various cancers, road injury, hypertensive heart disease, diabetes mellitus, and lower respiratory tract infections (CIA Factbook and WHO, 3/7/2019).

Summary of NIAID involvement and Possible Research Opportunities

For over 35 years, NIAID has had a robust intramural and extramural relationship with China focused on biomedical research and training. The U.S.-China Program for Biomedical Collaborative Research supports collaborative basic, translational, and clinical research between U.S. and Chinese researchers in the areas of allergy, immunology, and infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and its co-morbidities and co-infections, and other research areas. The National Natural Foundation of China (NSFC) funds the Chinese investigators, and NIAID and other ICs support the U.S. investigators. NIAID has an in-country representative in China, Dr. Ping Chen. Dr. Chen was the Director of the NIAID Office in Beijing/Office of Global Research for six years and is now back at headquarters (a replacement is currently being recruited).

Delegation Visits

- A delegation from the Chinese Embassy in DC visited NIAID on February 7, 2020 to exchange information and explore potential ways to cooperate on addressing the novel coronavirus (COVID-19).
- NSFC Vice President Xincheng Xie visited NIH on June 11, 2019.
- A delegation from the Beijing Chest Hospital visited on December 19, 2018.
- Dr. Chen Wang, the newly appointed CAMS President, visited NIH on November 5, 2018.
- The Kaifeng TB delegation visited on October 24, 2017.
- Dr. Xuetao Cao, President of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) visited September 29, 2017 and November 7, 2016.
- Dr. George Fu Gao, Director-General, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention; and Professor, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences visited on September 27, 2017.
- A delegation from Guangdong province interested in syphilis and STI control visited on April 6, 2017.
- Dr. Lanjuan Li, Director of Collaborative Innovation Center for Diagnosis and Treatment of Infectious Diseases, and Dr. Yiming Shao, China CDC, visited on November 10, 2016.
- CAMS staff (Drs. Yang and Zhu, Department of Strategic Planning and Development) visited August 18, 2016.
- China's Vice Premier visited June 24, 2015, as part of the U.S.-China Ebola Symposium. The delegation included the Minister of the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPCC), Director-General of the China CDC, and the President of CAMS.
- The China Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) visited July 21-22, 2014 for the NIH – MOST Clinical and Translational Science Workshop.
- State's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) Visitors from China visited July 9, 2014.
- The China FDA visited June 13, 2014.
- The China CDC visited June 24, 2014.

Key Chinese Research Institutions of interest to NIAID (with multiple current NIAID collaboration/support, source: GRADS)

- Anhui Medical University
- Chinese Academy of Sciences
- Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences/Peking Union Medical College
- Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention
- China Medical University
- Fudan University
- Guangdong Provincial Center for Skin Diseases and STI Control
- Guangxi Center for Disease Control and Prevention
- Institut Pasteur Shanghai
- Jilin University
- Nanjing Medical University
- National Center for AIDS/STD Control and Prevention
- Peking Union Medical College Hospital
- Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica
- Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine
- Sun Yat-Sen University
- Tsinghua University
- Wuhan University

Key Chinese Funding Agencies

- China's Ministry of Science and Technology
- National Health Commission (China's Ministry of Health)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China

NIAID Awards and Intramural Projects

There are currently about 101 NIAID-funded projects in China, most of which are involved with HIV, immunology, and bacterial, viral (including coronavirus and influenza), and parasitic infections with a significant number of these on malaria. Several grants support tuberculosis, vector biology, and general infectious diseases research.

HIV and other STIs

Domestic with Foreign Subcomponent

UCLA CENTER FOR AIDS RESEARCH (CFAR) (AI028697), UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES,

Collaborators : Ji, Guoping, Anhui Provincial Center for Woman and Child Health, CHINA;

REGULATION OF TRANSCRIPTIONAL ELONGATION BY HIV-1 TAT (AI041757), UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY,

Collaborators : Chen, Haifeng, Xiamen University, CHINA;

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR AIDS RESEARCH (AI050410), UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL,

Collaborators : Han, Jiang, Sichuan Provincial People's Hospital, CHINA; Lei, Gang, Aibai Chengdu LGBT Center, CHINA; Tang, Weiming, GUANGDONG PROVINCIAL CENTER FOR SKIN DISEASE AND STI CONTROL AND PREVENTION, CHINA; Tucker, Joe, CHINESE CENTERS /DISEASE CONTROL & PREV, CHINA;

LC: HIV PREVENTION TRIALS NETWORK (AI068613), JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators : Xi Ying, Michelle, Johns Hopkins Univ, CHINA;

LOC: HIV VACCINE TRIALS NETWORK (AI068614), FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RESEARCH CENTER,

Collaborators : Li, Ning, Beijing Capital Medical University (BCMU) CRS, CHINA;

SDMC: HIV VACCINE TRIALS NETWORK (AI068635), FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RESEARCH CENTER,

Collaborators : Li, Ning, Beijing Medical University, CHINA;

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY KAMPALA-NANNING CLINICAL TRIAL UNIT (AI069530),
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators : Wei, Liu, Guangxi Center for Disease Prevention and Control, CHINA;

IEDEA ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH COLLABORATION (AI069907), FOUNDATION FOR AIDS RESEARCH,

Collaborators : Lee, Man-po, Queen Elizabeth Hospital, CHINA; Zhang, Fujie, Beijing Ditan Hospital, Capital Medical University, CHINA;

CENTER FOR HIV/AIDS VACCINE IMMUNOLOGY AND IMMUNOGEN DISCOVERY (AI100645), DUKE UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Shao, Yiming, National Center for AIDS/STD Control and, CHINA;

CENTER FOR HIV/AIDS VACCINE IMMUNOLOGY AND IMMUNOGEN DISCOVERY (AI100663), SCRIPPS RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Collaborators: Shao, Yiming, Chinese Center for Disease Control, CHINA;

SPURRING INNOVATION IN HIV TESTING AND LINKAGE: A CROWDSOURCING APPROACH (AI114310), UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL,

Collaborators : Deming, Kang, Guangdong Provincial Centers for Skin Diseases and STI Contr, CHINA; Wei, Ma, Guangdong Provincial Centers for Skin Diseases and STI Contr, CHINA; Yang, Bin, Guangdong Provincial Centers for Skin Diseases and STI Contr, CHINA; Yang, Li-Gang, Guangdong Provincial Centers for Skin Diseases and STI Contr, CHINA;

BIFUNCTIONAL CHIMERIC ANTIGEN RECEPTORS FOR CLEARING HIV (AI116167), BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE,

Collaborators: Zhou, Paul, Institut Pasteur of Shanghai-Chinese Academy of Sciences, CHINA;

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CENTER FOR AIDS RESEARCH (DC CFAR) (AI117970), GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Tu, Jiong, SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

MECHANISMS OF THE EFFECT OF HIV DISCLOSURE ON CLINICAL OUTCOMES: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY (AI122919), UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA AT COLUMBIA,

Collaborators: Zhou, Yuejiao, GUANGXI ZHUANG AUT/CTR/DISEASE/PREV/CONT, CHINA;

BIFUNCTIONAL CHIMERAS TARGETING BOTH HIV-1 ENV AND HOST CELL CO-RECEPTORS (AI128815), DREXEL UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Long, Ya-Qui, Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica, CHINA;

ON THE PATHOGENIC ROLE OF ANTI-CD4 ANTIBODY IN POOR CD4+ T CELL RECOVERY AFTER ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY IN HIV DISEASE (AI128864), MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Collaborators : Wu, Hao, CAPITAL MEDICAL UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

MENTORING MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOBAL HIV PATIENT-ORIENTED RESEARCH (AI143471), UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL,

Collaborators: Yang, Bin, Guangdong provincial Centers for Skin Disease and STI Control, CHINA;

INTEGRATING A COMBINATION HIV PREVENTION INTERVENTION INTO A WIDELY-USED GEOSOCIAL APP FOR CHINESE MSM (AI143875), EMORY UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators : Guangyu, Ji, Jiangong Hospital , CHINA; Mi, Guodong, BlueD, CHINA; Mi, Guodong, Danlan Beijing Media Limited, CHINA; Qiang, Cheng, BlueD, CHINA; Qiang, Cheng, Danlan Beijing Media Limited, CHINA; Yue, Ma, BlueD, CHINA; Yue, Ma, Danlan Beijing Media Limited, CHINA;

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON (UW) SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS (STI) COOPERATIVE RESEARCH CENTER (CRC) - SYPHILIS VACCINE TO PROTECT AGAINST LOCAL AND DISSEMINATED T. PALLIDUM INFECTION (AI144133), UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,

Collaborators : CHINA; Zhang, Rui-Li, NANJING MEDICAL UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

A GLOBAL SYPHILIS VACCINE TARGETING OUTER MEMBRANE PROTEINS OF TREPONEMA PALLIDUM. (AI144177), UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCH OF MED/DNT,

Collaborators : Yang, Bin, SOUTHERN MEDICAL UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

ENRICHMENT OF THE STATE-1 CONFORMATION OF THE HIV-1 ENVELOPE GLYCOPROTEIN (AI145547), DANA-FARBER CANCER INST,

Collaborators : CHINA; Mao, Yudong, PEKING UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

GLOBAL TRANSCRIPTOME ANALYSIS OF MUCOSAL GONOCOCCAL INFECTION (AI116969), TUFTS UNIVERSITY BOSTON,

Collaborators : Su, Xiaohong, INSTITUTE OF DERMATOLOGY, CHINA;

RATIONAL DESIGN AND B CELL RESPONSES OF HIV EPI TOPE VACCINES (AI129698), SCRIPPS RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Collaborators : Shao, Yiming, Nankai University, CHINA;

POINT-OF-SAMPLING DETECTION OF HUMAN PAPILLOMAVIRUS (HPV) (AI137768) ,
FOUNDATION FOR APPLIED MOLECULAR EVOLUTN,
Collaborators : Ding, Xianping, SICHUAN UNIVERSITY, CHINA;
**HIV EVOLUTION DEFINES VIRUS-HOST/DRUG INTERACTIONS IN VIREMIC AND
AVIREMIC PEOPLE (AI140970)**, UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL,
Collaborators: Cai, Weiping, Infectious Disease Center, 8th People's Hospital, CHINA;

Intramural

**Pathogenesis and Vaccine Studies Of Simian Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Of
Monkeys (AI000370)**
Site Collaborator: Fan Wu (Fudan University) , Shanghai China
Lab: LMM, Intramural Investigator: Vanessa Hirsch

OTHER VIRAL DISEASES

Direct Foreign

**Impacts of Urbanization on Vector Biology and Transmission of Dengue in China
(AI136850)**

PI: Chen, Xiaoguang, SOUTHERN MEDICAL UNIVERSITY,
Collaborators: Chen, Xiaoguang, Southern Medical University, CHINA; Hu, Zhigang, Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, CHINA; Jaal, Zairi, University Sains Malaysia, MALAYSIA; Lin,
Lifeng, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, CHINA;

Domestic with Foreign Subcomponent

**ZOONOTIC SWINE INFLUENZA VIRUS TRANSMISSION IN CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS (AI108993)** , DUKE UNIVERSITY;

Collaborators : Cao, Wuhan, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, CHINA; Cao, Wuhan,
Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, CHINA; Gray, Gregory, Duke Kunshan University,
CHINA;

UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF BAT CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCE (AI110964) , ECOHEALTH
ALLIANCE, INC.,

Collaborators : CHINA; Guo, Li, Institute of Pathogen Biology, CHINA; Hu, Ben, Wuhan
Institute of Virology, CHINA; Ren, Lili, Institute of Pathogen Biology, CHINA; Shi, Zheng Li, Wuhan
Institute of Virology, CHINA; Zhou, Peng, Wuhan Institute of Virology, CHINA; Zhu, Guangjian, East
China Normal University, CHINA;

**DRUG DISCOVERY TARGETING THE INFLUENZA A VIRUS M2-S31N PROTON CHANNEL
(AI119187)**, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Collaborators : Yang, Dan, WuXi AppTec (Shanghai) Co., Ltd, CHINA;

**MECHANISMS REGULATING AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUS INFECTIONS IN HUMANS
(AI128805)** , ST. JUDE CHILDREN'S RESEARCH HOSPITAL,

Collaborators : Zhong, Nanshan, First Hospital Guangzhou Medical University, CHINA;

**ANTIBODY RESPONSES IN HUMANS AFTER INFECTION WITH AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUSES
(AI128821)** , ICAHN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AT MOUNT SINAI,

Collaborators : Xu, Jiangling, FUDAN UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

**POPULATION GENOMICS OF A GLOBALLY DISTRIBUTED ARBOVIRUS VECTOR, AEDES
ALBOPICTUS (AI132409)** ,

Collaborators : Xiao-Guang, Chen, Southern Medical University, CHINA;

THE ROLE OF HBEAG IN HBV PERSISTENCE (AI134818) , INDIANA UNIV-PURDUE UNIV AT
INDIANAPOLIS,

Collaborators : Zhang, Jiming, Fudan University, CHINA;

**RATIONAL DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF NOVEL MRNA VACCINES AGAINST MERS-COV
(AI137472)** , NEW YORK BLOOD CENTER,

Collaborators : Zhou, Yusen, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, CHINA;

**A NOVEL AND EFFECTIVE NANOBODY TO PREVENT AND TREAT ZIKA VIRUS INFECTION
(AI137790)** , NEW YORK BLOOD CENTER,

Collaborators : Zhou, Yusen, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, CHINA;

IMMUNOMODULATION BY HEPATITIS E VIRUS FREE ANTIGEN (AI137912) ,

Collaborators : Zheng, Zizheng, Xiamen University, CHINA;

STRUCTURE-BASED DESIGN OF CORONAVIRUS SUBUNIT VACCINES (AI139092), NEW YORK BLOOD CENTER,

Collaborators: Zhou, Yusen, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, CHINA;

MECHANISM FOR SPREAD OF A QUASI-ENVELOPED HEPATOTROPIC VIRUS (AI139511), RESEARCH INST NATIONWIDE CHILDREN'S HOSP,

Collaborators: Zheng, Zizheng, National Institute of Diagnostics and Vaccine Development in Infectious Diseases, CHINA;

A NEW TARGETING APPROACH TO INHIBIT BUDDING OF THE EBOLA VIRUS (AI139950), PURDUE UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Li, Zigang, Shenzhen Graduate School of Peking University, CHINA;

INFLUENZA D VIRUS ENTRY AND TISSUE TROPISM (AI141889), SOUTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Zhai, Shao-Lun, Guangdong Academy of Agricultural Sciences, CHINA;

DISEASE PERSISTENCE AND POPULATION DYNAMICS: MODELING MEASLES UNDER MASS VACCINATION (AI145883), COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES,

Collaborators: CHINA; Zhang, Wenyi, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, CHINA;

Intramural

Deciphering CTCF code in mammalian host and viral epigenomes (AI000860)

Site Collaborator: Alex Strunnikov (Guangzhou Institutes of Biomedicine and Health), Guangzhou China

Lab: LIG

TB AND OTHER MYCOBACTERIA

Domestic with Foreign Subcomponent

CALANOLIDES AS TOOLS TO FIND NEW DRUG TARGETS FOR MYCOBACTERIUM TUBERCULOSIS (AI108799), WEILL MEDICAL COLL OF CORNELL UNIV,

Collaborators: Liu, Gang, Tsinghua University, CHINA;

PRE-CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADVANCED GENEXPERT TEST FOR DRUG RESISTANT MTB (AI111397), RBHS-NEW JERSEY MEDICAL SCHOOL,

Collaborators: Liu, Xin, Henan Provincial Chest Hospital, CHINA;

RAPID MOLECULAR DETECTION OF TUBERCULOSIS WITHOUT PCR AMPLIFICATION (AI122527), SCANOGEN, INC.,

Collaborators: Huang, Hairong, National Clinical Laboratory on Tuberculosis, CHINA;

QUANTIFICATION OF CIRCULATING ANTIGENS FOR PEDIATRIC TB DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT MONITORING (AI122932), ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY-TEMPE CAMPUS,

Collaborators: Li, Yan, Institute of Biophysics, CHINA; Ma, Xin, Katharine Hsu International Research Center of Human Infectious Diseases, CHINA;

BETA-LACTAMASE FLUORESCENT PROBES FOR BACTERIAL DETECTION (AI125286),

Collaborators: Sun, Zhaogang, Beijing Chest Hospital, CHINA;

BIOSYNTHESIS AND MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY OF THE CAPURAMYCIN ANTIMYCOBACTERIAL ANTIBIOTICS (AI128862),

Collaborators: Yang, Zhaoyong, Peking Union Medical College, CHINA;

IGM IN THE REGULATION OF TB IMMUNITY (AI139297),

Collaborators: Zhu, Guofeng, Institute of Biophysics, Chinese Academy of Science, CHINA;

DEVELOPMENT OF INHALED CPZEN-45 FOR TUBERCULOSIS THERAPY (AI141082), RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE,

Collaborators: Hua, Bai, Zhejiang Hisun Pharm Co Ltd, CHINA;

HUMORAL IMMUNITY AGAINST THE M. TUBERCULOSIS KASB PERSISTENT MUTANT (AI141088),

Collaborators: Zhu, Guofeng, Institute of Biophysics, CHINA;

MODULATION OF PROTEIN PRODUCTION AND DEGRADATION AS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO RAPID STERILIZATION OF DRUG SENSITIVE AND RESISTANT MTB. (AI142735), GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR TB DRUG DEVELOPMENT,

Collaborators: Wang, Jane, WuXi AppTec (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., CHINA; Zhao, Lanjiao, BioDuro, CHINA;

Intramural

Intramural

International Tuberculosis Clinical Research (AI001081)

Site Collaborator: Qian Gao (Fudan University) Xing Yuan (Henan Chest Hospital) , Shanghai China , Zhengzhou China

Lab: LCIM, Intramural Investigator: Clifton Barry

OTHER BACTERIAL DISEASES

Domestic with Foreign Subcomponent

VIBRIO FISCHERI AS A MODEL FOR BACTERIAL COLONIZATION (AI050661) , UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MANOA,

Collaborators: Wang, Sally, GeneScript China, CHINA;

CRACKING SALMONELLA TYPHIS SECRET CODE: UNDERSTANDING PATHOGENIC MECHANISMS OF SALMONELLA TYPHI TOXIN (AI137345) , CORNELL UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators : Liu, Xiaoyun, BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

SALMONELLA TYPHI: ENHANCEMENT OF ENDEMIC POTENTIAL THROUGH ITS UNIQUE VIRULENCE FACTORS (AI141514),

Collaborators: Liu, Xiaoyun, PEKING UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

CENTER TO DEVELOP INNOVATIVE THERAPEUTICS TO MULTIDRUG RESISTANT HIGH-THREAT BACTERIAL AGENTS (AI142731),

Collaborators: Zhou, Gang, Sundia Meditech Co., Ltd, CHINA;

PARASITIC DISEASES

Domestic with Foreign Subcomponent

SOUTHEAST ASIA MALARIA RESEARCH CENTER (AI089672) , UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA,

Collaborators : Cao, Yaming, China Medical University, CHINA; Wang, Baomin, China Agricultural University , CHINA; Wang, Ying, Zhongyue Biological Engineering, CHINA; Yang, Zhaoqing, Kunming Medical University, CHINA;

THE ROLE OF POLO-LIKE KINASE IN THE DUPLICATION OF THE TRYPANOSOME CYTOSKELETON (AI112953) , BROWN UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators : Jing, Jiang, GenScript, CHINA;

MOLECULAR MECHANISMS OF ARTEMISININ RESISTANCE (AI128940), UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA,

Collaborators: Cao, Yaming, China Medical University, CHINA;

MYANMAR REGIONAL CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR MALARIA RESEARCH (AI129386), DUKE UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Zhou, Xiaoning, National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, China CDC, CHINA;

Y CHROMOSOME GENES IN ANOPHELES MOSQUITOES (AI133571) ,

Collaborators : Cao, Jun, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, CHINA; Chen, Xiao-Guang, Southern Medical University, CHINA; Ling, Erjun, Chinese Academy of Sciences, CHINA; Zhu, Guoding, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, CHINA;

SCHISTOSOMIASIS AT THE EDGE OF ELIMINATION: CHARACTERIZING SOURCES OF NEW INFECTIONS IN RESIDUAL TRANSMISSION HOTSPOTS (AI134673), UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO DENVER,

Collaborator: Liu, Yang, Sichuan Center for Disease Control and Prevention (SCDCP), CHINA;

Intramural

Malaria Parasite Development, Drug Resistance, Pathogenesis, and Genomics (AI000892)

Site Collaborator: Fangli Lu (Sun Yat-sen University) Jing Yuan (Xiamen University) Weiqing Pan (Second Military Medical University) Wenyue Xu (The Third Military Medical University) , Chongqing China , Guangzhou China , Shanghai China , Xiamen China

Lab: LMVR, Intramural Investigator: Xin-zhuan Su, Xinzhuan Su

Host-parasite-vector interactions during malaria transmission (AI001250)

Site Collaborator: Sibao Wang (Shanghai Institutes for Biological Sciences) , China

Lab: LMVR

OTHER AREAS

Direct Foreign

Influence of gut microbiota on vector competence of disease transmitting insects (AI129819)

PI: Wang, Jingwen, FUDAN UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Wang, Jingwen, FUDAN UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

Domestic with Foreign Subcomponent

GENETIC LINKAGE IN LUPUS (AI024717), CINCINNATI CHILDRENS HOSP MED CTR,

Collaborators: Zhang, Xuejun, ANHUI MEDICAL UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

COMPLEMENT IN INFLAMMATORY DISEASES: MECHANISMS & THERAPEUTIC MODULATION (AI068730), UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Collaborators: Gang, Cheng, TONGJI HOSPITAL, CHINA;

VIRAL MEDIATED TYPE I INTERFERON INDUCTION (AI069120), UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES,

Collaborators: Qin, Xiaofeng, CHINESE ACADEMY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, CHINA;

MECHANISMS THAT REGULATE ANTIBODY CLASS SWITCH RECOMBINATION AND SOMATIC HYPERMUTATION (AI077595), BOSTON CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL,

Collaborators: Meng, Feilong, CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCE SHANGHAI, CHINA;

REGULATION OF JUVENILE HORMONE TITERS IN MOSQUITOES (AI045545), FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators : Li, Sheng, SHANGHAI INSTITUTES FOR BIOLOGICAL SCIS, CHINA;

ROLE OF NCRNA SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX "RNA EXOSOME" IN CLASS SWITCH RECOMBINATION AND SOMATIC HYPERMUTATION (AI099195), COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES,

Collaborators: Deng, Haiteng, TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO IMMUNITY AND INFLAMMATION (AI100627), SCRIPPS RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Collaborators: Han, Jiahuai, Xiamen University, CHINA;

METABOLIC PROGRAMMING IN TH17 CELL DIFFERENTIATION (AI114581), RESEARCH INST NATIONWIDE CHILDREN'S HOSP

Collaborators: Huang, XingXu, Nanjing University, CHINA;

MHC AND KIR REGION GENOMICS IN PSORIASIS (AI119125), UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO,

Collaborators: Zhang, Zue-Jun, ANHUI MEDICAL UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

MONOCLONAL ANTIBODY FOR AUTOIMMUNE DISEASE (AI120433),

Collaborators : Chen, Chris, WuXi Biologics, CHINA;

REGULATION OF T FOLLICULAR HELPER CELL DIFFERENTIATION BY MICRORNAS (AI121155),

Collaborators: Qi, Hai, TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

TCR-LIKE ANTIBODIES FOR HPV-INDUCED CANCER BASIC RESEARCH AND THERANOSTICS (AI121242), FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RESEARCH CENTER,

Collaborators: Ma, Jie, Henan Cancer Hospital, , CHINA;

SPATIO-TEMPORAL DATA INTEGRATION METHODS FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE SURVEILLANCE (AI125842), UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY,

Collaborators : Gao, Wuchun, Beijing Institute of Microbiology & Epidemiology, CHINA; Yang, Changhong, China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sichuan, CHINA; zhou, Xiao-Nong, CHINESE CENTERS /DISEASE CONTROL & PREV, CHINA;

REGULATION OF DERMAL GAMMADelta T CELLS BY MICROBIAL

PATHOGENS/COMMENSALS IN HEALTH AND PSORIASIS (AI128818), UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE,

Collaborators : Zheng, Jie, Shanghai Jiaotong University School of Medicine, CHINA;

LIVER TISSUE-RESIDENT NATURAL KILLER CELLS (AI128845), WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators : Tian, Zhigang, University of Science and Technology, CHINA;

IMMUNOLOGICAL IDENTITY REDEFINED BY GENETICALLY FOREIGN MICROCHIMERIC CELLS (AI131080), CINCINNATI CHILDRENS HOSP MED CTR,

Collaborators: Qiu, Xiu, GUANGDONG WOMEN AND CHILDREN HOSPITAL, CHINA;

DEVELOPING A SMALL PEPTIDE TO CONTROL AUTOIMMUNE INFLAMMATION IN TYPE 1 DIABETES (AI131784), OP-T-MUNE, INC.,

Collaborators: Draper, Kenneth, WUXI BIOLOGICS, CHINA;

THE ROLE OF CANONICAL AND NON-CANONICAL AUTOPHAGY IN B CELL IMMUNITY (AI135052),

Collaborators: Zhang, Hong, INSTITUTE OF BIOPHYSICS, CHINA;

COMPARATIVE GENOMIC ANALYSIS OF SPECIFICITY TO MOSQUITOES IN METARHIZIUM PINGSHAENSE BASIS FOR IMPROVED BIOLOGICAL CONTROL (AI135751),

Collaborators: Wang, Chengshu, Shanghai Institutes of Biological Sciences, CHINA;

E3 LIGASE MEDIATED CONTROL OF FOXP3 EXPRESSION AND IMMUNE SUPPRESSION-MECHANISMS AND POTENTIAL AS IMMUNOTHERAPEUTIC TARGET (AI137046), JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Li, Bin, SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

CHARACTERIZING PARENTAL BELIEFS TO SUPPORT OPTIMIZATION OF VACCINE INTRODUCTION (AI137123), UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AT ANN ARBOR,

Collaborators: Xiaodong, Sun, SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL CTR/DISEASE/CONT/PREV, CHINA;

UNDERSTANDING AND HARNESSING THE FUNCTIONS OF B CELLS TO PREVENT PRETERM LABOR (AI138089), WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Li, Genxia, ZHENGZHOU UNIVERSITY NO 3 HOSPITAL OF JIHE NANSHENG MATERNITY AND CHILD CARE HOSPITAL, CHINA;

IN-SITU GEL OF POVIDONE IODINE/BUDESONIDE AS SUSTAINED NASAL DRUG DELIVERY FOR THE TREATMENT OF CHRONIC RHINOSINUSITIS (AI138660),

Collaborators: Wei, Gang, FUDAN UNIVERSITY, CHINA;

LEAD OPTIMIZATION OF HITS IDENTIFIED FROM VIRTUAL AND EXPERIMENTAL SCREENS OF MULTIPLE INDUSTRIAL LIBRARIES DNDI (AI141227), NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY,

Collaborators: Hao, Xingjie, WuXi Aptec, CHINA;

AUTOPHAGY MODULATORS AS NOVEL BROAD SPECTRUM ANTI-INFECTIVE AGENTS (AI142784), UT SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER,

Collaborators: Yu, Li, Tsinghua University, CHINA;

POLYMICROBIAL INTERACTIONS IN CROHN'S DISEASE (AI145289),

Collaborators: Huang, Guanghu, CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (BEIJING), CHINA;

CASPASE-8 AS A FOCAL HUB IN EFFECTOR-TRIGGERED IMMUNITY (AI146855),

Collaborators: Shao, Feng, National Institute of Biological Sciences, CHINA;

Intramural

Regulation of SIGNALLING PATHWAYS INVOLVING NUCLEAR FACTOR KAPPA B (AI000565)

Site Collaborator: Wei Lu (Chinese Academy of sciences), Shanghai China

Lab: LISB, Intramural Investigator: Michael Lenardo

Regulation of CTCF Functions and Target Sites by Cancer/Testis-specific CTCF Like BORIS Factor (AI001021)

Site Collaborator: Alex Strunnikov (Guangzhou Institutes of Biomedicine and Health),

Guangzhou China

Lab: LIG

Endotoxin Detoxification (AI001139)

Site Collaborator: Mingfang Lu (Fudan University), Shanghai China

Lab: LCIB

Transcriptional Regulation of Immune Cell Development, Activation and Functions (AI001169)

Site Collaborator: B Sun (Shanghai Institute of Biochemistry and Cell Biology) Bing Sun

(Shanghai Institute of Biochemistry and Cell Biology), Shanghai China

Lab: LISB

Innate inflammatory responses during pulmonary infections (AI001207)

Site Collaborator: Feng Shao (National Institute of Biological Sciences) Jianqing Xu (Fudan University) Ka-Wing Wong (Fudan University) Yanzhen Song (Fudan University) Yanzheng Song (Fudan University), China, Beijing China
Lab: LCIM

Antigenicity and Immunogenicity of Stabilized prefusion F protein (AI005129)

Site Collaborator: NingShao Xia (Xiamen Medical University), Xiamen China
Lab: VPL

US – China Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding

- In September 2016, HHS renewed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China's Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) with the intent to further enhance and expand cooperative efforts in health and medical sciences.
- In October 2010, the NIH Director and the President of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) signed a MOU. Then NIH and NSFC further signed an Implementing Arrangement (IA) in December 2010 to develop a new U.S.-China Program for Biomedical Research Cooperation. The MOU was renewed in 2015 and will expire on October 2020.
- In June 19, 2008, NIAID signed an Implementation Plan with the China National Center for Biotechnology Development (CNCBD) of the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) to expand collaborative research and training efforts on infectious diseases, microbiology and immunology. Under the Implementation Plan, NIAID and China's Henan Provincial Bureau of Health in Zhengzhou signed an implementation arrangement on April 29, 2009 to foster research on tuberculosis, including clinical research on new treatments for multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB). The Henan Provincial Bureau of Health and the NIAID plan to develop jointly a collaborative TB research program at the Henan Provincial Chest Hospital.
- An umbrella agreement between the U.S. Government and the government of the People's Republic of China on cooperation in science and technology, originally signed in 1979, continues to be extended and active.
- An agreement between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China was signed on April 18, 2006, to enhance and expand cooperative efforts in health and biomedical sciences.
- A memorandum of understanding between HHS and the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China was signed in 2005 to promote closer cooperation, capacity building, and exchange of information in the field of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases.
- A memorandum of understanding between HHS and the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China was signed in 2002 to foster cooperation on HIV/AIDS prevention, research, treatment, and care.
- The original Science and Technology (S&T) Agreement was signed by Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Since 1983, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has had an agreement with the Chinese Academy of Sciences for cooperation in the basic biomedical sciences. The S&T Agreement was last renewed in 2018.

General Talking Points

- NIAID highly values ongoing scientific cooperation with China and welcome exploring new or expanded research collaboration on areas of mutual interests/priorities.
- The U.S.-China Program for Biomedical Collaborative Research is a robust bilateral program co-funded by NSFC and NIH.
- One of the largest groups of Visiting Scientists at NIH comes from China.

Publications Related to NIAID Grants

China had numerous NIAID grant related publications. The majority reported on research findings in HIV, viral infections, immunology, and bacterial and parasitic diseases, particularly malaria. Several addressed vector biology, fungal infections, and tuberculosis.

Links to Other Information on China

- WHO Information on China: [HYPERLINK "<http://www.who.int/countries/chn/en/>"]
- U.S. State Department Information on China: [HYPERLINK "<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ci/bgn/18902.htm>"]
- CIA World Fact Book – China:[HYPERLINK "<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pc.html>"] [HYPERLINK "<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>"]

Produced to Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Pursuant to Oversight Request
Do Not Disclose Without Permission from Department of Health and Human Services

From: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]
Sent: 7/14/2023 2:46:00 PM
To: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]; daszak([REDACTED])
CC: roberts([REDACTED]); Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]; j_sturchio([REDACTED]); chmura([REDACTED])
Subject: RE: Confidential - re. David Morens' email issue

I'm glad you have that backup documentation, it never hurts to know you can put it on the table when it is necessary. Science works by challenging viewpoints with data objectively and competently obtained. Science works when communication, discussion and dispute are open and transparent. The Washington Post says Democracy Dies In Darkness and we can say the same for science.

Jerry

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 14, 2023 10:33 AM
To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; daszak([REDACTED])
Cc: roberts([REDACTED]); hotez([REDACTED]); j_sturchio([REDACTED]); chmura([REDACTED])
Subject: Re: Confidential - re. David Morens' email issue

I like your optimism! Your scenario has crossed my mind, because I have to keep remembering I did nothing wrong

I was the first person to alert Tony about what turned out to be a pandemic, a month later, and I am pretty sure the first to tell him this virus almost certainly arose from nature, in the early days of January, and provided him evidence in the form of publications and emails from people like Peter and Eddie

And, I never had any conversation or email with him that could be construed as anything other than honest and fair

As to your question I probably have 5 or so emails from nih od and maybe from niaid leadership. plus handwritten notes from some phone calls and the Zoom meeting with Tabak et al. I have saved and printed out all of these

Other than my occasional expletive and the email deletion charge (which I can defend I feel sure) there is nothing to find except a hard working scientist doing his job

I think I mentioned yesterday that I spoke at length with Linda Saif's lawyer, Kristine Blackwood, and she is wonderful. She will either represent me or, more likely, get one of her top colleagues to do so. This would be because representing Linda and me would be a potential conflict if the subcommittee tried to play us off against each other, which I think is doubtful (but she said it could be an ethics issue and she has to think it through)

Thanks to you and our colleagues for your support
david

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jul 13, 2023, 22:31, Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> wrote:

How many written messages from NIH OD and the legal office do you have? These will help to tell the story of your experience with them. Even the Republican congressthings might give you a promotion, a bonus, and a raise in salary and benefits for that.

Remember, they are actually not after you. The targets in addition to Tony are Francis Collins and by default Larry Tabak. By telling it like it was and is you can come out smelling like roses and they might come off as the stink-bombs in the room.

Jerry

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2023 7:28 PM
To: Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]@daszak[REDACTED]>
Cc: roberts [REDACTED] hotez@[REDACTED] j_sturchio@[REDACTED] chmura@[REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Confidential - re. David Morens' email issue

Thank you!!!! It is true I didn't have to respond, but as I surmised, and the lawyer stro gly agreed (her name is Kristine Blackwood, by th e way), NiH was trying to force me look bad by preventing me from replying to the committee until the very last minute, and then when it was too late to fully respond, telling me they withdrew all attempts to respond on my behalf and I was entirely on my own. Now I am asked to produce my own past emails residing on government servers, but they won't allow nih IT employees to search those servers to find them. Gotcha

Kristine was appalled and said two interesting things: first that I should not complain to the Subcommittee about nih throwing me under the bus, and second that the Subcommittee, which approached NIH directly, and not me, would immediately see the treachery involved and be royally passed at nih.

From her telling, if a committee approaches nih about any matter, they expect nih to fully respond back to them, never mind what I might do

But here is a new wrinkle

An hour after I contacted by email the Subcommittee, the HHS counsel (not nih, but hhs) emailed me out of tge blue saying lucky you, the Subcommittee just decided for some unknown reason to give you more time to work with them

Smell a rat?

My take is that there may be several layers of games being played out and I, as the mere pawn on the chessboard, am the only one being kept totally out of the loop

What was it that Shakespeare said about killing all the lawyers?

d

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jul 13, 2023, 18:50, Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> wrote:

Most important David is that you remain focused, with a consistent message no matter how aggressive or inappropriate the questions. And as part of that you seem to have landed with a highly qualified lawyer who believes in our cause. I will thank Linda for her rapid response and support.

The NIH you are talking about is OD under Collins, now Tabak, and with Lauer and his agenda in place. NIH, however, is not OD (unless of course we are talking about the likes of Harold Varmus, which is the NIH OD I think fondly of). It is rather the ICs and NIAID under Tony and hopefully in the future once again (no negative implications about Hugh intended) that is the heart, soul, and brain of NIH, and that has not changed.

Your response sounds perfect to me, including requesting time to obtain counsel. That alone will put a pause in the subcommittee's plans for two reasons. First its reasonable to allow you to have legal counsel if you want, and second you are seeking legal counsel. I don't think you have been subpoenaed so I think you don't have to respond personally if you don't want to. A subpoena is a different story. I have never personally responded to the Senate committee asking me to speak to them, and instead have allowed the BU government relations person in DC handle it. In the meanwhile I have received at least one additional request, as if I hadn't responded even though BU was in touch with the staff. No consequences so far, nor do I expect any. As Trump has shown, delaying one's appearance can make it seem less relevant as their short attention span turns to someone else who might be an easier target for their ultimate agenda. It's not you, nor is it me. It's ultimately Tony they are after.

Hang tough.

Jerry

From: kuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2023 6:25 PM
To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; daszak [REDACTED]
Cc: roberts [REDACTED]; hotez [REDACTED]; j_sturchio [REDACTED]; chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Confidential - re. David Morens' email issue

Jerry, that is true. I have scratched my brain and can honestly say I don't think I have ever forwarded or inappropriately discussed government business outside proper channels

It might be argued that discussing Peter's grant situation with him and others was government business, but this was only in the context of supporting Peter and emphasizing things like there is an appeals process and guidelines for when a grant can be terminated. All this is in the public domain. I have never seen let alone made a decision on any of Peter' grants nor have I tried to influence anyone who did. They can troll my emails forever but they won't find anything

You might be interested to know the following from my crazy day

First thanks to all of you for helping! Jerry, I did connect with Linda Saif, she did share with me her counsel, who I did call and who spent a free hour on the phone with me giving free advice. She will now either represent me or connect me with a colleague in her 1,000+ person firm. She will also propose that I be represented pro Bono because she is so outraged as what is going on. Incidentally she worked in the Obama administration and represented both Secs Sibelius and Burwell, and was also lead counsel for Francis Collins in some of his recent travails. She is rightfully pissed at what is happening.

Mid day today, both NIAID and NIH OD took back their demand that I NOT respond to the House Subcommittee and said I was on my own: I either respond or not, but they can't defend or even help me. In other words they repeatedly told me don't you dare respond to the Subcommittee (who contacted nih, but not me) unless we say so, but now, less than three hours after an nih response was due, they said we decided not to respond. Defend yourself if you can.

This is how you get thrown under the bus: let us handle your defense, but when the lynch mob shows up they say sorry, save yourself if you can, or not. It's your problem now

With literally 40 minutes before cob today, Linda's lawyer helped me craft an emergency response. I called the Subcommittee staff office and told them I would be defending myself, was seeking counsel, was fully cooperating, etc. I then emailed the staff director from my govt email, expressed my willingness to respond to all requests, and added that additional time to be able to retain and meet with counsel would be appreciated

Peter D, Jerry, Rich, and all of you, thanks for advice and support. I am sad to have learned the hard way that my agency, for which I have worked for 25 years, is eager to throw me under the bus and even conspire to complicate my situation

Evil has somehow crept into the system

dmm

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jul 12, 2023, 22:21, Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> wrote:

I don't think David ever sent NIH records. The only possible exception I can think of would be forwarding something from Greg Folkers with an article from the Washington Post or NY Times and that is hardly sharing government documents. These would be in the category of publicly available news articles being shared with scientific colleagues for information and thoughtful discussion. Seems to me a first amendment right and it would be rather suicidal for them to pull that card. Jerry

Sent from my iPhone

On Jul 12, 2023, at 4:07 PM, Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]> wrote:

Below is a letter from the National Archives Administration to NIH, 2 days ago, giving NIH 30 days to investigate and explain what they're doing to make sure this sort of thing (NIH staff allegedly doing official business on private emails) does not happen again.

<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23872063-nara-nih-morens-letter>

Ugly stuff, but it puts the onus on NIH to come up with recommendations. These don't sound like issues that should lead an agency to fire a long-serving senior executive.

By the way, I found this on James C. Tobias' Twitter account. He's an annoying, lab-leak-leaning, pseudo reporter who files FoIAs then writes pretty shoddy pieces for the Intercept and other fringe outlets. But, for those of you who don't understand the value of Twitter – when there's new information, it tends to appear there first because people are trying to 'show off' that they're the first to know...

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2023 3:54 PM

To: 'kuiipo9' [REDACTED] 'keusch' [REDACTED] 'roberts' [REDACTED]

'hotez' [REDACTED]

Cc: 'j_sturchio' [REDACTED], Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]

Subject: Confidential - re. David Morens' email issue

Importance: High

David,

I'm visiting DC tomorrow. I have a meeting with Julie Liao from NAM and Richard Hatchett, CEPI CEO to try to get CEPI to join the Forum on Microbial Threats – that's at 3:30pm.

I'll arrive in DC by train at 11:40am. Can we meet for lunch? Or just a coffee somewhere between 12:15 and 2:45pm

Re. the issue of lawyers. I've attached the transcribed interviews of each of the Proximal Origins authors, not just those who appeared in the hearing yesterday. When they did their transcribed interviews, they each had attorneys

representing them and/or their institutions. That gives you a list of names/companies to approach to see if they'll represent you and how much they'd cost.

I have some ideas from others re. how you can defend yourself and how to get ahead of the harassment. I look forward to talking about these with you either tomorrow in person or by phone..

One point is that at the end of the hearing yesterday the Chairman's closing statements referred to you and your emails. The Chairman (Wenstrup) said that they've requested an investigation into your emails from "NARA – the National Archives Administration". That process is likely to take some time, and they'll file a report, and NIH (considering the way they treated us) will likely wait until that's done before deciding how to deal with you.

You can listen to that bit on the link below at 3:15:10 (3 hours, 15 mins ,10 seconds into the video).

<https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/investigating-the-proximal-origin-of-a-cover-up/>

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: kuipo9 [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2023 7:19 PM

To: keusch([REDACTED]); roberts([REDACTED]); hotez([REDACTED]); daszak([REDACTED])

Cc: j_sturchio([REDACTED]); chmura([REDACTED])

Subject: Re: Trouble in River City

Again, as a follow up, please see my query from last week, below, re potential legal advice

Today I watched 3 hours of Kristian Anderson and Bob Garry being grilled by tge House Subcommittee. Not a pretty sight, but they pushed back repeatedly a ND I think won the day

I am scheduled to go to the th e Hill to be excoriated on 8/2. I am accused (falsely) of violating govt rules by using my Gmail for govt business

As I mentioned the NIH Directors office (tabak) has telegraphed they may try to throw me under the bus by bringing "career ending disciplinary action" against me for allegedly using my Gmail to do dirty work for Tony.

Needless to say, I hope, that is not true

Our NIAID Deputy director is essentially begging me to get a lawyer as the best way to protect myself, because they believe I am about to be thrown under the bus by the NIH OD

So I am asking for info on who I might contact, eg, the guy Linda Saif spoke to or anyone up on these issues

Or maybe if anyone helped Bob or Kristian. I am loathe to contact those 2 directly, although I did speak to them both face to face a few weeks ago, and had great discussions with both, so I am primed to contact them on my encrypted mail

I also had a brief chat with Hugh, our acting niaid director. I would say he is passionately disgusted with what is going on but feels he is powerless to do much to change the situation.

Thanks, David

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jul 5, 2023, 17:46, kuuipo9- [REDACTED] wrote:

Jerry et al,

I need some advice

I got a call this afternoon from Jill Harper, our Deputy Director for operations in NIAID, the number 2 under Acting Director Hugh Auchincloss

She is an old friend, good friend, going back 25+ years, and I totally trust her

She is concerned that the way things are shaping up, NIH may be positioning itself to throw me under the bus with career ending disciplinary action for using Gmail for official business. The tone of her voice was that she knows more than she can say and is trying to tip me off. her words and tone alarmed me that shit could be about to happen

Alternatively, maybe she is just over-reacting. I don't know but I am worried as this is not like her....

Also, I can fairly say that my using Gmail to avoid foia's had nothing to do with nih business, and everything to do with supporting and trying to protect science friends and colleagues who were being attacked, which is not government business. But, then, that could be a matter of opinion

Where is the ACLU when we really need them?????

In the recent past a couple of you have suggested that I speak with a lawyer but I didn't follow up for two

reasons: I didn't believe I was in serious trouble, and I am in a very difficult financial pinch which has forced me to sell my car, put my house up for sale, and drain whatever accounts I have. (this has nothing to do with my nih malfeasance but rather to nih's decision to cut my salary by 100k and my ex wife's ability to, after 15+ years, quadruple my payments to her) Clearly: shit happens!!!

So, while I might not be able to put a \$1,000-an-hour lawyer on the payroll, I can surely get some expert advice to cover my ass

I will appreciate your advice as long as it doesn't cost a fortune.

The back up plan is that nih fires me, I liquidate, and find a cabin in the woods somewhere. SOMEPLACE NICE. Ideas welcome. I could imagine Michigan, where I grew up, the wonderful Northeast, Soutuh and North Carolina, the Chesapeake's Eastern Shore, Idaho or Montana, or even Canada (I have a Canadian grandfather and Canadian relatives on both sides).

Ideas welcome!!!

d

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jun 30, 2023, 13:30, Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> wrote:

You did no government business in those calls and messages. If corporations can be a person and have commensurate rights, if people who threaten others on social media can do so as protected personal speech, then you can talk to friends outside of your office about the weather, baseball, and politics, all of which have political context.

Give them hell, but the key is to do it nicely. As you can see I'm gearing up for my invitation to meet with them, although the BU lawyers and government affairs people are intervening in the conversation to keep that from happening.

Jerry

From: kuuipo9 <[REDACTED]>

Sent: Friday, June 30, 2023 10:31 AM

To: Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]>; roberts<[REDACTED]>; hotez <[REDACTED]> daszak<[REDACTED]>

Cc: j_sturchio<[REDACTED]> chmura<[REDACTED]>

Subject: Re: The Intercept is reporting on David Morens' "dodgy" emails

Thanks, I am comfortable speaking to them and look forward to pushing back. Before that day, NIH lawyers and leadership will insist on briefing me and will probably tell me not to go into this or that, if at all possible

They claim I have committed a crime by using my Gmail to avoid foia's and intend to intimidate me and nih by demanding I be fired.

I will need to read up on whether what I did was a "crime" or, as I have always understood, merely a policy

I think I can defend myself in a way that any reasonable person would agree with

We will see,..... david

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jun 30, 2023, 09:49, Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> wrote:

When I google Wenstrup the only hearing that comes up is for July 11 with the likes of Kristian, Eddie Holmes, Bob Garry, Ian Lipkin. That's good because it will give you a flavor of the questions and the responses. Don't be afraid to tell it like it is – science works because it is a process. Talking science with others is the way it works.

Jerry

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2023 8:24 AM
To: roberts [REDACTED]; hotez [REDACTED]; daszak [REDACTED]
Cc: Keusch, Gerald T <keusch [REDACTED]>; j_sturchio [REDACTED]; chmura@ [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: The Intercept is reporting on David Morens' "dodgy" emails

[dmmorens@ \[REDACTED\]](mailto:dmmorens@ [REDACTED])

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

So true, and ironically most of the foia'd emails they are cruciying me for were sent to a friend and a boss (Peter and Tony) who were being unjustly attacked and threatened with death, in order to support and help protect them

Now they are saying that's a crime

d

----- Original Message -----

On Jun 30, 2023, 00:32, Roberts, Rich <[REDACTED]> wrote:

David:

Appalling again. I guess it is better not to communicate at all if you work for the US government. Too bad the jerks on these committees don't abide by those rules.

Rich

Richard J. Roberts
New England Biolabs
240 County Road

lpswich, MA 01938-2723
USA

[REDACTED]

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2023 5:56 PM
To: hotez@[REDACTED] daszak@[REDACTED]
Cc: keusch@[REDACTED] j_sturchio@[REDACTED] Roberts, Rich <roberts@[REDACTED]>; chmura@[REDACTED]
Subject: Re: The Intercept is reporting on David Morens' "dodgy" emails

EXTERNAL SENDER

Guys, this morning a request came from Brad Westrop, Chair of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to appear before them on 2 August

I believe this is the same date that Kristian Anderson is scheduled to appear

The letter is highly accusatory and clearly aimed at bringing down Tony, claiming that he and I colluded to cover up the truth

I don't want to copy and send to you but if you can't find it, it must already be in the public domain as three reporters have already emailed me about it

If all else fails and you can't get it i can go to FedEx and fax it, but there is really nothing new except me telling you, Peter, in an email, to consider "suing the assholes" harassing you

NIH is semi- backing me but also telling me to get a lawyer, hinting that if things get tough, I get thrown under the bus.

I am not too worried and actually look forward to giving these guys a polite middle finger. But tactical advice is appreciated.

If that fails I might be asking y'all for a reference in a job search!
david

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jun 29, 2023, 16:41, Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED] wrote:

Many thanks Peter

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP

Texas Children's Hospital: Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics | Co-Director, [Texas Children's Hospital Center for Vaccine Development](#) | Donate to our [COVID-19 Vaccine Development](#)

Baylor College of Medicine: Dean, [National School of Tropical Medicine](#) | Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology | Health Policy Scholar

Baylor University, University Professor

Rice University, Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty

Texas A&M University, Faculty-Senior Fellow, Hagler Inst for Advanced Study & Scowcroft Institute of Intl Affairs

[E-mail](#) | [Twitter](#) | [LinkedIn](#) | Skype: p.hotez

[Amazon Author Center](#) | [Daily Beast Contributor](#)

Media Inquiries:

homa.shalchi@bcm.edu

tchteam@dpwpr.com

kfcarvil@texaschildrens.org

iPhone

On Jun 29, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

CAUTION: This email is not from a BCM Source. Only click links or open attachments you know are safe.

By the way - if you open the emails (just 47 pages of them and many are repeated) you'll see that the discussion is a good one - it lays out an explanation for how the NIH was correct to classify our proposed work at WIV as not gain-of-function, and why the results did not show unexpected viral titers. Hopefully it will be a storm in a teacup at worse

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 8th Avenue, New York, NY10018-6507, USA

www.EcoHealthAlliance.org

On Jun 29, 2023, at 4:05 PM, Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

To be honest it's not that bad and comes across as the Republicans being very petty.

Here's the link: <https://theintercept.com/2023/06/29/covid-nih-personal-cmail-foia/>

They don't show evidence of anyone covering up information on covid origins - just a group of scientists who are sick of being foia'd.

I hope NIH won't take this any further David. Keep strong - this will be used mainly to attack Bob Garry, Kristian Anderson etc who are testifying before the select covid committee on July 11th.

This story comes on a Thursday before July 4th extended weekend. Let's see if it reaches the main news outlets. It may not.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President
EcoHealth Alliance

520 8th Avenue, New York, NY10018-6507, USA

www.EcoHealthAlliance.org

On Jun 27, 2023, at 8:39 PM, kuuipo9 [REDACTED] wrote:

Don,t forget that there are Jews in outer space burning California forests with laser beams, causing terrible wildfires. Maybe we should get on top of that too! dmm

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Jun 27, 2023, 18:01, Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] wrote:

Well between this idea and injecting bleach we now have feasible solutions for climate change and pandemics. I'm relieved to know it.

Jerry

From: Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2023 5:27 PM
To: Jeffrey Sturchio <[REDACTED]>; peter hotez <[REDACTED]>; Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> Rich Roberts <[REDACTED]>; David Morens <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Texas representative asks the Bureau of Land Management if they can "change the orbit of the moon" to help with climate change.

This is from 2 years ago. Although I believe the BLM never did find a way to do this, I did hear that the earth groaned slightly as he said it....

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JsA72dLabiY>

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474


Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Jeffrey Sturchio <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2023 8:12 AM
To: Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>; peter hotez <[REDACTED]>; M. D. Gerald T. Keusch <[REDACTED]> Rich Roberts <[REDACTED]>; David Morens <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]>
Subject: ICYMI: NYT Op-ed reinforcing that Peter H's decision not to debate RFK Jr was the right one

[Opinion | It's Not Possible to 'Win' an Argument With Robert F. Kennedy Jr. - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com)



Opinion | It's Not Possible to 'Win' an
Argument With Robert F. Kennedy Jr.

You can't win a debate against someone who disregards
facts.

www.nytimes.com

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: 4/4/2023 4:28:09 PM
To: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; j_sturchio [REDACTED]; Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]; roberts [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Gmail foia

Importance: High

CAUTION: This email is not from a BCM Source. Only click links or open attachments you know are safe.

Thanks for letting us know David. What a shame that our communications will now be used to beat us about the head and body with.

The story will be "Secret cabal of deep state NIH and other scientists worked to prevent information on NIH's work with WIV being released" or something similar.

I expect they'll be putting out a story in a week or two, just like they did with the other HHS emails that were handed over: <https://nypost.com/2023/03/05/new-emails-show-fauci-commissioned-paper-to-disprove-wuhan-lab-leak-theory/>

I'll start going through your gmail emails to see what they say.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, April 4, 2023 7:02 AM
To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; chmura@ [REDACTED]; j_sturchio [REDACTED]; hotez [REDACTED]; roberts [REDACTED]
Subject: Gmail foia

Peter and all,

Got a call from bldg 1 this morning at 630. The house committee wants hard copies of ALL my Gmail relating

to YOU, Peter, Ian Lipkin, and any Bloomberg reporter I have ever communicated with. I have to provide this by COB today

I have spoken to and emailed with various Bloomberg reporters over the years but can't remember who I said what to. Most likely Jason Gale. Don't recall speaking with Ian lately. I think he and I had a Zoom call early in the pandemic. Please give him a heads up for me

Incidentally, in the past month or so you all have inadvertently sent emails to my Gmail account on a number of occasions

Please make sure u that anything you send me 1) goes to my new account and 2) does not contain an email trail with old emails containing my Gmail or govt account

Sorry for this inconvenience, just trying to protect us all. david

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

Message

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: 2/13/2024 12:25:49 AM
To: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; David Morens [REDACTED]
CC: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Alison Andre [REDACTED]; Riva Rubenoff [REDACTED]; Armine Arustamyan [REDACTED]
Subject: Comment from head of the DMID program at NIAID
Attachments: NIHs Additional Award Conditions to EHA April 26 2023.pdf; Letter to Emily Linde NIAID re. 2 remaining SACs 2.6.24 FINAL.pdf

Importance: High

Please read the email chain below.

On advice from David Morens, I sent a copy of our recent letter to NIAID (and the original one from NIH re. the Specific Award Conditions) over to the head (Emily Erbelding) and Dep-Dir (Cristina Cassetti) of the Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases at NIAID, with an explanation.

I got a rapid response, which is a good sign.

We'll await the actual response from NIAID Grants Management, but I'll set the date of 15th March for us to follow up and strongly request (cc'd to lawyers) that they allow us to negotiate our IACUC with OLAW. The timing's important because we'll be setting up for the next year of our R01 and a renewal proposal on our CREID U01. We need to have that in place, or we lose a competitive edge.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, February 12, 2024 6:03 PM
To: 'Erbelding, Emily (NIH/NIAID) [E]' [REDACTED]; 'Cassetti, Cristina (NIH/NIAID) [E]'

[REDACTED]
Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED] Riva Rubenoff [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Copy of a letter to NIAID grants management

Thanks so much for the response Emily, and I look forward to hearing back as soon as there's a decision reached.

We're all trying our best to keep focused on the science.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Erbelding, Emily (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, February 12, 2024 4:56 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Cassetti, Cristina (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]
Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Riva Rubenoff [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Copy of a letter to NIAID grants management

Hi Peter,

We are aware that the constraints are likely delaying your research progress, as is the leadership of NIAID. Your special award conditions are a subject of ongoing discussions between grants management and OER.

We remain hopeful for a clear path soon.

Regards,
Emily

Emily Erbelding, M.D., M.P.H.
Director, Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
NIAID/NIH
5601 Fishers Lane
Rockville, MD 20852

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, February 12, 2024 12:42 PM
To: Cassetti, Cristina (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]; Erbelding, Emily (NIH/NIAID) [E]
[REDACTED]
Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Riva Rubenoff [REDACTED]
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Copy of a letter to NIAID grants management
Importance: High

Hi Emily and Cristina,

I'm sending you this so you're aware of the issues we're having with NIAID grants management and the Specific Award Conditions that were applied to all EcoHealth Alliance grants and contracts last year and the year before. We've worked incredibly hard, and fast, to address every single issue raised by NIH grants management and NIAID grants management. NIH wrote to us on 12th January to confirm that we're in compliance and to remove 2 of the 4 SACs, and let us know that removal of the other two is up to NIAID. However, we've been getting continued stonewalling from NIAID grants management, including them missing their own deadline by 5 months for us to request removal of our Specific Award Conditions.

As you can imagine, I'm very worried that these oversight issues are being applied in an arbitrary way, and that they're going to impinge on our ability to conduct the work. It's now about 12 months since we've received any funds from NIAID, and our animal work is still on hold because NIAID refuses to allow OLAW to work with our IACUC until these compliance issues are addressed.

I don't know if it's possible for you to talk with NIAID grants management about this. I've cc'd our Program Officers on the letter, but it would be very helpful if you could let grants management know that this has potential to impact the agreed-upon work of our grants and contracts.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and are confident the content is safe.



National Institutes of Health
National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases
Bethesda, Maryland 20892

April 26, 2023

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-4182

Dear Dr. Chmura,

I am writing to inform you of the additional actions the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is taking with respect to grants administration at EcoHealth Alliance (EHA). As you recall, NIH has implemented additional oversight measures regarding EHA awards to ensure EHA's documented efforts to strengthen administrative processes meet NIH's expectations. NIH previously imposed Specific Award Conditions (SACs) on awards to EHA. As reflected in Notices of Award, NIH placed the initial SACs on:

- U01 AI151797 on August 29, 2020, and again on February 2, 2022
- U01 AI153420 on February 2, 2022
- R01 AI163118 on September 22, 2022

The award R01 AI110964 beginning on April 19, 2020, remains suspended pending the renegotiation of specific aims for the award without the involvement of the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Based on NIH's assessment, EHA is still undertaking corrective actions in terms of reaching compliance with several elements of the terms and conditions for the awards cited above. However, the NIH National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) identified remaining challenges in terms of achieving timely submissions, providing sufficient quality and accuracy of budgets and budget justifications, implementation and corrections of prior administrative failures identified and communicated to EHA both verbally and in writing. Additionally, NIAID reviewed EHA's year 3 subaward agreements, provided to NIAID on November 21, 2022, for U01 AI151797, on December 15, 2022, and February 1, 2023, for U01 AI153420 and found that none of these formal written agreements met all the minimum requirements set forth in the NIH Grants Policy Statement, a term and condition of every NIH grant award, Section 15.2 Administrative and Other Requirements. See attached, subaward evaluation charts, for specific elements missing from each written agreement.

NIH acknowledges prior cooperation and substantial improvement in EHA processes and recognizes EHA is still working on implementing corrective actions. However, given the seriousness of these challenges, and in accordance with Federal regulations at Title 2 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Part 200.208(b) and NIHGPS Section 8.5, Specific Award Conditions and remedies for noncompliance (specific award conditions and Enforcement Actions), NIH will provide additional oversight of EHA's management of its grant awards, while EHA addresses the material deficiencies related to financial reporting and subrecipient monitoring. Additional specific award conditions will enable NIH grants management

officials to provide additional oversight and monitoring of spending on the grant while permitting EHA to continue work on this grant project.

Therefore, NIH is immediately instituting four SACs on NIAID awards to EHA, including R01 AI110964, U01 AI151797, R01 AI163118, U01 AI153420, along with any future NIH awards to EHA until the corrective actions described below have been implemented by EHA and accepted by NIH.

The four SACs NIH is instituting, described in more detail below, are:

1. Prior approval of subaward written agreement required, prior to entering into consortium agreements
2. Removal of eligibility for unrestricted advance payment
3. Develop or improve written policies and procedures that comply with NIH requirements for:
 - a. charging costs to NIH awards, and
 - b. entering into written agreements and monitoring subrecipients
4. Independent third-party financial capability review

The conversion from an unrestricted advance payment method to a cash request method extends to any future awards to EHA inclusive of any subaward agreements where EHA serves as a subrecipient on an NIH award.

SAC #1 – Prior approval of subaward written agreement required, prior to entering into consortium agreements

This SAC requires that, prior to entering into consortium agreements, EHA must submit all draft subaward agreements to NIH for prior approval, in accordance with NIHGPS [Section 8.1.3 Requests for Prior Approval](#). Written agreements must be submitted at the following times:

- For the four above-referenced active awards, EHA must renegotiate and resubmit any written agreements for subawards for which work is planned to continue the stated aims of the award beyond the date of this letter, prior to NIH allowing any work by that subrecipient organization.
- Once the written agreement is approved, EHA must submit any proposed amendments to written agreements to NIH for prior approval no later than 30 days before the proposed effective date of the amendment.
- For future subawards requested during a period of performance, and in accordance with NIHGPS [Section 8.1.3 Requests for Prior Approval](#), EHA must submit the written agreement to NIH no later than 30 days before the proposed start of the subaward agreement.
- For future subawards identified in a competing grant application, NIH will require the written agreement as part of Just-in-Time (See NIHGPS [Section 2.5.1 Just-in-Time Procedures](#)).

NIH will only approve written agreements that include, at a minimum, the specific requirements set forth in NIHGPS [Section 15.2 Administrative and Other Requirements](#).

SAC #2 – Removal of eligibility for unrestricted advance drawdown of funds

This SAC requires that payments received by EHA under this award be converted from an advance payment method to a reimbursement method, to ensure costs are appropriately charged to NIH awards in accordance with NIHGPS [Section 7.2 The Cost Principles](#).

EHA is ineligible for an unrestricted advance of funds due to this SAC; therefore, cash reimbursement requests must be submitted. Cash reimbursement requests are used when a recipient's cash management must be closely monitored. A recipient may be converted from an unrestricted advance payment method to a cash request basis if, during post-award administration, the responsible GMO determines that a recipient is not complying with the cash management requirements or other requirements of the award. While requests for reimbursement may be submitted monthly, a request for reimbursement may be submitted more often, if additional information is required by the grants management official within NIH. For timely receipt of cash reimbursements, a recipient must submit the request through the awarding office (in this case, NIAID) early enough for it to be forwarded to the HHS Payment Management System (PMS) and at least 20 days prior to the anticipated drawdown. PMS will make payments to the recipient electronically through the Automated Clearing House (ACH) process upon receipt of the approved payment request from the awarding Institute or Center (in this case, NIAID). Please see [NIHGPS Section 6.2 Cash Request](#) for additional information.

To ensure that grant payments are received in a timely manner the recipient must adhere to the specific award condition as outlined below:

This award is ineligible for an unrestricted advance of funds and is on a reimbursement only payment method. EHA is required to provide NIAID with a detailed listing of actual expenses incurred, along with supporting documentation, to support monthly drawdown requests for funds from PMS. The listing of actual monthly expenditures must be submitted via the provided unlocked spreadsheet, with expenses reported by budget category. Supporting documentation for each expense, including all products and services and subawards, must be included with the request. Acceptable documentation includes signed and approved timesheets with description of work performed for all personnel expenses; invoices for supplies, equipment, services or subawards, etc. with a description of the need and how it relates to the aims of the grant; a complete accounting of travel expenses (e.g., hotel, air, per diem) and an explanation of the reason for travel and how it relates to the aims of the grant, etc. All submitted invoices must align with and total the dollar amount submitted on the spreadsheet. If you have other categories of expenses, contact the NIAID grants management specialist to discuss documentation requirements. NIH must approve all drawdown requests before funds can be accessed in PMS. Please submit drawdown requests and supporting documentation to:

Shaun Gratton
Lead Grants Management Specialist
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases

National Institute of Health, DHHS
5601 Fishers Lane, Room 4G48, MSC 9824
Bethesda, MD 20892-9824
Phone: [REDACTED]
Fax: [REDACTED]
Email: [REDACTED]

All requests must be received by NIAID at least 20 business days prior to anticipated drawdown by EHA to provide sufficient time for review and approval by the appropriate awarding Institute/Center (IC) and transmission to PMS to ensure timely drawdowns.

SAC #3 – Develop or improve written policies and procedures that comply with NIH requirements for charging costs to NIH awards and entering into written agreements and monitoring subrecipients

This SAC requires EHA to develop or improve written policies and procedures to comply with NIH requirements for the following:

- a. Costs charged to NIH awards in accordance with NIHGPS Section 7.2 The Cost Principles. Policies should contain, at a minimum, information on roles and responsibilities; definitions; disclosure, review, and approval requirements and processes; timeliness of reporting, and consequences for noncompliance.
- b. Policy and processes used to enter into and monitoring subawards agreements under NIHGPS Section 15 Consortium Agreements. Policies and procedures must contain, at a minimum, information on roles and responsibilities; definitions; internal review and approval requirements and processes; how to negotiate subaward agreements; how to monitor subaward agreements, and consequences for noncompliance.

These policies and procedures must be provided to NIH for review no later than September 15, 2023. Please submit the documentation to:

Kristin Ta
Deputy Director, Office of Policy for Extramural Administration
Office of Extramural Research, Office of the Director
Phone: [REDACTED]
Email: [REDACTED]

SAC #4 – Independent third-party auditor

This SAC requires EHA to obtain an independent third-party accounting system audit. This must be a comprehensive review to determine if:

- Accounting practices are aligned with 2 C.F.R. § 200.302 Financial Management.
- EHA is financially capable of managing NIH grant funds in accordance with 2 C.F.R. § 200.302 Financial Management and maintains sufficient internal controls as required by 2 C.F.R. § 200.303 Internal Controls.

- Financial records are properly maintained as required by 2 C.F.R. § 200.334 Retention requirements for records.
- Financial reports are submitted to NIH timely and accurately.
- The recipient has complied with applicable laws, regulations, and terms and conditions of award.

For the independent third-party audit, EHA must select an organization that has not previously conducted an audit for EHA. EHA must submit potential firms to NIH for review by May 26, 2023. NIH will determine and communicate to EHA whether the selection is acceptable. The costs for the independent third-party audit may not be charged to NIH grants.

The report from this review must be provided to NIAID for review by September 15, 2023. NIAID will review the report, in detail, and will make informed decisions on whether EHA has satisfied the CAP within 60 days after the report is submitted.

Time allowed for completing corrective actions, and the method for requesting reconsideration of the conditions:

Please refer to the times noted above for the time allowed for completing the corrective actions. These additional SACs will remain effective until NIH assesses and accepts the corrective actions taken by EHA, based on EHA's submission of acceptable written agreements and drawdown requests, and NIH review of the written policies and procedures. Upon acceptance of corrective actions, NIH will notify EHA and will promptly lift the SACs. These SACs are a remedy for non-compliance and do not constitute an enforcement action. Therefore, the SACs are not appealable under 42 C.F.R. 50, subpart D. However, while not appealable under 42 C.F.R. 50, subpart D, EHA may request that NIH reconsider these SACs by submitting a written request within 30 days of the date of this letter to: Joel Snyderman, Director, Division of Grants Compliance and Oversight at: Joel.Snyderman@nih.gov

Please note this action does not preclude NIH from imposing additional SACs, corrective actions, or other remedies for non-compliance pursuant to 2 C.F.R. § 200.208(b) Specific Conditions and NIHGPS Section 8.5, including but not limited to withholding of support. However, if EHA fails to comply with any of the four SACs that are outlined in this letter, NIH reserves the right to terminate all awards to EHA pursuant to 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a) Termination and will issue an official letter to EHA providing termination provisions and appeals rights.

Please contact me with any questions concerning this letter.

Michelle G. Bulls Digitally signed by Michelle G.
Bulls -S
Date: 2023.04.26 13:23:37 -04'00'

Michelle G. Bulls
Director, Office of Policy for Extramural Research Administration
Office of Extramural Research, Office of the Director

cc:
Dr. Michael S. Lauer
Dr. Emily Erbelding
Dr. Erik Stemmy

Dr. Sara Woodson
Dr. Eun-Chung Park
Ms. Emily Linde

Attachments:

Review of Subrecipient Agreements – EcoHealth Cooperative
Agreements Cost Reimbursement Reporting Format 2-3-23
Subaward Agreements



6th February 2024

Ms. Emily Linde
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institutes of Health
9000 Rockville Pike
Bethesda, Maryland 20892

Dear Ms. Linde,

We were glad to read the email from Ms. Michelle Bulls from NIH on 12th January 2024 confirming that two of the four Specific Award Conditions (SACs) NIH placed upon EcoHealth Alliance over 9 months ago, on 26th April 2023, have been fully resolved – specifically, **SAC #3** (policies and procedures) and **SAC #4** (3rd party audit).

NIH directed us to work with you and NIAID to resolve the two remaining SACs: **SAC #1** (prior approval of subaward agreements), and **SAC #2** (unrestricted advance drawdown of reimbursement payment). Because we believe that we have fulfilled the requirements of these SACs (as detailed below), **the purpose of this letter is to request formally that you lift the two remaining SACs:**

SAC #1. Prior approval of subaward written agreement required, before entering into consortium agreements

- On 20 May 2023, EcoHealth Alliance provided NIH with revised versions of all requested subawards.
- On 11 July 2023, NIH responded with 6 requests for further modifications, including:
 - Incorporation of NIH policy (though it was not yet finalized) on subrecipient data reporting
 - Inconsistencies on allowability of taxes or vehicle insurance
 - Statement that NIH must also have rights to access the subaward's documents, papers, or other records pertaining to the award
- On 31 July 2023, EcoHealth Alliance provided NIH with all 12 of 14 requested, revised subaward contracts incorporating the requests of 11 July 2023.

On 9 August 2023, having not received approval of revised contracts, EcoHealth Alliance and NIH had an in-person Zoom meeting during which NIH stated that the over-arching issues with contracts had been addressed and now individual contracts needed to be revised to address specific issues arising from new Program Officer requests for revisions to scope of work.
- On 11 August 2023, EcoHealth Alliance sent two revised contracts (Chulalongkorn University and Conservation Medicine) to NIH for review and approval.
- On 24 August 2023, EcoHealth Alliance reconfirmed with NIH via email that only two contracts (out of all subaward contracts) would need to be revised to address specific issues arising from Program Officer requests.
- On 23 October 2023, following repeated requests from EcoHealth Alliance to NIH for an update or comments on its contracts to remove **SAC #1**, at EHA's request another in-person Zoom meeting was held between NIAID and EHA. In this call NIAID gave general feedback on contracts including instructions to:
 - Update to "CFDA number" to "Assistance Number"
 - "Prompt notice" not defined
 - Request to include the specific NIH Grants Policy Statement language when referenced - despite the full NIH Grants Policy Statement being included in each subaward as an attachment.

- Importantly, NIAID agreed that it would facilitate their review and approval process to use one contract template rather than revise and resubmit 14 or more separate subaward contracts.
- On 9 November 2023, EcoHealth Alliance submitted an updated contract template as per NIAID's requests.
- On 15 November, EcoHealth Alliance requested a call or Zoom meeting to discuss the template.
- On 16 November, NIAID emailed additional comments and a request on the contract template
- On 17 November, EcoHealth Alliance submitted an updated subaward template for NIAID's review and approval.
- On 28 and 30 November, EcoHealth Alliance requested a call to finalize the contract template.
- On 1 December 2023, NIAID confirmed via email that all items on contract templates had been resolved and that EcoHealth Alliance had approval to begin contract renegotiation with its subawards.
- On 9 January 2024, EcoHealth Alliance submitted three renegotiated, partner-signed subaward contracts to NIAID for approval. These were resubmitted the next day, 10 January, when NIAID out-of-office messages were received.
- On 30 January, EcoHealth Alliance contacted its Program Officers to request updates on NIAID's review and approval of its subaward contracts. Program Officers responded immediately to confirm that contracts were under review, but did not provide an estimate of completion. Later that same day, NIAID emailed EcoHealth Alliance with a request for additional details about its semiannual reports for two grants, but did not address approval of renegotiated subaward contracts other than to confirm receipt of three of these to date.
- On 02 February, EcoHealth Alliance submitted a 4th renegotiated partner-signed subaward contract for NIAID's approval. As of today, EHA has not yet heard back from NIAID with approval on the 4 subaward contracts submitted to date.

SAC #2. Removal of eligibility for unrestricted advance drawdown of funds

- On 30 June 2023, EcoHealth Alliance submitted invoices and reimbursement requests per NIH's SAC requirements.
- On 11 July 2023, NIH responded with a table of questions about line items in the invoiced template and supporting documentation
- On 15 August 2023, EcoHealth Alliance provided a revised invoice and detailed responses to all of NIH's comments and questions
- On 27 September 2023, and following repeated requests from EcoHealth Alliance for a meeting to address any questions, NIH replied with a letter providing specific feedback on the invoices submitted.
- On 23 October 2023, and in response to EcoHealth Alliance's request, NIAID and EHA had an in person Zoom meeting discussion to review all specific questions in invoicing raised by NIAID. EHA has addressed these issues and, per NIAID's recommendation in a letter dated 27 September 2023, requested a meeting to review these updates and for NIH to confirm that the issues have been dealt with acceptably.
- On 16 November 2023, NIAID responded with 14 additional edits, changes and requests for feedback to EcoHealth Alliance.
- On 30 January 2024, NIAID requested submission of cost reimbursement requests.
- On 04 February 2024, EcoHealth Alliance submitted a cost reimbursement request for NIAID's review and offered to speak at any time to address questions to expedite the review process.

Throughout this process, EcoHealth Alliance has worked rapidly to address all of NIH's and NIAID's requests regarding contracts and invoices. However, as laid out in our letter to Ms. Michelle Bulls on 15th November 2023 (cc'd to you and others at NIAID grants management), we are deeply concerned about significant delays from NIAID in response to our communications, and the imposition of additional requirements at multiple times during this timeline, none of which were initially indicated. Some of these involved policy changes that we made to our contracts that used language from other university's NIAID-approved contract templates, but were

subsequently rejected without explanation by NIAID when inserted into EcoHealth Alliance's contracts.

Importantly, in NIH's letter of 26th April 2023 imposing the SACs, NIH set a deadline of 15th September 2023, after which time EcoHealth Alliance could request these SACs to be lifted. **We are now nearly 5 months beyond that deadline**, and these two remaining SACs impose a significant burden by delaying reimbursement for expenditures by months, and threatening to make the NIH/NIAID approved scientific work harder to achieve. As always, EcoHealth Alliance will continue to respond rapidly to all requests. In response to your 30th January letter with additional questions about our semiannual reports, we will provide the table of requested sequences by the 9th of February – the requested deadline.

However, the seemingly arbitrary nature of the continued requests for modifications, and the delays in response from NIAID when we comply with these requests, are in effect allowing administrative oversight to prevent our critical research from moving ahead appropriately.

We are formally requesting an in-person meeting, or failing that a Zoom meeting, as soon as possible, to resolve any remaining issues and allow the SACs to be removed, without incurring penalties to our program work or reimbursement requests as laid out in the approved budgets.

We look forward to working rapidly with you to resolve these issues.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P. Daszak', with a horizontal line underneath.

Peter Daszak

President, EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018, USA
www.ecohealthalliance.org

CC: Erik Stemmy
Sara Woodson
EunChung Park
Shaun Gratton
EcoHealth Alliance Counsel - Tarter, Krinsky & Drogin

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 5/20/2022 8:49:41 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Letter from Ranking Member Johnson and Chairman Ossoff

Agreed. Let me know if you'd like me to join the meeting.

Jeff

Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone

----- Original message -----

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Date: 5/20/22 3:26 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED], Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Letter from Ranking Member Johnson and Chairman Ossoff

By the way Jeff, forgot to mention this – got a request now from the HSGAC group for a meeting next week to ‘discuss their request’.

I'm going to respond next week and let them know I have upcoming travel, but try to set up a date after mid-June.

I don't see any real purpose in them asking me about handing over private documents if their real aim is to investigate ‘public health threats’. It's tantamount to accusing EHA of being a public health threat, so it's utterly disingenuous. If that's their line – they need some docs, I'll help them by referring them to the FoIA lists. If they want us to produce documents that have not yet been made public, we should refuse at this point – there is nothing of value towards understanding COVID origins that hasn't already been published, or presented to the appropriate federal agencies.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Hartobey, Patrick (HSGAC) [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2022 5:34 PM
To: 'Peter Daszak' [REDACTED]; Alison Andre [REDACTED]
Cc: Eisenberg, Daniel (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Kielceski, Kate (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Downey, Brian (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Pasternak, Doug (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Wittmann, Scott (HSGAC) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Letter from Ranking Member Johnson and Chairman Ossoff

Dr. Daszak,

We have received the below referenced letter. We would like to schedule a time for next week to discuss the subcommittee's request in further detail. Please provide some dates and times which would work best for you and your team.

Thank you,

Patrick

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, May 13, 2022 5:16 PM
To: Hartobey, Patrick (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Alison Andre [REDACTED]
Cc: Eisenberg, Daniel (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Kielceski, Kate (HSGAC) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Letter from Ranking Member Johnson and Chairman Ossoff

Dear Patrick,

Please find attached EcoHealth Alliance's response to your letter of 4/28/22.

Sincerely,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: @PeterDaszak

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Hartobey, Patrick (HSGAC) [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2022 3:37 PM

To: 'Peter Daszak' [REDACTED]

Cc: Eisenberg, Daniel (HSGAC) [REDACTED] Kielceski, Kate (HSGAC)

Subject: Letter from Ranking Member Johnson and Chairman Ossoff

Good afternoon Dr. Daszak,

Attached please find a letter from Ranking Member Johnson and Chairman Ossoff. Please let me know if you have questions, and please confirm receipt.

Thank you,

Patrick Hartobey

Senior Counsel

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

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This communication, together with any attachment, may contain confidential and/or proprietary information (including without limitation copyright material and/or other intellectual property) and is intended only for the person(s) and/or entity(ies) to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this communication, or if you received it in error, you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this communication and you are asked to kindly delete it and promptly notify us. Any copying, use, disclosure or distribution of any part of this communication or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this communication, unless duly authorized by or on behalf of EcoHealth Alliance, is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful.

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Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 8/23/2022 9:52:12 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: More political harrassment for EcoHealth

Peter: And since it looks less and less likely that the Senate will flip in November, this is just bloviation.

JLS

From: David Morens <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2022 5:31 PM
To: Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]>; Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]>; Roberts, Rich <[REDACTED]>; peter hotez <[REDACTED]>; Jeffrey Sturchio <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: More political harrassment for EcoHealth

Sounds like the usual bullshit to me. My sense is that outside this small group of Republican idiots, almost everyone in govt, including most Republicans, realize this is just shameless grandstanding by a bunch of clowns. It may be more embarrassing for them than it is harmful to you, because every time they do things like this it makes them look worse than they were the day before.

Since there is no "there" there, the longer this charade goes on the more desperate and stupid it looks. All of Tony's emails? Good luck. He is too smart to leave anything for them to find. Not gonna happen. Waste of everyone's time, and most of the world is catching on.... d

David M. Morens, MD



IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 4:36 PM Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

It's probably just bluster, but today Sen. Rand Paul and Sen. Marshall demanded NIH preserve all records of Dr. Fauci and Collins so they can continue their investigations.

Sen. Marshall's letter is particularly aggressive for us, citing EcoHealth Alliance repeatedly as their rationale for needing to get hold of all of Tony Fauci's emails, texts, notes, and even "burner phones" as he states it.

Bizarre and a little bit worrying...

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2022 4:16 PM
To: 'David Morens' <[REDACTED]> 'Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E]' [REDACTED] Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED] 'Keusch, Gerald T' [REDACTED] 'Roberts, Rich' <[REDACTED]> 'peter hotez' <[REDACTED]>; 'Jeffrey Sturchio' <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Nasty hit piece today on Fox News about me and EcoHealth from Rep. Comer
Importance: High

Here's Representative Comer, Republican on House Oversight Committee repeatedly attacking me and EcoHealth Alliance by name on Fox News today.

Disgusting level of fake anger, with a series of lies and falsehoods to back it up.

Here's the video (you don't need Twitter to watch it).

<https://twitter.com/i/status/1561736412885651457>

I've already got journalists calling my home now, harrasing us.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2022 12:04 PM
To: Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]> Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]>; Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]> Roberts, Rich <[REDACTED]> peter hotez <[REDACTED]>; Jeffrey Sturchio <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: FW: Sharing Statements from President Joe Biden and HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra on Dr. Fauci's Announcement

David M. Morens, MD

IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Mon, Aug 22, 2022 at 12:00 PM Morens, David (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] wrote:



David M. Morens, M.D.

Senior Advisor to the Director
Office of the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institutes of Health
Building 31, Room 7A-03
31 Center Drive, MSC 2520
Bethesda, MD 20892-2520

☎ 301 496 2263 (assistants: Kimberly Barasch; Whitney Robinson)

☎ 301 496 4409

✉ dm270q@nih.gov

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From: owner-nih-all-staff@ [REDACTED] **On Behalf Of** NIH Executive Secretariat
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2022 11:54 AM
To: List NIH-ALL-STAFF [REDACTED]
Subject: Sharing Statements from President Joe Biden and HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra on Dr. Fauci's Announcement

Statement from President Joe Biden on the announcement of Dr. Anthony Fauci's Departure from NIAID

During my time as Vice President, I worked closely with Dr. Anthony Fauci on the United States' response to Zika and Ebola. I came to know him as a dedicated public servant, and a steady hand with wisdom and insight honed over decades at the forefront of some of our most dangerous and challenging public health crises. When it came time to build a team to lead our COVID-19 response – in fact, in one of my first calls as President-elect – I immediately asked Dr. Fauci to extend his service as my Chief Medical Advisor to deal with the COVID-19 crisis our nation faced. In that role, I've been able to call him at any hour of the day for his advice as we've tackled this once-in-a-generation pandemic. His commitment to the work is unwavering, and he does it with an unparalleled spirit, energy, and scientific integrity.

Dr. Fauci has served under seven Republican and Democratic Presidents during his career, beginning with Ronald Reagan. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2008 under President George W. Bush. For almost four decades, he has served as Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, helping our country navigate health crises ranging from HIV/AIDS to COVID-19. Because of Dr. Fauci's many contributions to public health, lives here in the United States and around the world have been saved. As he leaves his position in the U.S. Government, I know the American people and the entire world will continue to benefit from Dr. Fauci's expertise in whatever he does next. Whether you've met him personally or not, he has touched all Americans' lives with his work. I extend my deepest thanks for his public service. The United States of America is stronger, more resilient, and healthier because of him.

Statement by HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra on Upcoming Departure of Dr. Anthony S. Fauci

Today, Anthony S. Fauci, M.D. announced he is stepping down in December 2022 from the positions of Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and Chief of the NIAID Laboratory of Immunoregulation, as well as Chief Medical Advisor to the President. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Xavier Becerra issued the following statement:

"This is a decision we all knew would eventually come but hoped never would. As HHS Secretary, I am privileged to know Dr. Fauci professionally and personally and deeply admire his decades of public service that have undoubtedly improved the health of millions of people globally. When I arrived at HHS, the world was one year into the COVID-19 pandemic. I quickly came to rely on Dr. Fauci's wisdom and counsel in our

response, and along with his scientific acumen, I treasure his ability to break down complex science in simple terms to the American people to save lives.

“His selfless passion to bring hope and healing to people fighting for their health knows no bounds. In fact, Dr. Fauci’s pioneering approach to tackle public health decades ago included a critical role in our nation’s domestic and international response to HIV/AIDS, ultimately helping create the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.

“I will be sorry to see Dr. Fauci depart in December, but I wish him all the best in his future endeavors and look forward to witnessing his next chapter.”

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 1/26/2023 7:36:26 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Need to respond to the question from GAO's ongoing review

Importance: High

Peter:

I've carefully reviewed all the documents and suggest we respond to GAO's question about the mouse experiment as indicated below. (Have you and Aleksei responded on the additional question PREDICT II? - I don't have the information on this to craft a draft response.)

So, here's the proposed response to Jeffrey Rueckhaus:

Jeff:

Thanks for your email of January 24, with a further revision to your report. Here are our responses to the changes, with explanation:

Page 1 of the excerpt, line 15: Add the words "as required in their NIH Notice of Award," after "much earlier".

Page 2 of the excerpt, line 4: Delete the word "sufficient".

Page 2 of the excerpt, lines 5-6: Conclude this sentence at "mouse model." Delete the rest of the sentence: "warrant an immediate halt to the experiment and reporting to NIH under the award condition."

Explanation:

To begin with – EHA did report the results of the mouse experiment in question to the NIH in April 2018 in our Year 4 report. Furthermore, we conducted no further experiments on these viruses, which, it is important to note, were based on a WIV1 backbone and dealt with a MERS-like virus, not SARS-CoV (i.e., the work we were doing was with a bat CoV spike in a bat CoV backbone, which had never been shown to infect people). But, most importantly, as discussed in your footnote 3, we believe that there was no real evidence of enhanced viral growth in this experiment. The growth in viral genome copies/gram that we reported was transient, found only at days 2 and 4 post infection, and returned to almost identical to the backbone virus (WIV-1) by day 6, and lower than baseline by the end of the experiment. The results were from small numbers of mice and were therefore not statistically significant (they could have resulted from variation in individual mice before infection). For these reasons, we did not ask the WIV staff to conduct further viral titer work and we maintain that the

oversight of the experiments was in keeping with the conditions of the grant award. The NIH did not respond with any comments to our report, which suggests that they agreed at the time – it was only more than two years later, in hindsight, that they raised questions about this experiment – and started from the mistaken assumption that our report showed a real instance of enhanced viral growth.

Page 2 of excerpt, footnote 3: Please delete the second paragraph, for the reasons noted above. We don't disagree with the statements about viral titer vs. genome copies per gram, but the point is moot, since the experiment didn't demonstrate real enhanced growth.

Page 3 of excerpt, line 1-4: You might want to refer again here in a footnote to the language in the NIH letter to EHA of July 7, 2016, which you cite in the second paragraph of footnote 1 on page 1 of the excerpt, since this states clearly that that the NIH had determined that the research in question did not meet criteria for gain of function.

We have no issues with the other text highlighted in yellow. Thanks again for the opportunity to comment on these portions of the draft report. Please don't hesitate to contact me if you have any additional questions.

Best regards,
PD

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2023 6:48 AM
To: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Need to respond to the question from GAO's ongoing review
Importance: High

Jeff – would it be possible for you to have a look at response to this question from GAO today?

This is the issue where 1) they ask us to respond to the open ended question of why we didn't ask WIV to do viral titers, and 2) give us the chance to edit their highlighted text (File called "EcoHealth Additional_excerpts.."). Please check the footnotes carefully because they've used loaded language that doesn't paint us in a good light I think.

Here's what I sent you a couple of days ago, but it got lost in the OIG and the other GAO statements:

I think we should go along the lines of this as an opening gambit

Question 1: Rather than add to the suggested text ("EcoHealth Alliance did not require that WIV directly measure such growth (e.g., by measuring viral titer), because..."), we respectfully submit the following short statement, and hope that this could replace the suggested text:

Then it's over to you Jeff to come up with some language that parses correctly why we did the work how we did. Here are the pertinent facts:

- This issue is only for the SARSr-CoV experiments, not the MERS-CoV experiment.
- It's important to note that we only worked with WIV-1 as a backbone, NOT SARS-CoV, so that the work we were doing was bat CoV spike in a bat CoV backbone.
- The increased viral genome copies per gram was transient, found only at days 2 and 4 post infection, and returned to almost identical to the backbone virus (WIV-1) by day 6.
- The results were from small numbers of mice and therefore likely not statistically significant.

We could say that "It is important to note that, in the SARSr-CoV experiments: 1) the pattern of increased genome copies per gram was only found on day 2 and day 4, with results returning to similar to baseline by day 6 and even lower than baseline at the endpoint of the experiment; 2) the small numbers of mice used mean these difference could be due to variation among individual mice prior to infection, and therefore not statistically significant; 3) the viruses used as backbones and those used to insert spike proteins from were all from bats and have never been shown to infect people; 4) no further experiments were conducted with these viruses; and 5) no comments about viral genome copies per gram or viral growth were sent to EcoHealth Alliance on reporting the results. For these reasons, EcoHealth Alliance maintains that the oversight of the experiments was adequate."

Or, final sentence: "...Therefore, EcoHealth Alliance did not request that WIV staff conduct further viral titer work"

Or something better!!!!

I've attached:

- 1) The GAO additions (highlighted) – please read carefully, they're sloppy with their language and say things that make them seem worse for us. Please feel free to suggest edits to them that I can pass on...
- 2) Our Yr 2 report and plans for recombinant virus expts (highlighted)
- 3) Our response to NIH's questions about the planned recombinant virus work.
- 4) NIH's response to our response re. planned recombinant virus work.
- 5) Yr 3 NoA (that does not use the word 'immediately')
- 6) Our Yr 4 report that includes the description of the work (bottom of p.25 and top of p. 26). Note that in the report we say "on days 2 and day 4

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Rueckhaus, Jeffrey [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, January 23, 2023 10:29 AM

To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]

Cc: Khakoo, Farahnaaz H. [REDACTED]; Fletcher, Eliot [REDACTED]; Nour, Lena F. [REDACTED];
Steinberg, Michael [REDACTED]; Stewart, Ashley L. [REDACTED]

Subject: Please review and comment on some revisions

Hi Peter and Aleksei,

After our meeting on Jan. 17, and in light of the additional documents you provided, we have made several revisions to our report, which is still very much in draft. Please see the excerpts in the attachment. The statements in yellow highlight are likely new or substantially revised since your initial review.

In particular, the third footnote (p.2) contains a placeholder for EcoHealth to, please, provide an explanation as to why WIV was not required to measure viral titer, given the award condition to report viral growth. As with the previous excerpts you reviewed, please note any factual errors from us or mischaracterizations, and suggest any revisions to improve the accuracy and completeness.

In addition, for the PREDICT II award (AID-OAA-A-14-00102), do you happen to have an example(s) of WIV staff, specifically, participating in conferences, workshops or other forms of information sharing? For instance, under the NIH Award R01AI110964, Co-investigator Zhengli Shi of WIV presented at conferences alongside EHA staff (e.g. the North American Society of Bat Research (NASBR) conference in Mexico) according to the Year 5 RPPR. For our report, we are attempting to tie information sharing, like conference presentations, as close as possible to the subawards to WIV and the other Chinese entities in our study, which is more difficult with a huge study like PREDICT II.

Thank you again.

-Jeff

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 1/26/2024 8:25:02 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
CC: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; John Feigelson [REDACTED]
Subject: E&C deposition

Importance: High

Peter:

I've worked my way through the rest of the pages. I think you did remarkably well under the circumstances! There were a few sections where we'll want to rethink responses should they call you to a public hearing, but on the whole, this was a strong performance. I thought you did particularly well in responding to the Qs about Lauer's "forensic" audit, the *Lancet* letter, the WHO mission, and DEFUSE. And at the end, I wasn't bothered by going off the record – after all, it was Benzine, not you, who requested that.

Here are a few other edits and comments:

[Page/line number]

28/12: What are the retention periods in your retention policy? For NIH and other government grants, we should make sure that the retention periods align with Federal regulations.

29/7: add underlined words for clarification - "...working closely with the FBI to report these security incidents."

30: Delete line 8.

32/16: add underlined words for clarification -was the Director of NIAID.

32/17: Delete "Immunology."

36/13: Delete "which I thought was interesting."

87/13: viral, not vital.

99/9: EcoHealth, not "equal health".

102/12: safe, not save.

124/9: error, not arrow.

124/10: same

124/15: same

125/3: same

129: Pellegrini keeps hammering away at the alleged “greater than 1 log growth,” but he missed your point, which is correct – it was a transient effect on genome copies, not viral titers, and the number of mice was too small to have a statistically significant result. Had he criticized the design of the experiment, he might have had a point – but there was no “greater than 1 log growth” to report, so his line of questioning was pointless. (We covered this at length in the response to the DHHS OIG Audit, see pp. 60-61.)

140/141: This whole discussion about Lauer’s “forensic audit” is pointless – they didn’t share the “audit” with you, so you could respond to the actual claims. You’re right – Lauer and you could both be presenting an accurate picture, just looking at different parts of the elephant. But I recall seeing Aleksei’s receipts for your interactions with the NIH reporting system at the time – if you do have those documents, which prove that you did try to upload the information, or the emails with NIH people about the difficulties you were having, you should provide them to the Committee and ask that they be added to this record.

254/19: Tedros, not Tadros.

255/20: data were flowing, not was.

Talk to you at 1600.

As ever,
Jeff

Jeffrey L. Sturchio
1100 Custis Street
Alexandria, VA 22308-1023

Phone: [REDACTED]

Mobile: [REDACTED]

Email: [REDACTED]

Twitter: @jeffsturchio

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 3/29/2024 7:07:17 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
CC: Alison Andre [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Documents HSGAC request

Peter: I would not include any chimeras that were not from your work, and if you only reported published data to Genbank, then you would only need to provide accession numbers for those chimeras. How large would this group be? Is it tens or hundreds?

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2024 2:46 PM
To: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]
Cc: Alison Andre [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Documents HSGAC request

We don't have time to dig out all this. It's also a trap because there will be chimeras alluded to in foia'd docs that are not from our work, and others that are, or that were never published, for which we won't be able to find accession numbers.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2024 2:40 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]
Cc: Alison Andre [REDACTED]
Subject: Fwd: EcoHealth Alliance Documents HSGAC request

Peter, Jeff, and Alison,

It is a long weekend, so we have ample time to consider our response (and how to gather these data), and Patrick/HSGAC will not be chasing up immediately.

We are already set for a our communications meeting (with John Feigelson) meeting on Tuesday morning, next week, so we may discuss our response/approach here as well as our draft response to the NIH (Michelle Bulls) email from today.

Cheers,

-Aleksei

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Hartobey, Patrick (HSGAC)" [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Documents
Date: March 29, 2024 at 14:12:33 EDT
To: 'Aleksei Chmura' [REDACTED]
Cc: "Downey, Brian (HSGAC)" [REDACTED], "Gaspar, Jennifer (HSGAC)" [REDACTED], "Ahn, Meeran (HSGAC)" [REDACTED], "Wittmann, Scott (HSGAC)" [REDACTED], Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED], "Warner, Caitlin (HSGAC)" [REDACTED], Peter Daszak [REDACTED], Alison Andre [REDACTED]

Aleksei—As we continue to review records, we had an additional follow-up request. Can you provide a list of all the coronavirus chimera's, whether published or unpublished, created as part of or with funding from any federal grant work from January 1, 2009-January 1, 2020, including the chimeras genbank identifier, year it was created, and which lab created the chimera.

Thanks,

Patrick

-----Original Message-----

From: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2024 3:40 PM
To: Hartobey, Patrick (HSGAC) [REDACTED]
Cc: Downey, Brian (HSGAC) [REDACTED], Gaspar, Jennifer (HSGAC) [REDACTED], Ahn, Meeran (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Wittmann, Scott (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED], Warner, Caitlin (HSGAC) [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Alison Andre [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Subject: EcoHealth Alliance Documents

Dear Patrick,

Please find this month's tranche via the DropBox link, below.

<https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/mhui0463lsexlxvo87dt5/NIH-10.pdf?rlkey=7tc06caum7vgyzw1a0gg38f5t&dl=0>

Thank you,

-Aleksei

Aleksei Chmura, PhD, MBA
Chief of Staff

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-4182
www.ecohealthalliance.org

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation.

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 4/5/2024 1:28:27 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Democcrats on SSCP criticizing EcoHealth Alliance yesterday - looks like we're being thrown under the bus again.

Peter: We need to ask Porter to step into the fray and explain to the key Democrats on the Committee that when they say things like this, they are simply validating and enabling the political agenda of the MAGA Republicans on the Committee.

It would also be interesting to know if this unnamed spokesperson made his or her statement without authorization. Porter should be able to find out if this is something that Ranking Member Ruiz believe, or if it was a rogue comment. If the later, we definitely have something to work with.

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, April 5, 2024 9:12 AM
To: Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; David Morens [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; peter hotez [REDACTED]; Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]; Keith Martin [REDACTED]
Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Democcrats on SSCP criticizing EcoHealth Alliance yesterday - looks like we're being thrown under the bus again.
Importance: High

Checkout this quote from Democrat staffers, in an interview with Fox News: <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/covid-origins-ecohealth-alliance-president-testify-publicly-congress-next-month>

This was our experience in my on-the-record testimony, the Democrat chief staffer came after me repeatedly trying to make the case that we weren't forthcoming in our responses to NIH. Very upsetting and concerning...

A spokesperson for Democrats on the COVID subcommittee told Fox News Digital that throughout the Congress, they have "underscored the importance of pursuing and prioritizing forward-looking reforms that enhance biosafety standards in the United States and around the globe so that we can reduce the threat of future outbreaks and prevent future pandemics."

"In the Select Subcommittee's probe of federally funded research, testimony and documents reviewed by Select Subcommittee Democrats raise serious concerns that EcoHealth Alliance disregarded federal reporting requirements that ensure grantees are accountable to the American

people," the spokesperson told Fox News Digital. "We look forward to Dr. Daszak's testimony before the Select Subcommittee on this matter next month."

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 3:18 PM
To: David Morens [REDACTED]; Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; peter hotez [REDACTED]; Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Wenstrup Invites Top Scientific Journals to Testify on Possible Inappropriate Relationship with Federal Government

Unbelievable! We are being surrounded by morons.

Richard J. Roberts
New England Biolabs
240 County Road
Ipswich, MA 01938-2723
USA
Tel: [REDACTED]
Fax: [REDACTED]
email: [REDACTED]

Executive Assistant: Erin Varney
Tel: [REDACTED]

Fax: [REDACTED]
email: [REDACTED]

From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 3:04 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED] Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] peter hotez [REDACTED]
Roberts, Rich [REDACTED] Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Subject: Fwd: Wenstrup Invites Top Scientific Journals to Testify on Possible Inappropriate Relationship with Federal Government

EXTERNAL SENDER

From the cell phone of David Morens

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Folkers, Greg (NIH/NIAID) [C] [REDACTED]
Date: Wed, Apr 3, 2024, 14:25
Subject: Wenstrup Invites Top Scientific Journals to Testify on Possible Inappropriate Relationship with Federal Government
To:



Press Release **Published:** Apr 2, 2024

Wenstrup Invites Top Scientific Journals to Testify on Possible Inappropriate Relationship with Federal Government

WASHINGTON — Today, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Chairman Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio) invited the respective Editors-in-Chief of *Science*, *Nature*, and *The Lancet* to testify before the Select Subcommittee on Tuesday, April 16, 2024. The hearing seeks to examine any potential inappropriate influence exerted by the federal government over research publications related to COVID-19 and ensure that the federal government is not granted undue access to the scientific review process during a future health crisis.

Science, *Nature*, and *The Lancet* serve as critical information hubs for top scientific research across the world and individually publish articles that are cited millions of times each year. After the publication of the highly controversial, “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” (“Proximal Origin”) paper — which wrongly downplayed and vilified the lab leak hypothesis during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic — concerns arose regarding the suppression of scientific discourse by federal health officials in the United States. The Select Subcommittee has obtained evidence that indicates *Science*, *Nature*, and *The Lancet* were in communication with federal government officials, including Dr. Anthony Fauci and Dr. Francis Collins.

“Millions of people worldwide relied on Science, Nature, and The Lancet to provide scientifically accurate and impartial research during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, documents show that the federal government

may have censored and manipulated the sacred scientific review processes at these journals to progress their preferred narrative about the origins of COVID-19. Should these world-renowned scientific journals have done more to protect scientific discourse and ensure the peer review process was completed without outside influence? The Select Subcommittee expects the invited Editors-in-Chief to attend this hearing and address concerns that their research was inappropriately influenced by a political agenda,” said Chairman Wenstrup.

Read the letters to Science, Nature, and The Lancet below:

- [Editor-in-Chief of Science, Dr. Holden Thorp](#)
- [Editor-in-Chief of Nature, Dr. Magdalena Skipper](#)
- [Editor-in-Chief of The Lancet, Dr. Richard Horton](#)

Disclaimer: Any third-party material in this email has been shared for internal use under fair use provisions of U.S. copyright law, without further verification of its accuracy/veracity. It does not necessarily represent my views nor those of NIAID, NIH, HHS, or the U.S. government.

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 4/17/2024 4:30:28 AM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Testimony from Science Editor, Holden Thorp in front of the SSCP today

Peter: Exactly. Their assertion that “when it’s funded we’ll decide which assays are done where” is refuted by the evidence of the proposal itself, which shows that you and your collaborators decided to do the recombinant experiments at UNC, where there was a BSL3 lab.

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 12:21 AM
To: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Testimony from Science Editor, Holden Thorp in front of the SSCP today

The Republicans and others are essentially saying that, because I said “when it’s funded we’ll decide which assays are done where”, I was privately admitting that we intended change the workplans once it was funded. However, you’re exactly correct on this issue - the proposal sent into DARPA weeks later is the only document of record re. our intentions of what work to do where. The fact that it wasn’t funded only adds to the irrelevance of these allegations.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2024 12:12 AM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Testimony from Science Editor, Holden Thorp in front of the SSCP today

Peter: This sort of Monday-morning quarterbacking is not helpful – and it doesn't do Thorp's reputation as an editor any good to see such a pandering reaction to the crap that's circulated about the DEFUSE proposal and the drafts that have come to light recently.

As I was thinking about this today, I wonder if there's another angle we can speak about. The knuckleheads argue that your comments on the drafts provide "proof" that you intended to deceive DARPA. But this doesn't make logical sense – the only document that went to DARPA was the final proposal, which made clear your intention to use UNC's BSL3 lab for the recombinant experiments, whatever the exchange of views in the drafts. Since the drafts are just that – subject to revision after further discussion and debate among the investigators – and the comments about doing some assays at Wuhan rather than UNC were not included in the final proposal, isn't it nonsensical to claim that you were trying to mislead DARPA when the drafts were never shared with DARPA and the final proposal contained only your considered opinion that any recombinant work would be done at BSL3, consistent with the rules in place at the time? How could you mislead DARPA when they never even knew about the earlier discussions in the drafts? And even if you had thought to move the location of some of the work once the project was funded, as we've said, DARPA would have to have reviewed and approved those changes. So this entire tempest in a teapot is based on illogical and unfounded inferences that you were trying to mislead DARPA because you wanted to create a chimera that would become SARS-CoV-2, which is both absurd and contrary to the facts in the documents.

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2024 8:59 PM
To: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]
Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; John Feigelson [REDACTED]
Subject: Testimony from Science Editor, Holden Thorp in front of the SSCP today
Importance: High

Unpleasant to see him criticize me and EcoHealth today, in a pretty shoddy attempt to curry favor with the SSCP:

<https://x.com/COVIDSelect/status/1780332154620092505>

Here's the text of the tweet:

Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

@COVIDSelect

@ScienceMagazine

AGREES that EcoHealth Alliance may have misled the U.S. government about its highly controversial DEFUSE proposal — which some believe created a blueprint for COVID-19.

WATCH

You can see the video of him criticizing our work here:

<https://youtu.be/Oru0-fYGcJU>

The relevant section starts at 1hour, 31 minutes and 30 seconds into the video

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2024 3:22 PM

To: 'kuuipo9' [REDACTED]; 'Keusch, Gerald T' [REDACTED]; 'Jeff Sturchio' [REDACTED]

'Roberts, Rich' [REDACTED]; 'Hotez, Peter Jay' [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]

Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; John Feigelson [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]

Subject: COVID Select Subcommittee subpoena to David Morens for correspondence etc.

Importance: High

Here is today's subpoena & a cover letter to David Morens from the SSCP for all correspondence with the following people, related to WIV, EcoHealth or COVID origins or "regarding or referencing the following people". He has to produce this by April 30th

No direct demand for public hearing has been made public yet.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, April 15, 2024 8:39 PM

To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]

Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: COVID select subcommittee is now threatening to call David in for a public hearing

Guys, my lawyer called and i am to be subpoenaed to testify in public hearing on camera. They want me b4 Tony but after Peter. The Dems reached out to my lawyer and asked WTF is going on. Not sure why they don't know. d

Sent from Proton Mail Android

----- Original Message -----

On 4/12/24 16:12, Peter Daszak wrote:

Here's the COVID committee (SSCP) threatening to call David in for a public hearing based on the emails they claim show that we all used gmail inappropriately (based on a Washington Examiner report today)...

Tweet here: <https://x.com/COVIDSelect/status/1778859503796056214>

Washington Examiner BS article here: <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/healthcare/2964227/ecohealth-alliance-email-release-confirms-fauci-aide-used-private-account-discuss-covid/>

Full text of tweet:

Post

See new posts

Conversation

Pinned



Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

@COVIDSelect

BREAKING

@EcoHealthNYC

President Dr. Peter Daszak CONFIRMS whistleblower allegations that Dr. David Morens — a top advisor to Dr. Fauci — used Gmail to hide COVID-19 information. We are beginning the process to secure Dr. Morens's public testimony.



[From washingtonexaminer.com](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com)

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 1:37 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]
Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: My email to Michael Hiltzik with an EcoHealth Statement and Email release today

Again, this is excellent. We need more of these stand-up-to-bullies fusillades. d
Sent from Proton Mail Android

----- Original Message -----

On 4/12/24 11:20, Peter Daszak wrote:

Please read the email I just sent to Michael Hiltzik. It has links to a statement from EcoHealth and the release of the full text (slight redactions) of emails that involve David and Jerry, and were reported in the NY Post and other Right wing outlets yesterday, amplified by Republicans on the COVID Committee...

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 11:19 AM
To: 'Michael Hiltzik' [REDACTED]
Cc: 'Aleksei Chmura' [REDACTED]

Subject: EcoHealth Statement and Email release today has relevance to NIH and Michael Lauer issues

Importance: High

Good to talk with you yesterday Michael. We got more negative press yesterday, this time related to emails that allegedly show coverups and inappropriate behavior among scientists. The Republicans released only the subject line and addresses etc. (<https://oversight.house.gov/release/wenstrup-reveals-emails-from-whistleblower-alleging-additional-attempts-by-fauci-advisor-to-subvert-transparency-about-covid-19-origins/>), leading to BS stories in the usual right wing press. We released the full text of the emails today:

<https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/2024/04/ecohealth-alliance-releases-emails-that-are-the-subject-of-false-allegations-in-the-press>

These are all from me to senior NIAID staffmember David Morens and former NIH Center Director Jerry Keusch, trying to make sense of the termination of our grant by Trump, and to find a way to get it reinstated. In the end NIH did reinstate the grant (May 2023). One of the chains shows emails that refer to the pressure from Michael Lauer, and the fact NIH instructed me not to talk with our program officer (Erik Stemmy) and direct all communications to Grants Management (Emily Linde). That was another highly unusual move from NIH and is part of the pattern that I was talking with you about.

Here is that particular set of emails: <https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Emails-01.pdf>

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Michael Hiltzik [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2024 6:01 PM

To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Call tomorrow?

Absolutely. That time is good...I can call then...

MH

On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 2:59 PM Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

Hi Michael – just following up on this – are you available tomorrow at 5:30pm my time, 2:30pm West Coast time?

I can send a zoom link or call my cellphone 845-641-0899

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Sent: Sunday, April 7, 2024 9:34 AM

To: 'Michael Hiltzik' [REDACTED]

Cc: 'Aleksei Chmura' [REDACTED]; 'Alison Andre' [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Confidential - NIH still hampering EcoHealth's ability to conduct work 4 years since the termination of our

grant

Importance: High

I have good answers for you on all of those – it's ugly and political. There are also others who are well-placed who you can talk with.

I can do Wednesday at 5:30pm my time if that works for you (2:30pm West Coast). I have other times as well... cc'ing Alison who will make sure we find a time that works.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Michael Hiltzik [REDACTED]

Sent: Saturday, April 6, 2024 6:50 PM

To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Confidential - NIH still hampering EcoHealth's ability to conduct work 4 years since the termination of our grant

Peter,

Let's set up a time to talk next week (Wednesday or later best for me). On first glance, it strikes me that I'm glad I'm not in the grants-application business, because the bureaucratic behavior here seems incomprehensible, at least to a layman.

What's the overarching theme in their relations with you? Is it pressure from the lab-leak crowd, the FOIAing from Tobias, which as far as I can tell has yielded nothing of any substance? A spillover from the Trump era?

I read the Science piece, which was thorough in detailing what was done to the Chinese researchers but silent on what provoked it...what was the question I was left with--Why did NIH do all this?

MH

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 12:03 PM Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

Hi Michael, I'm just contacting you off the record in case you or others are interested in reporting on what's going on at NIH with respect to EHA's grants. We were trying to deal with this privately, without it becoming public, but we found out last week that some of our recent correspondence with Emily Erbelding asking for her help is in a batch of FOIA's emails that will be released to Jimmy Tobias in the next couple of weeks. Tobias is in the habit of simply dumping these on the internet, so we wanted to get these to a bona fide reporter before that happens.

As you probably know, our organization has been funded by NIAID for around 20 years, conducting successful research on emerging diseases, and working closely with communities, scientists and governments in emerging disease hotspot countries to try to reduce the risk of disease emergence. Prior to the termination of our R01 grant in April 2020 that would have had the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a subrecipient, we had never had any issues with NIH or NIAID, and had been lauded by program officers for our cutting edge research into viral emergence, and the many papers in Science, Nature, NEJM and others based on NIH funding.

After the termination of our grant, the HHS OIG was called in to audit our work and NIH's oversight. They reported back after an 18 month audit with recommendations for both us, and for NIH, most of which were minor and easily addressed. We rapidly complied and NIH's DFAS group confirmed that all audit findings were resolved. However, we continued to receive further actions from the Office of the Director (Michael Lauer, who *Science* wrote about re. NIH's actions on grantees with China connections <https://www.science.org/content/article/pall-suspicion-nih-secretive-china-initiative-destroyed-scores-academic-careers>), and the NIH group that manages oversight (OPERA) directly under Michael Lauer. In April 2023, Michelle Bulls from Opera and Emily Linde from NIAID placed 4 Specific Award Conditions (SACs) on our grants. At the time, Michael Lauer had contacted Tufts University who oversaw our IACUC approvals to conduct wildlife sampling because EHA doesn't have an animal facility. This led to Tufts canceling our interinstitutional agreement. The only way for us to proceed was to request an Animal Welfare Assurance from OLAW (based at NIH), but this was denied because of these SACs. One of the SACs stated that all of our subcontracts must be reviewed and revised by NIH reviews. We worked extremely hard to rapidly respond (often within days) to every single request, despite many of them being contradictory or

having no material impact on the contracts. In the original letter NIH set a deadline of September 2023 to resolve the SACs, which due to repeated delays by NIH grants management staff in responding to us, continued further requests and shifting of the goalposts means we still do not have resolution. Furthermore, grants management are now suggesting that we are beyond the period of work and our subcontractees won't be able to be reimbursed. Additionally, during the past 12 months, NIH has only reimbursed EcoHealth for around \$50K of the now nearly \$2 million we are expecting and have expended.

As you can imagine, this puts us in a very difficult position, with institutions like UNC and Uniformed Services University likely to be outraged that their funding is threatened, and with us unable to do our work fully – work that has been reviewed, scored well, and is critical to pandemic prevention. We've tried every possible avenue to get a fair and reasonable rapid resolution. We've informed Emily Erbeling of these issues (hence the FoIA'd email), and Program staff at NIAID remain supportive of our work, but we still have no resolution. Every time we try to seek a meeting or resolution, we get a hard response from NIH that we're out of compliance and they set further deadlines and further minor issues for us to fix. Right now I believe we're probably in greater compliance with NIH rules and just about any other institution in the US, given the level of scrutiny we've gone through. I've attached some of the many recent letters between NIH OPERA, NIAID Grants managements and EcoHealth Alliance to give you an indication of the levels of detailed work that we've gone through to try and resolve these issues.

We don't know the reasons why this is happening – all our subcontracts prior to April 2023 covered every single requirement in NIH's grants management guidance, subrecipients had to sign that they would adhere to these. The stonewalling, and shifting of goalposts by NIH is linked to emails that they send us stating that we're 'delinquent' or 'out of compliance', or that they're 'concerned' etc. and seem to us designed ready to be FoIA'd (which they are being) or to be used when NIH has to show Congressional Republicans that EcoHealth is being treated in the way they are calling for. Meanwhile, important findings can't be reported, including a novel SARS-CoV-2 related virus able to bind well to human ACE2 that we have found in one of our country sites, but are now unable to publish because our subrecipient is concerned they don't yet have an approved contract. This is hurting our ability to conduct pandemic prevention work, and the US's ability to be informed about public health threats that could emerge and threaten our citizens.

If you want to report on this, I'm happy to talk on-the-record on some issues, and there are others who are aware of these problems that I can put you in touch with, including at NIH and senior people from outside.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200

New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 5/4/2024 11:49:32 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Strategy re. allegations from my public hearing.

Peter: Bulls is relentless...she acknowledges that you've complied with a ton of stuff already, then says that there are other unspecified things that you still have to do. At the same time, with respect to the Linde issues, NIH/NIAID refuse to sit down together with you to go through the issues one by one and agree what's done and what is still open. This hardly seems a fair and reasonable way to do business, but it is what it is.

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, May 4, 2024 5:19 PM
To: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Strategy re. allegations from my public hearing.
Importance: High

Responses below:

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, May 4, 2024 2:53 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Strategy re. allegations from my public hearing.

Peter:

I agree with you that we need to respond to their more scurrilous allegations – particularly those, like Griffiths's, that are based on clear misunderstandings of what the documents say. I've started to work my way through the "hearing takeaways" this afternoon.

[Peter Daszak:] Great – we'll carry on with these docs and get everything in order for these two specific (and important) issues – the delay in reporting yr5 and the allegations that I misled NIH about access to samples from the WIV freezer (what a joke!).

Also, I agree that the way to approach their faux outrage and shock that you are now saying there are additional documents that you didn't provide is to point out that you produced documents responsive to the questions they asked. That is exactly what you were supposed to do – and you could hardly be expected to figure out in advance what they were going to ask you and then make sure you'd already provided every relevant document. So there's nothing sinister here.

[Peter Daszak:] Glad you agree – and we will need to state that succinctly when we write to the committee, and when we post the docs publicly

Markolin's analysis is consistent with what we discussed with Porter – having found nothing on the origins of COVID-19, the SSCP leadership needs to produce a scalp, and you're the convenient fall guy. This also serves the D's interests, because they can sacrifice EHA in service to their objective of saving NIH. But as Chamberlain discovered with Hitler, appeasement is not a winning strategy. It's ugly and stressful for you, but I'm sure we'll find a way through this.

[Peter Daszak:] That gives me some hope. I worry that in the Chamberlain metaphor (one of my favorite quotes from history), EcoHealth is either 'Poland' (not good) or the Great British Isles (also not good but they did survive).

Do you have Lauer's testimony to the SSCP (or can we get it?) –

[Peter Daszak:] No and I doubt we can, but we can ask

I want to find out if he was forthcoming about the SACs and the work that EHA did to comply with these extra administrative requirements.

[Peter Daszak:] Don't forget we have an outstanding email from him to respond to. In his email before that he said 'concerns about ongoing compliance issues'. However Michelle Bulls from OPERA (NIH grants oversight group) wrote to us a couple of weeks earlier in response to us showing her the DFAS letter. She acknowledged that we are compliant, but then went on to say that NIH still has things to do, and then lists a bunch of onerous stuff. That will be helpful. I've attached it above.

I bet he wasn't – because this is evidence that contradicts their narrative that EHA was a rogue grantee. Far from it, you accepted the additional oversight and worked in good faith to make sure that your procedures were shipshape.

[Peter Daszak:] We have a stack of emails and responses that we can hand over to the committee to show that we have been responsive to a whole raft of oversight issues, including emails from Michelle Bulls stating that we are now compliant and rescinding 2 of the SACs

Also, can Michael or Juan find out if the SSCP has a transcript of the hearing that they would be willing to share with us?

[Peter Daszak:] we will ask them. Aleksei – we also need to ask for a transcript of my on-the-record testimony. It's beyond a joke that the only way they will let me see that is to have it on a read-only website, while at the same time they use it to allege I've lied to Congress.

As ever,
Jeff

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, May 4, 2024 2:33 PM
To: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Strategy re. allegations from my public hearing.
Importance: High

Jeff – I'm thinking carefully about your suggestions, and the ideas from our call yesterday re. the wildlife trade idea etc.. Here are some initial thoughts that we can delve into further over the next few days:

The SSCP is not allowing us to respond to the allegations live, and is now trying to prevent us responding publicly. I'll fill you in by phone, but both D & R counsels met (R was in NYC, D on the phone) with our lawyers and are insisting that our lawyers now conduct all the email trawls they've requested previously. They cite an email from me to Jerry cc'd to David about 2 wks ago that they believe shows I'm trying to slow down production. What this means is now days of work going through thousands of emails to rapidly redact any privileged information and hand over. They said they will be releasing other emails in coming days. This means we'll always be on the back foot in any response

Re. the wildlife trade idea etc. My current thinking is that this will be more of a longterm strategy and we should do it, but do it ourselves. We can discuss this later, and depending on how much it would cost, I believe most of this is internal.

Re. if and/or how we should respond to the allegations from my public hearing – I believe we actually have to respond. In the hearing I told the SSCP that we have found more information about the Yr5 reporting that help to show we were doing best efforts to upload. We also have the allegation that I told NIH I had access to samples in the WIV's freezers. I have opened two files (attached) and have been working with Aleksei to start compiling the timeline and evidence for these. We will have these two issues done by Monday and I believe we should write to the committee and formally thank them for the opportunity to take part in the hearing, explain that many of the answers are long and complicated and we realize there isn't enough time to do that in the public hearing, and that I promised more information. We should then supply them with the timeline and answers to those two issues, as per the above files with evidence. This may not have any effect on the Rs, but will potentially give opportunity for Ds who are willing, to support us not being debarred.

On the issue of the Ds comment that if we have more information, that's concerning because it suggests we haven't been forthcoming, we need to have a preamble to the docs above that explains this has taken significant staff time, and

included evidence (e.g. screenshots from EHA's portal onto the NIH system) that were not in the email requests from the SSCP, but have direct relevance to the issues.

Note also that while the Yr 5 reporting timeline now has a lot more evidence of us trying to get this submitted, and of requests to NIH not being responded to, it ultimately still will be used to say we could have done more – they'll say you initiated the report upload on 27th July, but didn't submit, and the deadline of Sept 28th 2019 came and went. We show that the system had a "Due Date" of "N/A", and we weren't sure we should submit, and requests to NIH were not returned. In addition, there is evidence in this timeline that we were locked out for months, that NIH couldn't open their system for us to upload our report on yrs 6&7 of the grant, later on (2022).

I believe that once we've sent this to the SSCP, we should then make a statement on the website about how delivering on our promises to the committee, and then link to the documents so the public can see all this evidence.

Please mull this over and let me know what you think – I believe it's a mistake to leave these out there without responding, and if we do this respectfully, to the SSCP first, it will not irritate them. If we do this publicly first, I think that would be a mistake. We won't do anything until we've discussed this, and we still need to finish the reports.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 5/6/2024 5:04:40 AM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; John Feigelson
Subject: RE: Closing statement
Attachments: SSCP hearing universe versus reality .pptx

Importance: High

Peter: Attached is a document I finished earlier that compares the SSCP “alternate” reality to the reality of what you were trying to present during last week’s hearing – I’ve constructed this as a side-by-side comparison of the biased hearing takeaways published by the Republican majority last Thursday. I think we’ll find this useful in keeping track of the key claims against you and EHA – none of which bear up under objective scrutiny. The language I’ve suggested in each case can undoubtedly be improved – but I hope you find this exercise useful.

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, May 6, 2024 12:45 AM
To: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; John Feigelson
Subject: RE: Closing statement
Importance: High

Good point re. the closing statement Jeff.

Also, please see a now near-complete report on our compliance efforts for yr4 and 5 reports. It’s a litany of NIH glitches, dysfunction, lack of response, and EcoHealth’s repeated efforts to draft reports well ahead of the due date, get things uploaded, and communicated frequently and repeatedly with NIH to get things moving.

Aleksei is trying to pull phone records prior to 2021 (we haven’t been able to in the past and told NIH we could not, so we must be careful how we communicate this if we can get them). We’re hoping to add the final bits of information re. phone call records that add to the evidence EHA did a good job.

Look forward to talking. I’m also working on a report re. the fact that I was crystal clear with NIH about whether “Samples” or “Sequences” were available to us for the renegotiated grant. That will be easy and we intend to have both of these done by tomorrow, so we can send to the Committee on Tuesday morning.

ALEKSEI – please use this v7 to work on tomorrow...

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]

Sent: Sunday, May 5, 2024 9:42 PM

To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED] Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED] John Feigelson
[REDACTED]

Subject: Closing statement

Peter: The SSCP didn't give you an opportunity for a closing statement, although we submitted one. When we talk in the morning, let's think through how to put it to use.

As ever,
Jeff

Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone

An analysis of the
May 1 SSCP hearing

May 5, 2024

An unbalanced "wrap-up" of the hearing's results

SSCP universe

- "The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic held a hearing titled "A Hearing with the President of EcoHealth Alliance, Dr. Peter Daszak" to examine EcoHealth Alliance's (EcoHealth) use of U.S. taxpayer dollars to fund dangerous gain-of-function research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). This hearing also served to hold Dr. Daszak publicly accountable for discrepancies between his closed-door transcribed interview and available evidence. Prior to the hearing, the Select Subcommittee released a new, interim report which revealed that Dr. Daszak repeatedly violated the terms of the NIH grant awarded to EcoHealth. The report recommended the formal debarment of and a criminal investigation into EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak. During the hearing, members questioned Dr. Daszak about the findings of this report, pressed him to explain EcoHealth's relationship with the WIV, and scrutinized his abuse of U.S. taxpayer dollars to fund dangerous, potentially pandemic-causing

Reality

- Despite repeated assertions to the contrary by SSCP members and documentary evidence from the NIH itself, EcoHealth Alliance did not conduct risky "gain-of-function" research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
- EHA and Dr. Daszak are accountable for their use of U.S. taxpayer funds and were responsible stewards of these resources. They have worked assiduously with the NIH over the past four years to improve the procedures and oversight on their grants and contracts. The HHS OIG and GAO have both conducted investigations of EHA's practices and did not find financial wrongdoing - and the NIH Division of Financial Advisory Services has stated unequivocally that EHA is in compliance with the issues noted in the HHS OIG report. The picture that the SSCP attempted to paint of repeated violations of grant terms simply does not hold up to unbiased scrutiny of the evidence.
- Had Dr. Daszak been permitted respond to SSCP "grilling," he could have made this clear. But the SSCP had drawn its conclusions before the hearing began, constantly interrupted Dr. Daszak or refused to let him answer, and was interested only in a rush to judgment.

Scrutinizing the biased "hearing takeaways" published by the SSCP

SSCP universe

- Dr. Daszak is not a faithful steward of U.S. taxpayer dollars and should never again receive funding from the federal government.
- Members of both the majority and the minority agree that EcoHealth has not been transparent with the American people.

Reality

- The biased and politically-motivated conclusions from the SSCP are not proven by the actual evidence of EHA's behavior over the years.
- EHA has been a faithful steward of U.S. taxpayer dollars and has contributed important research findings that have helped to protect the health of the American population.
- EHA has been transparent with the American people through extensive and thorough reporting to funding agencies of how it has used grant monies - and through hundreds of publications in the peer-reviewed literature that shared their findings with the broader scientific community.

EHA did not conduct "gain-of-function" research

SSCP universe

- Dr. Daszak failed to defend his public position that EcoHealth has never facilitated gain-of-function research at the WIV.
- The Select Subcommittee's staff report revealed that research facilitated by EcoHealth - with U.S. tax dollars - was conducted at the WIV and qualified as gain-of-function research.
- When Rep. Nicole Malliotakis (R-Ny.) confronted Dr. Daszak with the broadly understood definition of gain-of-function as "a type of research that modifies a biological agent so that it confers new and enhanced activity to that agent," he played semantics with the definition and falsely denied that EcoHealth has ever conducted this type of research.

Reality

- Dr. Daszak has consistently maintained that EHA did not and does not conduct gain-of-function research as defined by the NIH. The NIH itself agreed and stated this unequivocally.
- With due respect, Representative Malliotakis, who has degrees in communications and business, but not virology, presented her own definition of gain-of-function, but did not permit Dr. Daszak to make the point that the NIH definition - which EHA has followed consistently - requires both enhanced activity and a pathogen that has been shown to have the potential to create a human disease outbreak. The organisms that EHA and WIV studied were bat coronaviruses that had not been shown to cause harm to humans - which is why the NIH found that this research did not meet the definition of gain-of-function.

There is no verifiable scientific evidence that COVID-19 emerged from the WIV

SSCP universe

- Dr. Daszak admitted that "of course" the WIV could have hidden coronavirus samples and that he does "not know" if the WIV has the ability to genetically modify viruses without leaving a trace.
- However, he curiously maintains the posture that COVID-19 originated in nature and not from the WIV.

Reality

- There is no scientifically-verifiable evidence that COVID-19 emerged from the WIV via a laboratory leak. All of the claims that this is so are based on conjecture and speculation. On the other hand, experts in the scientific community point to the convergence of at least 10 lines of verifiable evidence that point to the likelihood of zoonotic spillover.
- Dr. Daszak's comments quoted by the SSCP were in response to a direct question of whether the WIV could have hidden samples or genetically modified viruses without leaving a trace. Those are possibilities, but, as he testified, there is no evidence that they have done so - and, most importantly, the WIV never did either of those things with U.

Dr. Daszak did not mislead the US government about samples held at WIV

SSCP universe

- Dr. Daszak's testimony confirmed he repeatedly misled the U.S. government by downplaying his relationship with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
- When NIH reinstated Dr. Daszak's grant in 2023, it was under the impression that EcoHealth Alliance was no longer working with the WIV.
- During his testimony, Dr. Daszak revealed that the WIV is still in possession of coronavirus samples that may belong to the U.S. government stating, "To the best of my knowledge, they were in the freezers in Wuhan - over 15,000 of them."

Reality

- This allegation is simply untrue. Dr. Daszak and EHA never misled the U.S. government about their relationships with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
- The claim arises again from a misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the facts. One of the results of years of collaborative research between EHA and WIV (with NIH funding) was the collection of some 15,000 samples of bat coronaviruses. These samples have always resided in the WIV - a fact well-known to NIH throughout the period that they have supported EHA research. Of those samples, some 700 showed evidence of viral activity, and the genomic sequences of those viruses were analyzed and shared with EHA. Those genomic sequences are now in EHA's possession and the scientific data in them has been uploaded to the US-owned GenBank and published in the open scientific literature, where the information is available to the global scientific community.
- When NIH reinstated the EHA grant in 2023, they knew perfectly well that the samples were still in Wuhan, but that the relevant data had been extracted and was in the hands of EHA. There was never any question of this. WIV has since been debarred from using US government funds, so of course EHA no longer has any contractual relationship with them (and the 2023 renewal of their NIH grant excluded any active research in China, at EHA's suggestion). But some of the genomic data from the samples collected in some cases nearly a decade ago still need to be analyzed and published. To that limited extent, EHA is in contact with WIV to ensure that the publications are accurate. This is standard practice in the scientific community - and a responsible research by EHA to make sure that all of the data

Dr. Daszak has not shown contempt for the American people; rather, with EHA and other colleagues, he has worked for years to protect them from emerging pandemics

SSCP universe

Reality

- The Select Subcommittee will take further steps to address Dr. Daszak's contempt for the American people.
- The only people at the SSCP hearing who showed contempt for the American people were the Congresspeople and staff members who repeatedly refused to allow Dr. Dazsak to respond to their accusations and allegations based on their selective reading of the record.
- This hearing was clearly not a search for the truth and ignored basic

Member "highlights" from the SSCP hearing

SSCP universe

- Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Chairman Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio), D.P.M, pressed Dr. Daszak on why he repeatedly downplayed EcoHealth's relationship with the WIV in order to secure a federal grant.

Reality

- Chairman Wenstrup's line of questioning was confused and confusing. First, he focused on a draft version of a grant proposal that was rejected by DARPA. The proposed research was never done - so there is obviously no basis for claiming that EHA was trying to "mislead" or "deceive" DARPA. Nor was there ever an attempt to "downplay" the relationship with WIV in the proposal.
- Chairman Wenstrup tried to make this case, but seemed unwilling to let Dr. Daszak explain what was plainly evident in the proposal submitted to DARPA. Chairman Wenstrup confused two different kinds of studies that EHA and its collaborators proposed to do, and mixed up the biosafety levels required for the different experiments. EHA never proposed to do any recombinant viral experiments anywhere but in a US-based BSL-3 facility, and other assays in the proposal were to be done in China at a BSL-2 facility. In each case, this was the appropriate biosafety level - whether

SSCP Universe

- Committee on Oversight and Accountability Chairman James Comer (R-Ky.) grilled Dr. Daszak on his relationship with the intelligence community - specifically pressing him on his communications about EcoHealth's ties to the WIV and the Chinese Communist Party.

Reality

- Representative Comer claimed that "something fishy" was going on at the WIV, but despite his insistence on this, the intelligence community has stated that there is no conclusive evidence that COVID-19 emerged as the result of a lab leak from the WIV.
- The only research that EHA did in collaboration with the WIV was funded by and approved by the NIH.
- As Dr. Daszak's testimony clearly shows, he answered clearly that he was not an "informant" for the intelligence agencies, but did respond to questions from the CIA and FBI, as any patriotic citizen would.

SSCP universe

- Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chairman Morgan Griffith (R-Va.) revealed disturbing discrepancies between Dr. Daszak's transcribed interview in November of 2023, the evidence uncovered by the Select Subcommittee during its years-long investigation, and his public testimony this week.

Reality

- Chairman Griffith's performance was full of faux outrage - and he refused to let Dr. Daszak respond to his allegations, which do not hold up to scrutiny. He claimed that Dr. Daszak had lied about findings concerning the extent of bat coronavirus infections in Southeast Asia because of alleged discrepancies in testimony and drafts of research reports - in one of which he stated that this was a rare occurrence and in another stating that it led to some 60,000 infections per year.
- Had he allowed Dr. Daszak to respond, it would have become clear that there was no sinister discrepancy between the different documents. The simple explanation is that the crossover of infection from bats to humans is indeed rare - but in an at-risk population in Southeast Asia of some 300,000,000 people, the absolute number of infections is large - an estimated 60,000 infections per year. In between the time of the original report to NIH and the publication of these important results in a peer-reviewed article in *Nature Communications*, EHA collected and analyzed additional data. It is standard practice to share this evolving picture with the NIH in interim reports, which is precisely what EHA did.

SSCP Universe

- Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-Ariz.) elicited a concession from Dr. Daszak that the U.S. State Department is responsible for allowing EcoHealth to conduct gain-of-function research at labs tied to the Chinese Community Party -including the WIV.

Reality

- Dr. Daszak made the unexceptional statement that before EHA can conduct research in another country using U.S. taxpayer funds, there is a process in place in which the U. S. State Department vets the proposed partner. All he said - not a "concession" - is that if the State Department knew that there were problems with the WIV, they would have refused permission for the collaboration using NIH funds. Because they didn't, EHA was correct to assume that there was no reason not to proceed with the collaboration.
- Rep. Lesko based her line of questioning on a discredited "fact sheet" issued by the State Department in the last weeks of the Trump Administration. The U.S. intelligence community, in its later statement with respect to COVID-19 origins, did not corroborate many of the claims in this "fact sheet."

SSCP Universe

- Rep. Michael Cloud (R-Texas) pushed Dr. Daszak to explain why he funds research in adversarial countries - including China - that have repeatedly conducted highly-dangerous experiments at inadequate biosafety levels and have faced accusations of deleting sequences and samples that may have been paid for by the U.S. government.

Reality

- Rep. Cloud presented no evidence that the WIV had deleted data or that they conducted "highly-dangerous experiments at inadequate biosafety levels."
- Dr. Daszak clearly explained why EHA has worked in countries like China. Emerging pathogens do not respect geopolitical boundaries - they are only looking for evolutionary advantage so that they can continue to replicate and spread. To protect the American public from emerging pandemics, it is critical to study the regions where these pathogens emerge - that is EHA's mission, and that is exactly why the NIH, USAID, and Department of Defense have funded and continue to support EHA research.

SSCP Universe

- Rep. Rich McCormick (R-Ga.), M.D., exposed Dr. Daszak's inaccurate testimony that he only communicated with Dr. Fauci's senior advisor - Dr. David Morens - for personal reasons via Dr. Morens's personal Gmail. The Select Subcommittee is in possession of emails proving Dr. Daszak and Dr. Morens discussed both EcoHealth and NIH official business on Gmail in violation of federal record transparency and retention laws.

Reality

- Dr. Daszak's testimony was not inaccurate. As he explained, after former President Trump arbitrarily and unexpectedly instigated the termination of EHA's NIH grant in April 2020 (despite majority staff's insistence that this did not come from the White House, the SSCP has sworn testimony from Lawrence Tabak of the NIH that the call came from Trump's chief of staff Mark Meadows to him, and he conveyed the order to terminate EHA to Michael Lauer), he contacted a number of colleagues at NIH and throughout the scientific community to ask for advice on how EHA could petition to have its grant reinstated. There is nothing either inappropriate or unusual about this. Dr. Morens was one of those individuals - because his duties at NIH did not involve any decisionmaking authority over grants like EHA's, these conversations for advice as a friend were not NIH official business.

Conclusion: contrary to the claims of the SSCP, EHA has been accountable to the American people and good stewards of US taxpayer research funds.

SSCP Universe

- The SSCP states its position that EcoHealth Alliance should be criminally investigated and formally debarred.

Reality

- Any objective observer of the proceedings in the SSCP hearing on May 1 would have to conclude that this verdict is not proven.
- However, the SSCP does not appear to be concerned about due process. Indeed, both the majority and minority counsel of the SSCP issued their pre-ordained verdicts in reports before the hearing even began - declaring EHA guilty until proven innocent.
- EHA has been accountable - since their NIH grant was terminated in April 2020, they have worked assiduously with the NIH to comply with new Special Award Conditions to ensure that their research and all subcontracts for their grants are conducted in accord with NIH rules - including rules introduced since April 2020. And the HHS Office of Inspector General audit found no major issues after an 18-month audit; indeed, the OIG found that the NIH owed more money to EHA than EHA was required to reimburse for a few minor administrative errors in allocating expenses! In four years of enhanced scrutiny by the NIH, HHS OIG, GAO, and countless Congressional committees, there has been no evidence of any financial wrongdoing, despite feverish claims to the contrary. So the evidence shows that EHA has also been a responsible steward of US taxpayer money. There is no rational basis for debarring EHA from Federal grants or launching a criminal investigation of their activities.
- Finally, the tragic aspect of this hearing is that none of the SSCP members acknowledged what Federal scientific agencies and EHA's scientific peers have long known and appreciated - that their research shows that most pandemics originate from animals (mainly wildlife) in rapidly developing countries where people and animals come into direct contact. But, as we saw with COVID-19, once a virus begins to spread, it exploits travel and trade networks, which means a virus emerging anywhere on the planet is a direct threat to all of us here in

Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 5/9/2024 11:10:37 AM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: 1st draft of letter in response to SSCP follow up questions
Attachments: EcoHealth Alliance response to SSCP letter with follow up questions from May 1st hearing JLS 20240509.docx

Peter: Some comments for your consideration.

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 8, 2024 11:31 PM
To: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: 1st draft of letter in response to SSCP follow up questions
Importance: High

Just getting this ready. No sign of their letter yet, but it's good to have language ready to adapt.

Jeff, I still think it's important to get this information to them, and then to the Dems on the committee. Otherwise, we leave damaging allegations unanswered.

Of critical importance is that whatever you might believe about whether our expts are GoF or not, the GoP narrative that's been used on Fauci, and on us, is that he's 'wordsmithing' or 'shifting' the definition. However, the issue of whether we uploaded our report on time is not one where most people believe there's doubt – it's pretty clear that our report was not, in fact, submitted fully on time. Therefore, it's really important that we address this particular issue straight away, with the documentation, so that those who are willing to cross check, will do so.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation



May 2024

Addressed to Mitchell Benzine & Pellegrini?
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Commented [JS1]: Should be addressed to Chairman Wenstrup and Ranking Member Ruiz

Dear Mitchell Benzine & XXX Pellegrini:

Commented [PD2]: Chair and ranking member cc'd at end

I am writing in response to your letter of XXX, regarding requests for follow up information from my public hearing on May 1, 2024. EcoHealth Alliance staff and counsel have already begun work on producing these documents, and will fulfil all of your requests by the deadline you indicate. Additionally, we identified 8 specific issues that were raised by members of the Committee, and Chief of the Majority and Minority Counsels on which that we would like to provide have further information to address assist the Committee in its inquiries. These are:

Commented [PD3]: Depends if all our 8 issues are in his request letter

1. A timeline of EcoHealth Alliance's effort to upload its Y5 report into the NIH portal for its grant R01 AI110964. This includes some information that may have already been supplied to the committee, or available by FoIA, but also important new information from internal emails, files, and screenshots of EcoHealth Alliance's interaction with the NIH eRA Commons reporting portal.
2. Information that addresses potential confusion around EcoHealth Alliance's renegotiation of R01 AI110964. Specifically, we provide documents and other evidence to ascertain whether that show clearly that EcoHealth Alliance had made NIAID and NIH staff fully aware that it had already acquired genetic sequences from prior work in China, and that no further work on samples from the WIV, and that no additional on-the-ground work in China, would be proposed or necessary to achieve the scientific aims of the renegotiated R01. This information also demonstrates that NIH concurred in this view, as evidenced by the terms of the new Notice of Award, provided here.
3. Information that will help the SSCP access if demonstrates that EcoHealth Alliance was informed by NIH that the proposed experiments to be conducted at WIV were not Gain-of-function as defined by HHS and the NIH.

4. Information that ~~may assist the SSCP's investigation into~~ that shows that ~~whether~~ the experiments conducted at WIV on SARS-related bat CoVs were reported in compliance with NIH instructions, ~~or not~~.
5. Information that ~~may shed light on whether~~ clarifies where assays (e.g. PCR tests, binding assays) or experiments using infectious recombinant virus material were proposed to be conducted ~~at WIV or UNC~~ in the DARPA DEFUSE proposal and whether these were proposed to occur under BSL-2 or -3 conditions.
6. Comparison of the rules governing biosafety of laboratory work with SARS-related bat coronaviruses in China and the USA, with full references.
7. Information to explain the changes in the description of serology results in a draft Y5 report and the final submitted version of the Y5 report, which were based on additional analysis of data in the months between the two drafts – part of the usual practice in such scientific research.
8. Information ~~to help~~ that shows clearly that ~~the SSCP assess if~~ EcoHealth Alliance has been working with NIH on compliance issues, and if NIH deems these to be sufficient to warrant continued funding of EcoHealth Alliance.

Because of the considerable time and research it takes to produce the evidentiary documents for these issues, we have so far only addressed the first two: 1) A timeline of EcoHealth Alliance's effort to upload its Y5 report into the NIH portal for its grant R01 AI110964; and 2) Information that addresses potential confusion around EcoHealth Alliance's renegotiation of R01 AI110964. At the hearing on 1 May 2024, SSCP counsels expressed concern that EcoHealth Alliance may have further information that has not yet come to light. We want to emphasize that some of the information we are supplying today was indeed already in documents provided to the SSCP. Other information (e.g. screenshots of the NIH eRA Commons portal) were not requested, but ~~do provide valuable data for the SSCP to consider in its investigations~~. In light of the questions posed by the SSCP in the 1 May 2024 hearing, it became clear that they were of interest and that is why EHA is now providing them to the SSCP to ensure a more complete record.

Sincerely,



Peter Daszak, PhD

President, EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018, USA
+1.212.380.4460

[HYPERLINK "mailto:daszak@ecohealthalliance.org"]

[HYPERLINK "http://www.ecohealthalliance.org"]

cc: The Honorable Brad Wenstrup, M.D., Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

The Honorable Raul Ruiz, M.D., Ranking Member
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

EcoHealth Alliance Counsel - Tarter, Krinsky & Drogin

Message

From: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Sent: 10/21/2021 6:26:00 PM
To: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: NIH is now accusing me publicly of not following GoF rules; Republicans are saying we lied to NIH

Join Zoom Meeting

<https://ecohealthalliance-org.zoom.us> [REDACTED]



Aleksei Chmura, PhD
Chief of Staff

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018, USA

+1.212.380.4473 (direct)
+1.917.385.5267 (mobile)
Aleksei MacDurian (Skype)

www.ecohealthalliance.org

Visit our blog: www.ecohealthalliance.org/blog

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science we develop solutions that promote conservation and prevent pandemics.

On Thu, Oct 21, 2021 at 1:52 PM Aleksei Chmura <[REDACTED]> wrote:

Dear Jeff,

Additional details in Peter's email, below, and a brief agenda:

1. Phylogeny
2. NIH posting and POLITICO's request
3. Undark's deep dive on EcoHealth
4. Letter from Lawrence Tabak

Cheers,

-Aleksei

Aleksei Chmura, PhD
Chief of Staff

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018, USA

+1.212.380.4473 (direct)
+1.917.385.5267 (mobile)
Aleksi MacDurian (Skype)

www.ecohealthalliance.org

Visit our blog: www.ecohealthalliance.org/blog

EcoHealth Alliance leads cutting-edge research into the critical connections between human and wildlife health and delicate ecosystems. With this science we develop solutions that promote conservation and prevent pandemics.

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>
Date: Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 8:13 PM
Subject: NIH is now accusing me publicly of not following GoF rules; Republicans are saying we lied to NIH
To: Keusch, Gerald T <[REDACTED]>, David Morens <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Aleksi Chmura <[REDACTED]>

I need some help and advice here, and it's complicated.

In year 3 of our NIAID grant, we were given the go-ahead to conduct experiments with chimeric viruses based on SARSr and MERSr backbones, but with a proviso that:

"Per the letter dated July 7, 2016 to Mr. Aleksi Chmura at EcoHealth Alliance, should any of the MERS-like or SARS-like chimeras generated under this grant show evidence of enhanced virus growth greater than 1 log over the parental backbone strain you must stop all experiments with these viruses and provide the NIAID Program Officer and Grants Management Specialist, and Wuhan Institute of Virology Institutional Biosafety Committee with the relevant data and information related to these unanticipated outcomes."

That text is in the NoA pdf attached NIH-NOA_5401A1110964-03.PDF

We asked WIV for a report on the year's work during year 4, and put a graph of an experiment they did where one of the chimeric viruses *did* grow a more than 1 log faster, but by day 4, the parental strain had leveled this out. We heard about this after the fact, and reported it in our end-of-year report. No one said anything about it at NIH until now.

NIH was FoIA'd for all documents on our original China grant, including this, and a Congressional member James Comer has asked them to explain, I think. NIH have now responded to him (and he's made the letter public) – see two image files "NIH letter to James Comer Oct 20th 2021". These are from Lawrence Tabak, and they state that we "failed to report this finding right away, as was required". They've now written to us with 5 days notice to send them the IACUC and all unpublished data. They state this in the letter to James Comer as a way of saying they're calling us to task, but it seems like nothing to do with the experiments anyway.

My problem is that James Comer is now saying EcoHealth hid GoF work from NIH.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200

New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

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Message

From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: 1/21/2022 10:34:21 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
CC: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: FW: Article about our correspondence with NIH on the terminated-now-suspended grant

Twice in the past, including a month or so ago, I deleted everything with EHA people from my entire Outlook....

d
David M. Morens, MD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (work)
[REDACTED] (cell)

IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 5:29 PM Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

They're awful – US Right to Know – just out to cause trouble and drum up lab leak controversy.

I hope NIH can help reduce the amount that comes out – some of the emails between us all via your NIH account were a bit embarrassing re. criticizing the lab leakers and will be reported as showing that we were 'conspiring' together in some way...

Eventually, there will be no more to FoIA – that's the only silver lining.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 5:15 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Cc: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: FW: Article about our correspondence with NIH on the terminated-now-suspended grant

PS, just got a FOIA from Gary Ruskin of US Right to Know. This one is only to me and not Tony or the others, and asks for all correspon with anyone at EHA going back 5 years.

Do you know these guys? From their website they sound like they have done alot of alarmist things

d

David M. Morcns, MD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (work)

[REDACTED] (cell)

IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 4:40 PM Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

These Intercept reporters foia'd our lawyer's correspondence with NIH regarding the terminated-now-suspended R01.

Here's the article that came out of that. It's not that bad and in some places paints a picture of an organization doing its best to get on with science. I think the nay-sayers will continue to think we're acting disingenuously, and the supporters will continue to think we're being harassed, so in that sense, no harm done. Here's the link, and the full article pasted below. I recommend you look at the link because it provides a link to the FOIA'd documents also.

<https://theintercept.com/2022/01/20/coronavirus-research-china-ecohealth-fbi/>

FBI SOUGHT DOCUMENTS RELATED TO U.S.-FUNDED CORONAVIRUS RESEARCH IN CHINA

New records from the National Institutes of Health detail internal conversations involving the EcoHealth Alliance's research in Wuhan.



Mara Hvistendahl, Sharon Lerner

January 20 2022, 5:42 p.m.

THE FBI SOUGHT National Institutes of Health grant documents covering bat coronavirus research in Wuhan in spring 2020, according to emails obtained by The Intercept. The emails, released through ongoing litigation between The Intercept and the NIH, detail internal NIH conversations involving the New York-based nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance, which collaborated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology on research. The emails also contain previously unreported requests the agency made of EcoHealth Alliance as a condition for restoring a grant funding its research.

While unable to provide some of the information requested by the agency, Peter Daszak, EcoHealth's besieged president, fought fiercely to save the grant.

The new information gives an unprecedented window into the high-profile tussle between EcoHealth Alliance and the NIH, and underscores the agency's tenuous grasp of the biosafety protocols in place in its research projects, even with a project that has since come under scrutiny for a possible link to the Covid-19 pandemic.

"There doesn't seem to be transparent and accessible record-keeping of incident reporting," said Filippa Lentzos, co-director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College London, after viewing some of the emails. "That is very worrying and underscores the need for an overhaul of biosafety oversight in the United States."

The correspondence contains letters going back to April 2020, when Trump administration officials were blaming the Wuhan Institute of Virology, without sufficient evidence, for causing the pandemic. On April 17, President Donald Trump was asked in a press conference about the NIH grant to EcoHealth Alliance, under which the Chinese lab was a partner. He responded, "We will end that grant very quickly." Two days later, Michael Lauer, NIH deputy director for extramural research, informed Daszak that the agency was suspending grant funds to the Wuhan Institute of Virology and instructed his group to cease providing grant money to the institute. On April 24, according to a letter included in the new communications, Lauer followed up with the news that the NIH was terminating the entire grant because it did not "align with the program goals and agency priorities." He told EcoHealth Alliance officials that nearly \$370,000 needed to be remitted back to the NIH's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, with their access to the remaining grant funds restricted "effective immediately." (Politico reported the existence of the letter that same month, and Science later published an excerpt of it.)

The confrontation earned Daszak sympathy in the press and from other scientists. NIH officials, meanwhile, refuted the possibility of a lab origin, at least in public. It would later be revealed, however, that in February 2020 NIAID Director Anthony Fauci and then-NIH Director Francis Collins had privately consulted with prominent scientists who had seriously considered the possibility of a lab origin for the pandemic, and that two months later some leading researchers still believed a lab accident was possible. "Wondering if there is something the NIH can do to help put down this very destructive conspiracy," Collins wrote in an email to Fauci in late April, in reference to a Fox News segment mentioning the lab-origin

hypothesis. While a handful of biosafety experts had openly called for scrutinizing the NIH's funding of EcoHealth Alliance, their entreaties were largely drowned out by political wrangling.

MOST READ

Congressional Democrats Join Republicans to Undermine Biden Administration's Surprise Medical Billing Rule

Austin Ahlman

Trump Campaign Embraces "Blacks for Trump" Founder Who Belonged to Violent Cult

Robert Mackey

UAE Adviser Illegally Funneled Foreign Cash Into Hillary Clinton's 2016 Campaign

Matthew Cole

Trump officials had reportedly instructed U.S. intelligence agencies to search for evidence linking the Wuhan lab to the pandemic. Trump's interest appeared to be scapegoating China, and officials in his administration homed in on sketchy evidence from Wuhan. But the emails obtained by The Intercept indicate that the FBI looked where biosafety experts had suggested they should: at EcoHealth Alliance's NIH grant, though it's unclear what prompted the FBI's request for information. On May 22, 2020, Ashley Sanders, an officer with the NIH's Office of Management Assessment, emailed FBI agent David Miller under the subject line "FW: Grant Questions – FBI Inquiry – 1-R01AI110964-01 – 2-R01AI110964-06": the numbers the NIH had assigned to the grant and its renewal.

The correspondence suggests that NIH administrators provided Miller with detailed information about the grant. "In preparation for our call on Tuesday, Erik (cc'd) has provided responses to your initial questions below," Sanders wrote, referring to Erik Stemmy, a program officer for the grant. The several pages of text that follow are redacted, except for the title of an attachment that includes the grant number and "SF424." The SF 424 is a detailed NIH form that grant applicants must submit.

From: Sanders, Ashley (NIH/OD) [E]
To: Miller, David A. (DK) (FBI)
Cc: Stamm, Erik (NIH/OD) [E]; Shannon, Mike (NIH/OD) [E]
Subject: FW: Grant Questions - FBI Inquiry - 1-R01AI110954-01 - 2-R01AI110954-06
Date: Friday, May 22, 2020 3:18:05 PM
Attachments: SE 324 AI110954.docx

Hi David,

In preparation for our call on Tuesday, Erik (cc'd) has provided responses to your initial questions below (also attached).

Hope you have a great holiday weekend!

Ashley


Ashley M. Sanders, MFS
Senior Program Investigations Officer
NIH, OMA, Division Program Integrity
6011 Executive Blvd.
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Office: (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

SE 324 AI110954-06 (received date 11/05/2019)



Last October, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a report assessing the possible origins of the pandemic. In the document, which followed a 90-day review by the spy agencies ordered by President Joe Biden, one agency assessed with moderate confidence that the pandemic had a lab origin, “probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” While the DNI report did not name the agency, the New York Times reported at the time that it was the FBI. (Four other intelligence agencies and the National Intelligence Council concluded with low confidence that the pandemic had a natural origin.)

Experts have puzzled over whether the spy agencies gained access to EcoHealth Alliance’s grant documents. The DNI’s detailed report did not list grant documents or communications as a source of information, but the email about the inquiry now suggests that the FBI had previously obtained at least some internal information about the EcoHealth Alliance grant. The FBI declined to confirm the existence of the inquiry or otherwise comment.

Separately, in December 2020, the NIH cited a law enforcement exemption when denying a public records request from The Intercept for the EcoHealth Alliance grant documents. In a July 2021 hearing, a federal litigator explained the agency’s rationale: “At the time that they asserted the exemption, they were told and were under the impression there were ongoing investigations, law enforcement investigations, into what plaintiffs are alleging is a lab-leak hypothesis, what caused COVID,” said Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander J. Hogan, referring to the NIH’s 2020 denial of The Intercept’s FOIA request. “And because of the implication of those investigations, they withheld these documents in full.”

The NIH released the bat coronavirus grant proposal to The Intercept in September 2021.

In a previously unpublished email sent in April 2021, Daszak told an NIH administrator that following a trip to China as part of the World Health Organization investigation, he had briefed the FBI and other intelligence agencies, as well as the National Security Council.

“Fishing for Material”

The newly released emails detail how EcoHealth Alliance fought back against the NIH’s termination of its grant. On May 22, 2020, lawyer Andrew Krinsky of the New York firm Tarter Krinsky & Drogin wrote to Lauer on behalf of

EcoHealth Alliance. The lawyer said that NIAID had ranked the grant as “extremely high priority” when it was considered for renewal in mid-2019 and that EcoHealth Alliance had already agreed not to pass any more funding on to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

While the NIH had said that “the decision not to award a grant, or to award a grant at a particular funding level, is at the discretion of the agency” and cited a clause that allowed it to terminate grants at will, Krinsky argued that the NIH didn’t have the legal right to cut off the funding and that according to the NIH’s own rules, there was “no rational basis to terminate” the grant.

The NIH, EcoHealth Alliance, and Tarter Krinsky & Drogin did not immediately respond to requests to comment.

Date: April 19, 2020

From: Michael S Lauer, MD
NIH Deputy Director for Extramural Research

Lauer, Michael
(NIH/OD) [E]

Digitally signed by Michael S Lauer, MD (NIH/OD) [E]
Date: 2020.04.19 10:47:48 -0400

To: Kevin Olival, PhD
Vice-President for Research
EcoHealth Alliance

(b) (6)

Naomi Schrag, JD
Vice-President for Research Compliance, Training, and Policy
Columbia University

(b) (6)

Subject: Project Number 2R01AI110964-06

Dear Dr. Olival and Ms. Schrag:

EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. is the recipient, as grantee, of an NIH grant entitled "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence." It is our understanding that one of the sub-recipients of the grant funds is the Wuhan Institute of Virology ("WIV"). It is our understanding that WIV studies the interaction between corona viruses and bats. The scientific community believes that the coronavirus causing COVID-19 jumped from bats to humans likely in Wuhan where the COVID-19 pandemic began. There are now allegations that the current crisis was precipitated by the release from WIV of the coronavirus responsible for COVID-19. Given these concerns, we are pursuing suspension of WIV from participation in Federal programs.

While we review these allegations during the period of suspension, you are instructed to cease providing any funds from the above noted grant to the WIV. This temporary action is authorized by 45 C.F.R. § 75.371(d) ("Initiate suspension or debarment proceedings as authorized under 2 C.F.R. part 180"). The incorporated OMB provision provides that the funding agency may, through suspension, immediately and temporarily exclude from Federal programs persons who are not presently responsible where "immediate action is necessary to protect the public interest." 2 C.F.R. § 180.700(e). It is in the public interest that NIH ensure that a sub-recipient has taken all appropriate precautions to prevent the release of pathogens that it is studying. This suspension of the sub-recipient does not affect the remainder of your grant assuming that no grant funds are provided to WIV following receipt of this email during the period of suspension.

In a July 2020 letter previously published by Vanity Fair, Lauer informed Daszak that the grant could be reinstated, but only if EcoHealth Alliance could meet seven conditions. Those included providing a sample of “the actual SARS-CoV-2 virus that WIV used to determine the viral sequence” and explaining apparently unusual activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, including roadblocks and diminished cellphone traffic, as well as the deletion of the online profile of a staffer at the lab named Huang Yanling.

The next month, the newly released emails reveal, the Tarter Krinsky & Drogin lawyers sent Lauer a detailed, seven-page rebuttal, demanding that the NIH reinstate the grant and immediately release the grant funds. The rebuttal suggested that EcoHealth Alliance and the Wuhan Institute of Virology were being unfairly scrutinized. Daszak echoed that idea in an interview with Nature that same month in which he called the NIH’s conditions “heinous.”

In October 2020, Lauer responded, arguing that the agency was within its rights to cut off the grant. “EcoHealth’s responses have not satisfied the NIH’s concerns that EcoHealth had failed to adequately monitor the compliance of its subrecipient, and that the subrecipient, WIV, had failed to comply with safety requirements,” Lauer wrote. Still, he offered the nonprofit one last chance to respond to its seven conditions — and added three more requests about the research in Wuhan. Among the new requests, which have not been previously reported, were descriptions of EcoHealth Alliance’s efforts to monitor risk at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and copies of all WIV biosafety reports from June 2014 through May 2019.



Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP
 1350 Broadway
 New York, NY 10018
 P 212.216.8000
 F 212.216.8001
 www.tarterkrinsky.com

Andrew N. Krinsky, Partner
 (85) (8) Direct Dial
 (8) (66)

August 13, 2020

Via Email, Certified Mail, & FedEx

(b) (6)

Michael S. Lauer, MD
 NIH Deputy Director for Extramural Research
 National Institutes of Health
 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
 1 Center Drive, Building 1, Room 144
 Bethesda, Maryland 20892

Re: Suspension of NIH Grant 2R01 AI 110964-6

Dear Dr. Lauer:

This firm represents EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. ("EcoHealth Alliance"), in connection with the post-award decision by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases ("NIAID"), an Institute within the National Institute of Health ("NIH"), under the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), on July 8, 2020, to suspend grant 2R01 AI 110964-6 (the "Suspension"), which funds the project *Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence* (the "Project").

This letter constitutes EcoHealth Alliance's initial response to the Suspension, which was due to purported concerns regarding the safety of unspecified research being conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology ("WIV") and for EcoHealth Alliance's alleged failure to report certain subawards in connection with grant 2R01 AI 110964-6 (the "Grant").¹ As set forth in more detail below, the Suspension is unjustified as WIV has no connection to the Project or EcoHealth Alliance's current research and EcoHealth Alliance had not issued any subawards in connection with the Grant at the time of the Suspension. Moreover, NIAID is not authorized under 45 CFR §§ 75.371, 75.205, and 75.207, entitled *Specific Award Conditions*, to impose, *inter alia*, conditions that consist of demands for information regarding entities that are neither subrecipients of grant funds nor project affiliates.² Accordingly, EcoHealth Alliance hereby demands that the Suspension be withdrawn and all funding in the HHS Payment Management System be released immediately.

BACKGROUND

A. EcoHealth Alliance

EcoHealth Alliance is a prolific New York-based nonprofit institution dedicated to protecting the health of people, animals, and the environment from emerging zoonotic diseases. For more than a decade, EcoHealth Alliance has been conducting cutting edge scientific research

¹ A copy of my prior letter, dated May 22, 2020, regarding NIH's termination of the Grant, is attached hereto as Exhibit I.

² Notwithstanding NIH's lack of authority to impose extraneous conditions on the Grant and Project, EcoHealth Alliance has made a good faith effort to respond to NIH's questions regarding WIV.

Six months later, in April 2021, Daszak wrote a lengthy letter to Lauer — this time signed by him and not his lawyers — addressing the 10 conditions. He offered to meet with Lauer “without legal counsel in a scientist-to-scientist conversation,” adding, “I look forward to your reply and hope that these will allow NIH to lift the suspension on funding so that we can continue our work to help protect our nation, indeed the global population, against future coronavirus pandemics.”

Yet, in a confiding email he sent to NIH officials and program officers later in April, he struck a less conciliatory tone. “I believe he’s fishing for material to support his earlier insinuation that EHA has done a poor job of monitoring biosafety,” Daszak wrote about Lauer in the email. Daszak interpreted the NIH official’s oversight efforts as a possible attempt to “provide cover so that he can say that we weren’t in compliance” and asked the NIH staffers to intervene.



Related

NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

Among the recipients of the email was Erik Stemmy, the program officer on the EcoHealth Alliance grant. The Intercept previously [reported](#) that Stemmy

was one of two agency employees who had allowed Daszak to draft a rule governing his group's research. The recipient list also included several NIH section heads, including Emily Linde, the director of the NIH's grant management program; Matthew Fenton, director of the agency's division of extramural activities; and Emily Erbelding, director of the division of microbiology and infectious diseases.

"Any nudging you could give to Dr. Lauer would be welcome," Daszak wrote to the group. He also nodded at recent developments. In the preceding weeks, dozens of scientists had signed open letters calling for a robust investigation of the origin of the pandemic. "I realize that the politics are not great right now, but this is science, not politics, and we have a job to do in trying to identify the next COVID-like disease, which is surely out there and probably already spilling over somewhere in S. China."



EcoHealth Alliance

Dr. Michael Lauer
Deputy Director for Extramural Research,
NIH, Bethesda, MD.

Response to the Reinstatement and immediate suspension of 2R01AI110964
"Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence"

April 11th 2021

Dear Dr. Lauer,

I am responding your letters of 7/8/2020 and 10/3/2020 regarding the reinstatement and immediate suspension of NIH grant 2R01AI110964 "*Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence*", that was terminated "for convenience" on 4/24/2020. In particular, this letter addresses the conditions you state would need to be fulfilled in order for us to have access to the funds to continue this work.

As you know, we had not set up any subcontracts to the Wuhan Institute of Virology under this renewal R01. Immediately following NIH's letter on 4/19/2020 that the WIV was being 'investigated', we suspended all plans for contractual work with WIV. This termination of a funded relationship with the institute makes it extraordinarily difficult and more likely impossible to provide the information requested about an autonomous foreign organization – as would also be the case for a domestic one – that our organization neither works with currently, nor has control over.

Additionally, our collaborative work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology prior to your grant termination letter of 4/24/2020 and that planned in the suspended grant, is wholly unrelated to many of the conditions listed below. These conditions also pertain to certain events and situations that in no way involve EcoHealth Alliance or are not under our control. Thus, most of the conditions below are either unrelated to EcoHealth Alliance's planned research in our highly rated, approved and funded grant application, and/or to the biosafety of our continued research funded by the suspended grant when it is reinstated in full.

Furthermore, in our recent correspondence with NIH regarding the latest in a series of FOIA requests, we were informed (1/26/2021 – see email correspondence at the end of this letter) by an NIH staff member Garcia-Malene Gorka that "any indication from my program that there is an ongoing investigation into WIV can now be disregarded, as we recently confirmed there are no pending investigations into that organization." Because this was the explanation in your initial letter of 4/19/2020 for the decisions from your office regarding restrictions on, termination of, then reinstatement and suspension of our grant, we believe that these decisions should now be reassessed.

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1100
New York, NY 10018
212 380 1450
EcoHealthAlliance.org

As NIH-funded research in Wuhan was thrust into the spotlight in 2020, agency communications added to the sense that staffers had a flimsy grasp of the biosafety of both that project and others. In August 2020, a ProPublica article about a biosecurity lapse at a University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill lab sparked a flurry of emails at NIAID. Two days after the article was published, the communications show, staff scrambled to find information about the incident, in which a researcher was bitten by a mouse infected with a coronavirus and did not isolate afterward.

The NIAID employees appear to have had no record of it. “Was this February 2016 incident reported to NIAID and, if so, for which grant was this incident report filed?” a staffer in the NIH’s Office of Extramural Research and Policy Operations wrote to Stemmy, the NIH program officer, on August 19. She said her office had been asked to determine whether researchers at UNC followed proper biosafety procedures but “was unable to locate incident report memos in the grants folders” for five grants. The office had checked folders for two grants for research on coronaviruses at UNC, as well as the folder for the grant funding EcoHealth Alliance’s bat coronavirus research in Wuhan, possibly because the nonprofit worked closely with UNC. (UNC was a partner on the bat coronavirus grant, as well as on a new grant that NIH awarded to EcoHealth Alliance in August 2020.)

According to ProPublica, federal lab safety officials at the NIH had confirmed that the UNC incident involved types of “SARS-associated coronavirus” and the university had said in a statement that it had informed the proper oversight agencies. But several staffers looked for and were unable to find records of the risky episode. In one email, an administrator said that the incident had been reported to another division at the NIH but not to NIAID. He added that the program officer for the grant only knew about a more recent safety breach because a scientist had told him.

“That just seems to indicate that they do not have their house in order,” said Lentzos, the biosecurity researcher. “It underscores that as a funder, NIH is not the independent oversight body that you would want for this kind of research.”

“Great Personal Burden”

In his April 2021 letter to Lauer, Daszak said that he had traveled to China with a World Health Organization team in part to satisfy the NIH’s demands for more information. “I have made extensive efforts to satisfy NIH’s broad

concerns,” Daszak wrote. “This includes serving as an expert on the WHO-China joint Mission on the Animal Origins of COVID-19, which involved 1 month on the ground in China (including 2 weeks locked in quarantine), at great personal burden and risk to me, to our organization, and to my family.”

While admitting that EcoHealth Alliance would not be able to meet some of the agency’s conditions, Daszak nevertheless appeared hopeful that the NIH might reassess its decision to terminate the funding. He again pushed back against some of the agency’s requests. Specifically, Daszak said that the questions about roadblocks near the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the deletion of Huang’s online presence — both of which had been focal points of online speculation — could be easily explained without any malfeasance.

“While many conspiracy theorists have suggested that the lack of a web presence of this person suggests some nefarious activity, there are dozens of unremarkable and routine reasons why a person may be removed from a web listing of employees or students,” he wrote of Huang. Similarly, Daszak noted, roadblocks and diminished cellphone traffic could be due to unremarkable road repair or other ordinary occurrences.



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Coverage **The Coronavirus Crisis**

Daszak also had a different read on State Department cables from January 2018 that Lauer had asked about in his letter. The cables detailed a shortage of trained technicians for the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s BSL-4 laboratory, the first lab in China certified to deal with the most dangerous pathogens.

While in April 2020, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin had interpreted excerpts of the cables as evidence of safety and management weaknesses in the lab, Daszak disagreed. Indeed the full cables, which were

released in July 2020, give a more complex picture, favorably describing research at the lab to which Daszak had contributed. "These do not in fact provide evidence of safety concerns at the laboratory," he wrote to Lauer. "Neither do they convincingly imply safety issues."

Lauer had also asked EcoHealth Alliance to arrange for an outside inspection of the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Daszak argued that cutting off the grant had made it virtually unthinkable that the Wuhan lab would assist with such requests. "This termination of a funded relationship with the institute makes it extraordinarily difficult and more likely impossible to provide the information requested," Daszak wrote to Lauer. International politics made the situation worse, as he noted in an explanation of why EcoHealth Alliance was unable to procure a sample of the actual SARS-CoV-2 virus that the Wuhan Institute of Virology had used to determine its viral sequence.

"During the last 16 months, there has been a series of vitriolic attacks from the US Government accusing China of bioengineering and releasing SARS-CoV-2 or of otherwise allowing COVID to become pandemic," he wrote to Lauer.

"Given these attacks, and WIV's status as a government entity, it seems to us incredulous that any request, particularly without scientific rationale, from a US non-profit to a Chinese Government laboratory for an active sample of a pathogenic human virus would likely be successful."

Daszak also cited strained international relations when explaining why he couldn't produce copies of the WIV biosafety reports, which might have provided insight into what precautions the lab had taken in its work on bat coronaviruses and whether any breaches of protocol had occurred.

"Some of [NIH's] demands were a little impractical," said Alina Chan, co-author of the book "Viral: The Search for the Origin of Covid-19." "How would EcoHealth Alliance be able to obtain information about the missing staffer?" But Daszak should have been able to provide lab safety records, which are "much more significant," she said.

To Lauer, Daszak noted that the media attention and resultant public curiosity about the work EcoHealth Alliance conducted in Wuhan had cost him personally. "This type of harassment has accelerated to the point that personal security guards are now stationed at my home address, where I have also had to install invasive equipment and set up procedures to protect my family against expected violent attacks," Daszak wrote. "Additionally, I now meet regularly with FBI agents and others at my home to monitor these threats." As he did in communications The Intercept published in December, Daszak

referred to a letter containing white powder that he had received at his home. Local news media reported the incident at the time.

Denying Document Requests

Meanwhile, EcoHealth Alliance was also pushing on another front. In January 2021, Matthew Torsiello, one of its lawyers, emailed Lauren Bartok, an information specialist in the NIH's Freedom of Information Act Office, to request that a FOIA request for EcoHealth Alliance's grant documents be denied. Torsiello asked that the request, which was made by a member of the public through the transparency organization MuckRock, be denied because the grant termination was under appeal and because "a law enforcement investigation concerning WIV remains ongoing." Torsiello explained that his law firm had previously asked for the the NIH to deny a request for EcoHealth Alliance grant documents made in 2020, also by a member of the public.

The lawyer's email went on to make a tenuous argument. "As demonstrated by the recent attack on the US Capital [sic] fueled by disinformation and conspiracy theories, the need to protect the privacy of EcoHealth Alliance's employees and affiliates is more important than ever." The email did not offer further explanation, but Daszak had previously argued to the press and in the pages of the medical journal The Lancet that the notion that the pandemic could have a lab origin was a conspiracy theory.

We're really hopeful that this is the case, and everyone at EcoHealth Alliance is looking forward to continuing this critical work.

Looking forward to hearing news from you!

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel: (b) (6)
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Garcia-Malene, Gorka (NIH/OD) [E] (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2021 12:20:51 PM

To: Matthew R. Torsiello

Cc: Neis T. Uppert; Andrew N. Krinsky; Bartok, Lauren (NIH/NIAID) [E]; NIH FOIA

Subject: [EXT] FW: FOIA Case No. 55702 re: EcoHealth Alliance & Grant No. R01AI110964-6

Good afternoon, Mr. Torsiello –

I'd like to insert myself into the unfolding FOIA conversation in hopes of providing some helpful context. Our records show that this competing renewal has in fact been funded. In addition, any indication from my program that there is an ongoing investigation into WIV can now be disregarded, as we recently confirmed there are no pending investigations

The day after Torsiello sent his email, another NIH FOIA officer wrote an email to an undisclosed recipient rejecting the lawyer's arguments for withholding the records. The officer noted that "there are no pending investigations" into the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Nine months later, the NIH FOIA office closed the public records request, pointing the requester to documents that the NIH had released online.

While EcoHealth Alliance's intervention in the FOIA request is not unusual, agencies are required by law to independently determine whether records should be disclosed, said Gunita Singh, an attorney for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. "Agencies subject to FOIA are obligated to serve the public's interest in learning about government functions," she wrote in an email. "They cannot operate at the behest of private parties."

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200

New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

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Message

From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: 1/21/2022 10:34:21 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
CC: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: FW: Article about our correspondence with NIH on the terminated-now-suspended grant

Twice in the past, including a month or so ago, I deleted everything with EHA people from my entire Outlook....

d
David M. Morens, MD

IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 5:29 PM Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]> wrote:

They're awful – US Right to Know – just out to cause trouble and drum up lab leak controversy.

I hope NIH can help reduce the amount that comes out – some of the emails between us all via your NIH account were a bit embarrassing re. criticizing the lab leakers and will be reported as showing that we were 'conspiring' together in some way...

Eventually, there will be no more to FoIA – that's the only silver lining.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation


From: David Morens <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 5:15 PM
To: Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Jeff Sturchio <[REDACTED]>; Keusch, Gerald T <keusch@bu.edu>; Aleksei Chmura <chmura@ecohealthalliance.org>
Subject: Re: FW: Article about our correspondence with NIH on the terminated-now-suspended grant

PS, just got a FOIA from Gary Ruskin of US Right to Know. This one is only to me and not Tony or the others, and asks for all correspon with anyone at EHA going back 5 years.

Do you know these guys? From their website they sound like they have done alot of alarmist things

d

David M. Morcns, MD



IMPORTANT: My gmail frequently sends incoming messages to Trash, which is apparently not correctable. If you don't hear from me in a reasonable time, please try again, call, or use my NIH email address

IMPORTANT: For US Government-related email, please also reply to my NIAID address

On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 4:40 PM Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]> wrote:

These Intercept reporters foia'd our lawyer's correspondence with NIH regarding the terminated-now-suspended R01.

Here's the article that came out of that. It's not that bad and in some places paints a picture of an organization doing its best to get on with science. I think the nay-sayers will continue to think we're acting disingenuously, and the supporters will continue to think we're being harassed, so in that sense, no harm done. Here's the link, and the full article pasted below. I recommend you look at the link because it provides a link to the FOIA'd documents also.

<https://theintercept.com/2022/01/20/coronavirus-research-china-ecohealth-fbi/>

FBI SOUGHT DOCUMENTS RELATED TO U.S.-FUNDED CORONAVIRUS RESEARCH IN CHINA

New records from the National Institutes of Health detail internal conversations involving the EcoHealth Alliance's research in Wuhan.



Mara Hvistendahl, Sharon Lerner

January 20 2022, 5:42 p.m.

THE FBI SOUGHT National Institutes of Health grant documents covering bat coronavirus research in Wuhan in spring 2020, according to emails obtained by The Intercept. The emails, released through ongoing litigation between The Intercept and the NIH, detail internal NIH conversations involving the New York-based nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance, which collaborated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology on research. The emails also contain previously unreported requests the agency made of EcoHealth Alliance as a condition for restoring a grant funding its research.

While unable to provide some of the information requested by the agency, Peter Daszak, EcoHealth's besieged president, fought fiercely to save the grant.

The new information gives an unprecedented window into the high-profile tussle between EcoHealth Alliance and the NIH, and underscores the agency's tenuous grasp of the biosafety protocols in place in its research projects, even with a project that has since come under scrutiny for a possible link to the Covid-19 pandemic.

"There doesn't seem to be transparent and accessible record-keeping of incident reporting," said Filippa Lentzos, co-director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College London, after viewing some of the emails. "That is very worrying and underscores the need for an overhaul of biosafety oversight in the United States."

The correspondence contains letters going back to April 2020, when Trump administration officials were blaming the Wuhan Institute of Virology, without sufficient evidence, for causing the pandemic. On April 17, President Donald Trump was asked in a press conference about the NIH grant to EcoHealth Alliance, under which the Chinese lab was a partner. He responded, "We will end that grant very quickly." Two days later, Michael Lauer, NIH deputy director for extramural research, informed Daszak that the agency was suspending grant funds to the Wuhan Institute of Virology and instructed his group to cease providing grant money to the institute. On April 24, according to a letter included in the new communications, Lauer followed up with the news that the NIH was terminating the entire grant because it did not "align with the program goals and agency priorities." He told EcoHealth Alliance officials that nearly \$370,000 needed to be remitted back to the NIH's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, with their access to the remaining grant funds restricted "effective immediately." (Politico reported the existence of the letter that same month, and Science later published an excerpt of it.)

The confrontation earned Daszak sympathy in the press and from other scientists. NIH officials, meanwhile, refuted the possibility of a lab origin, at least in public. It would later be revealed, however, that in February 2020 NIAID Director Anthony Fauci and then-NIH Director Francis Collins had privately consulted with prominent scientists who had seriously considered the possibility of a lab origin for the pandemic, and that two months later some leading researchers still believed a lab accident was possible. "Wondering if there is something the NIH can do to help put down this very destructive conspiracy," Collins wrote in an email to Fauci in late April, in reference to a Fox News segment mentioning the lab-origin

hypothesis. While a handful of biosafety experts had openly called for scrutinizing the NIH's funding of EcoHealth Alliance, their entreaties were largely drowned out by political wrangling.

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Matthew Cole

Trump officials had reportedly instructed U.S. intelligence agencies to search for evidence linking the Wuhan lab to the pandemic. Trump's interest appeared to be scapegoating China, and officials in his administration homed in on sketchy evidence from Wuhan. But the emails obtained by The Intercept indicate that the FBI looked where biosafety experts had suggested they should: at EcoHealth Alliance's NIH grant, though it's unclear what prompted the FBI's request for information. On May 22, 2020, Ashley Sanders, an officer with the NIH's Office of Management Assessment, emailed FBI agent David Miller under the subject line "FW: Grant Questions – FBI Inquiry – 1-R01AI110964-01 – 2-R01AI110964-06": the numbers the NIH had assigned to the grant and its renewal.

The correspondence suggests that NIH administrators provided Miller with detailed information about the grant. "In preparation for our call on Tuesday, Erik (cc'd) has provided responses to your initial questions below," Sanders wrote, referring to Erik Stemmy, a program officer for the grant. The several pages of text that follow are redacted, except for the title of an attachment that includes the grant number and "SF424." The SF 424 is a detailed NIH form that grant applicants must submit.

From: Sanders, Ashley (NIH/OD) [E]
To: Miller, David A. (DK) (FBI)
Cc: Stamm, Erik (NIH/OD) [E]; Shannon, Mike (NIH/OD) [E]
Subject: FW: Grant Questions - FBI Inquiry - 1-R01AI110954-01 - 2-R01AI110954-06
Date: Friday, May 22, 2020 3:18:05 PM
Attachments: SE 324 AI110954.docx

Hi David,

In preparation for our call on Tuesday, Erik (cc'd) has provided responses to your initial questions below (also attached).

Hope you have a great holiday weekend!

Ashley

Ashley M. Sanders, MFS


Senior Program Investigations Officer
NIH, OMA, Division Program Integrity
6011 Executive Blvd.
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Office: (301) (b) (6)

Cell: (301) (b) (6)

(301) (b) (6)

SE 324 AI110954-06 (received date 11/05/2019)



Last October, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a report assessing the possible origins of the pandemic. In the document, which followed a 90-day review by the spy agencies ordered by President Joe Biden, one agency assessed with moderate confidence that the pandemic had a lab origin, “probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” While the DNI report did not name the agency, the New York Times reported at the time that it was the FBI. (Four other intelligence agencies and the National Intelligence Council concluded with low confidence that the pandemic had a natural origin.)

Experts have puzzled over whether the spy agencies gained access to EcoHealth Alliance’s grant documents. The DNI’s detailed report did not list grant documents or communications as a source of information, but the email about the inquiry now suggests that the FBI had previously obtained at least some internal information about the EcoHealth Alliance grant. The FBI declined to confirm the existence of the inquiry or otherwise comment.

Separately, in December 2020, the NIH cited a law enforcement exemption when denying a public records request from The Intercept for the EcoHealth Alliance grant documents. In a July 2021 hearing, a federal litigator explained the agency’s rationale: “At the time that they asserted the exemption, they were told and were under the impression there were ongoing investigations, law enforcement investigations, into what plaintiffs are alleging is a lab-leak hypothesis, what caused COVID,” said Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander J. Hogan, referring to the NIH’s 2020 denial of The Intercept’s FOIA request. “And because of the implication of those investigations, they withheld these documents in full.”

The NIH released the bat coronavirus grant proposal to The Intercept in September 2021.

In a previously unpublished email sent in April 2021, Daszak told an NIH administrator that following a trip to China as part of the World Health Organization investigation, he had briefed the FBI and other intelligence agencies, as well as the National Security Council.

“Fishing for Material”

The newly released emails detail how EcoHealth Alliance fought back against the NIH’s termination of its grant. On May 22, 2020, lawyer Andrew Krinsky of the New York firm Tarter Krinsky & Drogin wrote to Lauer on behalf of

EcoHealth Alliance. The lawyer said that NIAID had ranked the grant as “extremely high priority” when it was considered for renewal in mid-2019 and that EcoHealth Alliance had already agreed not to pass any more funding on to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

While the NIH had said that “the decision not to award a grant, or to award a grant at a particular funding level, is at the discretion of the agency” and cited a clause that allowed it to terminate grants at will, Krinsky argued that the NIH didn’t have the legal right to cut off the funding and that according to the NIH’s own rules, there was “no rational basis to terminate” the grant.

The NIH, EcoHealth Alliance, and Tarter Krinsky & Drogin did not immediately respond to requests to comment.

Date: April 19, 2020

From: Michael S Lauer, MD
NIH Deputy Director for Extramural Research

Lauer, Michael
(NIH/OD) [E]

Digitally signed by Michael S Lauer, MD (NIH/OD) [E]
Date: 2020.04.19 10:47:48 -0400

To: Kevin Olival, PhD
Vice-President for Research
EcoHealth Alliance

(b) (6)

Naomi Schrag, JD
Vice-President for Research Compliance, Training, and Policy
Columbia University

(b) (6)

Subject: Project Number 2R01AI110964-06

Dear Dr. Olival and Ms. Schrag:

EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. is the recipient, as grantee, of an NIH grant entitled "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence." It is our understanding that one of the sub-recipients of the grant funds is the Wuhan Institute of Virology ("WIV"). It is our understanding that WIV studies the interaction between corona viruses and bats. The scientific community believes that the coronavirus causing COVID-19 jumped from bats to humans likely in Wuhan where the COVID-19 pandemic began. There are now allegations that the current crisis was precipitated by the release from WIV of the coronavirus responsible for COVID-19. Given these concerns, we are pursuing suspension of WIV from participation in Federal programs.

While we review these allegations during the period of suspension, you are instructed to cease providing any funds from the above noted grant to the WIV. This temporary action is authorized by 45 C.F.R. § 75.371(d) ("Initiate suspension or debarment proceedings as authorized under 2 C.F.R. part 180"). The incorporated OMB provision provides that the funding agency may, through suspension, immediately and temporarily exclude from Federal programs persons who are not presently responsible where "immediate action is necessary to protect the public interest." 2 C.F.R. § 180.700(c). It is in the public interest that NIH ensure that a sub-recipient has taken all appropriate precautions to prevent the release of pathogens that it is studying. This suspension of the sub-recipient does not affect the remainder of your grant assuming that no grant funds are provided to WIV following receipt of this email during the period of suspension.

In a July 2020 letter previously published by Vanity Fair, Lauer informed Daszak that the grant could be reinstated, but only if EcoHealth Alliance could meet seven conditions. Those included providing a sample of “the actual SARS-CoV-2 virus that WIV used to determine the viral sequence” and explaining apparently unusual activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, including roadblocks and diminished cellphone traffic, as well as the deletion of the online profile of a staffer at the lab named Huang Yanling.

The next month, the newly released emails reveal, the Tarter Krinsky & Drogin lawyers sent Lauer a detailed, seven-page rebuttal, demanding that the NIH reinstate the grant and immediately release the grant funds. The rebuttal suggested that EcoHealth Alliance and the Wuhan Institute of Virology were being unfairly scrutinized. Daszak echoed that idea in an interview with Nature that same month in which he called the NIH’s conditions “heinous.”

In October 2020, Lauer responded, arguing that the agency was within its rights to cut off the grant. “EcoHealth’s responses have not satisfied the NIH’s concerns that EcoHealth had failed to adequately monitor the compliance of its subrecipient, and that the subrecipient, WIV, had failed to comply with safety requirements,” Lauer wrote. Still, he offered the nonprofit one last chance to respond to its seven conditions — and added three more requests about the research in Wuhan. Among the new requests, which have not been previously reported, were descriptions of EcoHealth Alliance’s efforts to monitor risk at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and copies of all WIV biosafety reports from June 2014 through May 2019.



Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP
 1350 Broadway
 New York, NY 10018
 P 212.216.8000
 F 212.216.8001
 www.tarterkrinsky.com

Andrew N. Krinsky, Partner
 (85) (8) Direct Dial
 (8) (66)

August 13, 2020

Via Email, Certified Mail, & FedEx

(b) (6)

Michael S. Lauer, MD
 NIH Deputy Director for Extramural Research
 National Institutes of Health
 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
 1 Center Drive, Building 1, Room 144
 Bethesda, Maryland 20892

Re: Suspension of NIH Grant 2R01 AI 110964-6

Dear Dr. Lauer:

This firm represents EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. ("EcoHealth Alliance"), in connection with the post-award decision by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases ("NIAID"), an Institute within the National Institute of Health ("NIH"), under the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), on July 8, 2020, to suspend grant 2R01 AI 110964-6 (the "Suspension"), which funds the project *Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence* (the "Project").

This letter constitutes EcoHealth Alliance's initial response to the Suspension, which was due to purported concerns regarding the safety of unspecified research being conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology ("WIV") and for EcoHealth Alliance's alleged failure to report certain subawards in connection with grant 2R01 AI 110964-6 (the "Grant").¹ As set forth in more detail below, the Suspension is unjustified as WIV has no connection to the Project or EcoHealth Alliance's current research and EcoHealth Alliance had not issued any subawards in connection with the Grant at the time of the Suspension. Moreover, NIAID is not authorized under 45 CFR §§ 75.371, 75.205, and 75.207, entitled *Specific Award Conditions*, to impose, *inter alia*, conditions that consist of demands for information regarding entities that are neither subrecipients of grant funds nor project affiliates.² Accordingly, EcoHealth Alliance hereby demands that the Suspension be withdrawn and all funding in the HHS Payment Management System be released immediately.

BACKGROUND

A. EcoHealth Alliance

EcoHealth Alliance is a prolific New York-based nonprofit institution dedicated to protecting the health of people, animals, and the environment from emerging zoonotic diseases. For more than a decade, EcoHealth Alliance has been conducting cutting edge scientific research

¹ A copy of my prior letter, dated May 22, 2020, regarding NIH's termination of the Grant, is attached hereto as Exhibit I.

² Notwithstanding NIH's lack of authority to impose extraneous conditions on the Grant and Project, EcoHealth Alliance has made a good faith effort to respond to NIH's questions regarding WIV.

Six months later, in April 2021, Daszak wrote a lengthy letter to Lauer — this time signed by him and not his lawyers — addressing the 10 conditions. He offered to meet with Lauer “without legal counsel in a scientist-to-scientist conversation,” adding, “I look forward to your reply and hope that these will allow NIH to lift the suspension on funding so that we can continue our work to help protect our nation, indeed the global population, against future coronavirus pandemics.”

Yet, in a confiding email he sent to NIH officials and program officers later in April, he struck a less conciliatory tone. “I believe he’s fishing for material to support his earlier insinuation that EHA has done a poor job of monitoring biosafety,” Daszak wrote about Lauer in the email. Daszak interpreted the NIH official’s oversight efforts as a possible attempt to “provide cover so that he can say that we weren’t in compliance” and asked the NIH staffers to intervene.



Related

NIH Officials Worked With EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on Coronavirus Experiments

Among the recipients of the email was Erik Stemmy, the program officer on the EcoHealth Alliance grant. The Intercept previously [reported](#) that Stemmy

was one of two agency employees who had allowed Daszak to draft a rule governing his group's research. The recipient list also included several NIH section heads, including Emily Linde, the director of the NIH's grant management program; Matthew Fenton, director of the agency's division of extramural activities; and Emily Erbelding, director of the division of microbiology and infectious diseases.

"Any nudging you could give to Dr. Lauer would be welcome," Daszak wrote to the group. He also nodded at recent developments. In the preceding weeks, dozens of scientists had signed open letters calling for a robust investigation of the origin of the pandemic. "I realize that the politics are not great right now, but this is science, not politics, and we have a job to do in trying to identify the next COVID-like disease, which is surely out there and probably already spilling over somewhere in S. China."



EcoHealth Alliance

Dr. Michael Lauer
Deputy Director for Extramural Research,
NIH, Bethesda, MD.

Response to the Reinstatement and immediate suspension of 2R01AI110964
"Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence"

April 11th 2021

Dear Dr. Lauer,

I am responding your letters of 7/8/2020 and 10/3/2020 regarding the reinstatement and immediate suspension of NIH grant 2R01AI110964 "*Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence*", that was terminated "for convenience" on 4/24/2020. In particular, this letter addresses the conditions you state would need to be fulfilled in order for us to have access to the funds to continue this work.

As you know, we had not set up any subcontracts to the Wuhan Institute of Virology under this renewal R01. Immediately following NIH's letter on 4/19/2020 that the WIV was being 'investigated', we suspended all plans for contractual work with WIV. This termination of a funded relationship with the institute makes it extraordinarily difficult and more likely impossible to provide the information requested about an autonomous foreign organization – as would also be the case for a domestic one – that our organization neither works with currently, nor has control over.

Additionally, our collaborative work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology prior to your grant termination letter of 4/24/2020 and that planned in the suspended grant, is wholly unrelated to many of the conditions listed below. These conditions also pertain to certain events and situations that in no way involve EcoHealth Alliance or are not under our control. Thus, most of the conditions below are either unrelated to EcoHealth Alliance's planned research in our highly rated, approved and funded grant application, and/or to the biosafety of our continued research funded by the suspended grant when it is reinstated in full.

Furthermore, in our recent correspondence with NIH regarding the latest in a series of FOIA requests, we were informed (1/26/2021 – see email correspondence at the end of this letter) by an NIH staff member Garcia-Malene Gorka that "any indication from my program that there is an ongoing investigation into WIV can now be disregarded, as we recently confirmed there are no pending investigations into that organization." Because this was the explanation in your initial letter of 4/19/2020 for the decisions from your office regarding restrictions on, termination of, then reinstatement and suspension of our grant, we believe that these decisions should now be reassessed.

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1100
New York, NY 10018
212 380 1450
EcoHealthAlliance.org

As NIH-funded research in Wuhan was thrust into the spotlight in 2020, agency communications added to the sense that staffers had a flimsy grasp of the biosafety of both that project and others. In August 2020, a ProPublica article about a biosecurity lapse at a University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill lab sparked a flurry of emails at NIAID. Two days after the article was published, the communications show, staff scrambled to find information about the incident, in which a researcher was bitten by a mouse infected with a coronavirus and did not isolate afterward.

The NIAID employees appear to have had no record of it. “Was this February 2016 incident reported to NIAID and, if so, for which grant was this incident report filed?” a staffer in the NIH’s Office of Extramural Research and Policy Operations wrote to Stemmy, the NIH program officer, on August 19. She said her office had been asked to determine whether researchers at UNC followed proper biosafety procedures but “was unable to locate incident report memos in the grants folders” for five grants. The office had checked folders for two grants for research on coronaviruses at UNC, as well as the folder for the grant funding EcoHealth Alliance’s bat coronavirus research in Wuhan, possibly because the nonprofit worked closely with UNC. (UNC was a partner on the bat coronavirus grant, as well as on a new grant that NIH awarded to EcoHealth Alliance in August 2020.)

According to ProPublica, federal lab safety officials at the NIH had confirmed that the UNC incident involved types of “SARS-associated coronavirus” and the university had said in a statement that it had informed the proper oversight agencies. But several staffers looked for and were unable to find records of the risky episode. In one email, an administrator said that the incident had been reported to another division at the NIH but not to NIAID. He added that the program officer for the grant only knew about a more recent safety breach because a scientist had told him.

“That just seems to indicate that they do not have their house in order,” said Lentzos, the biosecurity researcher. “It underscores that as a funder, NIH is not the independent oversight body that you would want for this kind of research.”

“Great Personal Burden”

In his April 2021 letter to Lauer, Daszak said that he had traveled to China with a World Health Organization team in part to satisfy the NIH’s demands for more information. “I have made extensive efforts to satisfy NIH’s broad

concerns,” Daszak wrote. “This includes serving as an expert on the WHO-China joint Mission on the Animal Origins of COVID-19, which involved 1 month on the ground in China (including 2 weeks locked in quarantine), at great personal burden and risk to me, to our organization, and to my family.”

While admitting that EcoHealth Alliance would not be able to meet some of the agency’s conditions, Daszak nevertheless appeared hopeful that the NIH might reassess its decision to terminate the funding. He again pushed back against some of the agency’s requests. Specifically, Daszak said that the questions about roadblocks near the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the deletion of Huang’s online presence — both of which had been focal points of online speculation — could be easily explained without any malfeasance.

“While many conspiracy theorists have suggested that the lack of a web presence of this person suggests some nefarious activity, there are dozens of unremarkable and routine reasons why a person may be removed from a web listing of employees or students,” he wrote of Huang. Similarly, Daszak noted, roadblocks and diminished cellphone traffic could be due to unremarkable road repair or other ordinary occurrences.



[Read Our Complete](#)

Coverage **The Coronavirus Crisis**

Daszak also had a different read on State Department cables from January 2018 that Lauer had asked about in his letter. The cables detailed a shortage of trained technicians for the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s BSL-4 laboratory, the first lab in China certified to deal with the most dangerous pathogens.

While in April 2020, Washington Post opinion columnist Josh Rogin had interpreted excerpts of the cables as evidence of safety and management weaknesses in the lab, Daszak disagreed. Indeed the full cables, which were

released in July 2020, give a more complex picture, favorably describing research at the lab to which Daszak had contributed. "These do not in fact provide evidence of safety concerns at the laboratory," he wrote to Lauer. "Neither do they convincingly imply safety issues."

Lauer had also asked EcoHealth Alliance to arrange for an outside inspection of the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Daszak argued that cutting off the grant had made it virtually unthinkable that the Wuhan lab would assist with such requests. "This termination of a funded relationship with the institute makes it extraordinarily difficult and more likely impossible to provide the information requested," Daszak wrote to Lauer. International politics made the situation worse, as he noted in an explanation of why EcoHealth Alliance was unable to procure a sample of the actual SARS-CoV-2 virus that the Wuhan Institute of Virology had used to determine its viral sequence.

"During the last 16 months, there has been a series of vitriolic attacks from the US Government accusing China of bioengineering and releasing SARS-CoV-2 or of otherwise allowing COVID to become pandemic," he wrote to Lauer.

"Given these attacks, and WIV's status as a government entity, it seems to us incredulous that any request, particularly without scientific rationale, from a US non-profit to a Chinese Government laboratory for an active sample of a pathogenic human virus would likely be successful."

Daszak also cited strained international relations when explaining why he couldn't produce copies of the WIV biosafety reports, which might have provided insight into what precautions the lab had taken in its work on bat coronaviruses and whether any breaches of protocol had occurred.

"Some of [NIH's] demands were a little impractical," said Alina Chan, co-author of the book "Viral: The Search for the Origin of Covid-19." "How would EcoHealth Alliance be able to obtain information about the missing staffer?" But Daszak should have been able to provide lab safety records, which are "much more significant," she said.

To Lauer, Daszak noted that the media attention and resultant public curiosity about the work EcoHealth Alliance conducted in Wuhan had cost him personally. "This type of harassment has accelerated to the point that personal security guards are now stationed at my home address, where I have also had to install invasive equipment and set up procedures to protect my family against expected violent attacks," Daszak wrote. "Additionally, I now meet regularly with FBI agents and others at my home to monitor these threats." As he did in communications The Intercept published in December, Daszak

referred to a letter containing white powder that he had received at his home. Local news media reported the incident at the time.

Denying Document Requests

Meanwhile, EcoHealth Alliance was also pushing on another front. In January 2021, Matthew Torsiello, one of its lawyers, emailed Lauren Bartok, an information specialist in the NIH's Freedom of Information Act Office, to request that a FOIA request for EcoHealth Alliance's grant documents be denied. Torsiello asked that the request, which was made by a member of the public through the transparency organization MuckRock, be denied because the grant termination was under appeal and because "a law enforcement investigation concerning WIV remains ongoing." Torsiello explained that his law firm had previously asked for the the NIH to deny a request for EcoHealth Alliance grant documents made in 2020, also by a member of the public.

The lawyer's email went on to make a tenuous argument. "As demonstrated by the recent attack on the US Capital [sic] fueled by disinformation and conspiracy theories, the need to protect the privacy of EcoHealth Alliance's employees and affiliates is more important than ever." The email did not offer further explanation, but Daszak had previously argued to the press and in the pages of the medical journal The Lancet that the notion that the pandemic could have a lab origin was a conspiracy theory.

We're really hopeful that this is the case, and everyone at EcoHealth Alliance is looking forward to continuing this critical work.

Looking forward to hearing news from you!

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel: (b) (6)
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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From: Garcia-Malene, Gorka (NIH/OD) [E] (b) (6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2021 12:20:51 PM

To: Matthew R. Torsiello

Cc: Neis T. Uppert; Andrew N. Krinsky; Bartok, Lauren (NIH/NIAID) [E]; NIH FOIA

Subject: [EXT] FW: FOIA Case No. 55702 re: EcoHealth Alliance & Grant No. R01AI110964-6

Good afternoon, Mr. Torsiello –

I'd like to insert myself into the unfolding FOIA conversation in hopes of providing some helpful context. Our records show that this competing renewal has in fact been funded. In addition, any indication from my program that there is an ongoing investigation into WIV can now be disregarded, as we recently confirmed there are no pending investigations

The day after Torsiello sent his email, another NIH FOIA officer wrote an email to an undisclosed recipient rejecting the lawyer's arguments for withholding the records. The officer noted that "there are no pending investigations" into the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Nine months later, the NIH FOIA office closed the public records request, pointing the requester to documents that the NIH had released online.

While EcoHealth Alliance's intervention in the FOIA request is not unusual, agencies are required by law to independently determine whether records should be disclosed, said Gunita Singh, an attorney for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. "Agencies subject to FOIA are obligated to serve the public's interest in learning about government functions," she wrote in an email. "They cannot operate at the behest of private parties."

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200

New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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Message

From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: 1/17/2022 10:40:04 PM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]
CC: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Draft response to the first of the two letters from NIH

Peter: I think the response is a good draft. Let's spend some time refining and tightening the argument. On issue 1, the IACUC approval, Lauer continues to move the goalposts on you. In his initial letter, he asked for the WIV IACUC approval for field work, which you quite rightly pointed out is not required by Chinese regulations, so there is no WIV IACUC approval for field work. He then dings you for non-compliance for not sending him the information about the Tufts IACUC approval – when it was available in the NIH system all along. This is at most a misunderstanding, and seems to me hard to construe as non-compliance with NIH regulations.

Issue 2 is a bit more complicated, as you appreciate, but I think we can boil it down to the following. Yes, there is CFR language that NIH has the right to review original lab notebooks and data, and that EHA would in the normal course of events be able to obtain these data from the WIV. But his pedantic insistence on these rules completely ignores the context of his request – the NIH unilaterally suspended your relationship with the WIV for political reasons in April 2020 and thus your usual interactions with WIV collaborators were abrogated through no fault of EHA's. Since that decision by the NIH – due to White House political pressure stemming from the then President's fraught relationship with China – the situation surrounding this grant was disrupted in a unique way. It is disingenuous, to say the least, for Lauer to now demand that you turn over WIV's laboratory notebooks and related data, when the actions of NIH and the USG have made it impossible for you to maintain the usual kind of relationship with your Chinese collaborators on which that exchange of data would usually be based. Under the circumstances, you have taken the appropriate action – asking the WIV to provide the data, which is under their control. If Lauer feels it is so important to see the original data, it is unreasonable of him to expect EHA to be able to provide it, given the political context of this grant; under these circumstances, he should use NIH intergovernmental channels to gain access to the data. That kind of cooperative action would be more appropriate than the confrontational approach he is taking.

As ever,
Jeff

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2022 4:50 PM

To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]
Cc: Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Draft response to the first of the two letters from NIH
Importance: High

Dear Jerry and Jeff,

Here's a draft response to the first of two letters from NIH on 6th January. This one deals with the Terminated-now suspended R01 grant for work in China on coronaviruses. The other one deals with our current 2 contracts and we have up to the first week of Feb to deal with those (we're working on a response).

All comments are welcome!

As you can see from Michael Lauer's letter – issue #1 is their complaint about not getting the right IACUC docs (these are the permission docs to work with animals) and a pretty direct criticism of our administration. I explain to him that he asked for the wrong thing and that our records are in order, and indeed were shared with NIH as far back as 2007. This is important, I think, because each of these letters he sends to us, NIH also shares with Republicans in Congress, and they make them public. It's therefore important to clarify that we did nothing wrong here, and that NIH is exerting unusual and inappropriate pressure on us. Should I add something about how NIH never requested these documents prior to the grant being awarded, or while the grant was actually in operation (they pertain to work from 2014-9 under the first grant)? Should I add something about how we've been through multiple audits and never had this issue coming up in the past?

The second part of his letter is about his request for lab notebooks and original computer files from Wuhan. We've already told him that we passed his request on to WIV, and now we're saying that we haven't heard back yet. Given that NIH spend a whole page on this issue, going into various CFRs and trying to make the case (for Republicans and public consumption) that if we don't get these docs we won't be in compliance, should I expand the response to item #2? I could talk about how this is a request that is very unlikely to be granted given the political interference in science on this specific issue. I could also talk about how we've already given them the information and their request to ask for original computer files is highly unusual, and not something that scientists normally would be required to do for NIH. Furthermore, given the sensitivity that this is us acting on behalf of a US Govt agency in requesting sensitive files from a Chinese Federal laboratory, it seems inappropriate to use us in this way. I could also comment that the fact that the grant has been terminated and suspended, our leverage to push WIV this sort of information is minimal. Finally, I could state that the very negative public discourse around our work with Wuhan has in part been driven by NIH misstating our record of compliance, and we are concerned that this letter is simply an attempt to further undermine our reputation.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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Message

From: Emma Greco [REDACTED]
Sent: 2/24/2023 2:38:46 PM
To: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
CC: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; John Feigelson [REDACTED]
Subject: EHA Board Meeting Slides
Attachments: Public Affairs slides.pptx

Hi Jeff,

I've attached the slides from Peter's presentation that focus on public affairs. Looking forward to seeing you on Zoom at 10:15!

Best,
Emma

--

Emma Greco
Development and Communications Manager

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018

[REDACTED]
www.ecohealthalliance.org

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Public Affairs

1. Communications (w/ Jeff Sturchio)

- Responding to all journalists inquiries w/ statements to correct myths
- Working with allies to refute allegations, drive truthful narrative of EHA
- Positive PR (Trips w/ journalists, film maker, authors of books)

Take homes for Board:

- Expect regular negative press
- Be ready with Q&A 'facts and myths about EHA'
- Talk to your friends when they ask about specific stories

UPDATED 2/2023

Only Philippines award and WAB-Net 2 proposal updated – all else same.
Focus on renewals, i.e. WAB-Net 2

Public Affairs

2. Security

- All-staff training in office; security at my house & during hearings in DC
- Working actively w/ law enforcement, FBI

UPDATED 2/2023

Only Philippines award and WAB-Net 2 proposal updated – all else same.
Focus on renewals, i.e. WAB-Net 2

Public Affairs

3. Legal (TKD – led by Nels Lippert)

- 1st lawsuit offer to withdraw; 2nd lawsuit motion to dismiss; 3rd in progress
- DoJ subpoena for genetic sequences, docs – almost complete
- Negotiating with Congressional committees re. scope/timing of requests
- Costs manageable - mixture of *pro bono*, reduced rate, and capacity to request insurance payment of some costs

UPDATED 2/2023

Only Philippines award and WAB-Net 2 proposal updated – all else same.
Focus on renewals, i.e. WAB-Net 2

Public Affairs

4. Political strategy (w/ Kyle House Group)

- Responding to 3 committees' requests:
 - Senate Homeland Security & Government Affairs
 - House E&C
 - House Select Subcomm. on Coronavirus Pandemic
- Active outreach to Democrats and Republicans
 - To anticipate/track amendments/bills
 - To build a defense against House passing defunding bills
- Coalition for Responsible Pandemic Research
- Benefit & pre-meet

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UPDATED 2/2023

Only Philippines award and WAB-Net 2 proposal updated – all else same.
Focus on renewals, i.e. WAB-Net 2

Message

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: 3/13/2023 3:50:19 PM
To: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
CC: John Feigelson [REDACTED] Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: DARPA DEFUSE was not rejected due to GoF concerns

Importance: High

Yes, correct, DARPA told us in our official interview re. why they rejected the proposal that it was too ambitious and too expensive. We had extensive conversations about cutting the project up into fundable chunks, and they even revisited this after the COVID pandemic began. These are in emails that will likely come out when we release them soon.

The reason this conspiracy about DARPA rejecting our proposal due to risks of GoF came up is that the internet 'researchers' found a document that allegedly is a reviewers' comments document from DARPA – it mentions the lack of detail re. GoF as one of the many reasons for rejection. However, I don't believe this rejection document is real. The actual proposal is a poorly scanned pdf that was released by the DRASTIC group (<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21066966-defuse-proposal>). The rejection review is a fresh pdf doc that looks like commentary from DRASTIC and it's something we never were given. Here it is: <https://drasticresearch.files.wordpress.com/2021/09/defuse-project-rejection-by-darpa.pdf>

The problem for us is that DARPA never sent any of the rejected proposers a written review. I have my original notes, but nothing detailed from them, so it's harder to push back on this BS DRASTIC review document. It would be good, however, to at least publicly state the above.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474
Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org
Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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From: Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2023 11:28 AM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: EcoHealth Alliance Statement Re. Jeff Sachs' testimony in front of the House Oversight Committee March 6th

Peter: I noticed that Birrell, like Sachs and Wade, makes a big deal out of the rejected DARPA proposal. It's good to have the rebuttal out there that the work was never done.

Birrell also makes the unwarranted assumption that DARPA turned down the proposal due to its purported risks. But there is no evidence for this, is there? I recall your telling me they said they didn't have the budget?

As ever,
Jeff

Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone

----- Original message -----

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Date: 3/13/23 11:11 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Hotez, Peter Jay" [REDACTED]
Cc: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED], David Morens [REDACTED], Gerald Keusch [REDACTED],
[REDACTED] "Roberts, Rich" [REDACTED], Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: EcoHealth Alliance Statement Re. Jeff Sachs' testimony in front of the House Oversight Committee March 6th

I've attached our statement re. Jeff Sachs' testimony. You're right Peter, it's a tedious waste of time that we have to do this. To be honest, it's been grist for the mill for the past 3 years – between checking for media attacks, scanning through documents for >50 FOIA requests and getting other docs ready for various political committees, it's become my evening and weekend 'hobby'.

Once it's all over, I'll have to find something else equally absorbing to do. Maybe I'll resurrect my childhood stamp collection or something...

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]

Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2023 9:47 PM

To: 'Hotez, Peter Jay' [REDACTED]

Cc: 'Jeff Sturchio' [REDACTED]; 'David Morens' [REDACTED]; 'Gerald Keusch' [REDACTED]

'Roberts, Rich' [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]

Subject: Jeff Sachs' testimony in front of the House Oversight Committee March 6th

Importance: High

Turns out Jeff Sachs spoke with the Oversight and Accountability Committee on March 6th and here's his testimony:

<https://docs.house.gov/meetings/VC/VCO0/20230308/115426/HHRG-118-VCO0-20230308-SD007.pdf>

I went through it (attached), and found 10 huge factual inaccuracies about EHA's work (highlighted and with a 'sticky note' explaining why it's incorrect). We'll probably put out a public statement about this tomorrow to correct these errors.

Jerry – you'll see he cites BU's recent experimental work – don't know if he's accurate about it, but you might want to pass this on to the appropriate people to see if they want to comment...

Very surprisingly – actually pretty shocking – Jeff Sachs seems to have fallen for another conspiracy (in addition to the allegations that the US blew up the Nordstream pipeline) – he makes comments at the end of his testimony (Questions #6 & #7) about alleged timing of patents for the mRNA work on CoV vaccines. This well-known (and crazy) conspiracy alleges NIH and Pfizer had sequences of SARS-CoV-2 in December 2019 – he even states that here. Of course it's pure "bollocks" and already widely debunked (just search "moderna SARS-CoV-2 patent conspiracy" using Google...).

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200

New York, NY 10018-6507

USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

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From: Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, March 8, 2023 7:46 AM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Cc: Jeff Sturchio [REDACTED]; David Morens [REDACTED]; Gerald Keusch [REDACTED]; Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Link to Written Testimonies for tomorrow's hearing

It's looking that the Dems might not call anyone?

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP

Texas Children's Hospital: Endowed Chair of Tropical Pediatrics | Co-Director, Texas Children's Hospital Center for Vaccine Development | Donate to our COVID-19 Vaccine Development

Baylor College of Medicine: Dean, National School of Tropical Medicine | Professor, Departments of Pediatrics, Molecular Virology & Microbiology | Health Policy Scholar

Baylor University, University Professor

Rice University, Baker Institute Fellow in Disease & Poverty

Texas A&M University, Faculty-Senior Fellow, Hagler Inst for Advanced Study & Scowcroft Institute of Intl Affairs

E-mail | Twitter | LinkedIn | Skype: p.hotez

Amazon Author Center | Daily Beast Contributor

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On Mar 7, 2023, at 11:17 PM, Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

CAUTION: This email is not from a BCM Source. Only click links or open attachments you know are safe.

I heard that the Dems will have a Lyme disease ID physician testifying - Paul Auwaerter from Hopkins. I've never heard of him and it doesn't seem like a great choice, but let's see how that goes.

Angela Rasmussen, Michael Worobey and Stephen Goldstein are mightily pissed off that they've not been asked – all three were ready to testify, but maybe the Dems thought it would cause too much trouble and therefore get too much press?

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance
520 Eighth Avenue, Suite 1200
New York, NY 10018-6507
USA

Tel.: +1-212-380-4474

Website: www.ecohealthalliance.org

Twitter: [@PeterDaszak](https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak)

EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: Peter Daszak <[REDACTED]>

Sent: Tuesday, March 7, 2023 8:08 PM

To: Jeff Sturchio <[REDACTED]> David Morens <[REDACTED]>
<[REDACTED]> 'Gerald Keusch' <[REDACTED]> 'Roberts, Rich' <[REDACTED]> 'Hotez, Peter Jay'

Cc: 'Aleksei Chmura' <[REDACTED]>

Subject: FW: Link to Written Testimonies for tomorrow's hearing

Importance: High

Dear All,

Here's a link to the written testimonies by Nicholas Wade, Robert Redfield, and Jamie Metzl.

<https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=115426> I've also attached them

We've already spotted numerous factual inaccuracies, and will be ready to rebut those that directly attack EcoHealth Alliance or our work. Note that all 3 'witnesses' are long-term pro-lab leak, and were invited by the Republicans.

If you have the stomach, and want to watch the hearing (Starts at 9am), the link is here: <https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/investigating-the-origins-of-covid-19/>.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

EcoHealth Alliance

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Message

From: kuuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: 4/5/2023 4:12:57 PM
To: [REDACTED]
CC: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Gmail foia

Yup..... dmm

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Apr 5, 2023, 09:16, Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED] wrote:

Sounds terrible.

Peter Hotez, MD, PhD, DSc (hon), FASTMH, FAAP

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Texas A&M University, Faculty-Senior Fellow, Hagler Inst for Advanced Study & Scowcroft Institute of Intl Affairs

[E-mail](#) | [Twitter](#) | [LinkedIn](#) | Skype: p.hotez

[Amazon Author Center](#) | [Daily Beast Contributor](#)

Senior Coordinator & Executive Support: Douglas Soriano

[REDACTED] | Phone: [REDACTED] | Fax: [REDACTED]

Media Inquiries:

[REDACTED]
iPhone

On Apr 5, 2023, at 9:06 AM, Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] wrote:

CAUTION: This email is not from a BCM Source. Only click links or open attachments you know are safe.

Simply awful stuff, David. Linda Saif (Ohio State Vet School coronavirologist, member of the Lancet/Independent Task Force, and senior author on the PNAS paper) has been asked by the chief counsel for the Republicans on a Senate investigations committee to talk to him, and OSU told her to get a personal lawyer. I'm anticipating a similar request from them, but BU seems to view support for faculty very differently, and the Legal Counsel office has been very helpful and upfront thus far.

Jerry

From: kuipo9 [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 5, 2023 7:57 AM
To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Gmail foia

Jerry, no, Gmail is not stored on government servers, but I learned about 6 months ago from Tony that through some foia like mechanism the private email accounts of govt employees can be accessed by congress. It happened to Tony and now it is happening to me

A related issue is that although I don't think it's a law, we are told not to "conduct govt business" on private devices, with the definition of govt business not being spelled out, but the examples being given including discussing patient identifiers and things like that, not issues related to science as a whole or issues of the day

Had an hour long 10 person Zoom last night with Larry Taback, the head NIH lawyer, The head of the nih congressional liaison office, Hugh Auchincloss, and 6 others about my impending trip before the Congressional committee firing squad over the next few days. They are telling me I need to get a personal lawyer and implied that this could be the beginning of the end of my nih employment

Otherwise it was a fine day yesterday! david

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

----- Original Message -----

On Apr 4, 2023, 23:12, Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] wrote:

I didn't think gmails were government property and could be FOIA'ed. Are they housed on an NIH owned computer and is that the issue? Can you refuse? And now that its 12 past 11 pm what did you do?

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, April 4, 2023 12:28 PM
To: kuipo9 [REDACTED]; Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Gmail foia

Importance: High

Thanks for letting us know David. What a shame that our communications will now be used to beat us about the head and body with.

The story will be "Secret cabal of deep state NIH and other scientists worked to prevent information on NIH's work with WIV being released" or something similar.

I expect they'll be putting out a story in a week or two, just like they did with the other HHS emails that were handed over: <https://nypost.com/2023/03/05/new-emails-show-fauci-commissioned-paper-to-disprove-wuhan-lab-leak-theory/>

I'll start going through your gmail emails to see what they say.

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak

President

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EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: kuipo9 [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, April 4, 2023 7:02 AM

To: Keusch, Gerald T [REDACTED] Peter Daszak [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Subject: Gmail foia

Peter and all,

Got a call from bldg 1 this morning at 630. The house committee wants hard copies of ALL my Gmail relating to YOU, Peter, Ian Lipkin, and any Bloomberg reporter I have ever communicated with. I have to provide this by COB today

I have spoken to and emailed with various Bloomberg reporters over the years but can't remember who I said what to. Most likely Jason Gale. Don't recall speaking with Ian lately. I think he and I had a Zoom call early in the pandemic. Please give him a heads up for me

Incidentally, in the past month or so you all have inadvertently sent emails to my Gmail account on a number of occasions

Please make sure u that anything you send me 1) goes to my new account and 2) does not contain an email trail with old emails containing my Gmail or govt account

Sorry for this inconvenience, just trying to protect us all. david

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

Message

From: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Sent: 5/5/2023 4:38:10 PM
To: David Morens [REDACTED]
CC: Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Gerald Keusch [REDACTED]; Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Question re. NIH refusing to allow

Thanks David – and now switching to your [kuuipo9](#) [REDACTED] address!

Cheers,

Peter

Peter Daszak
President

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EcoHealth Alliance develops science-based solutions to prevent pandemics and promote conservation

From: David Morens [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, May 5, 2023 11:32 AM
To: Peter Daszak [REDACTED]
Cc: Roberts, Rich [REDACTED]; Hotez, Peter Jay [REDACTED]; Aleksei Chmura [REDACTED]; Gerald Keusch [REDACTED]; Jeffrey Sturchio [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Question re. NIH refusing to allow

I do not remember for sure but think it was Zerhouni. d

From the cell phone of David Morens

On Fri, May 5, 2023, 11:22 Peter Daszak [REDACTED] wrote:

Rich just shared a 'fruity' quote he gave to the Daily Telegraph re. Francis Collins' particular weakness in terminating NIH funding on direction from Trump. I'll leave it for you to either read it in the press, or hear it from Rich – it's a cracker...