Timmons and Subramanyam Release New Report on Deadly DCA Crash and DOD Use of Civilian Airspace

Lawmakers call for IG review of all DoD operations in civilian airspace

WASHINGTON—Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs Chairman William Timmons (R-S.C.) and Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-Va.) today released a staff report titled, “The DCA Incident: Assessing the Military’s Role in the National Airspace Tragedy.” The report analyzes how the fatal mid-air collision between American Airlines flight 5342 and a U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter occurred and determined what failures – procedural, regulatory, or operational – within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) may have contributed to the crash. Following the Military and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee’s investigation, it is recommending that the DoD Inspector General conduct a comprehensive evaluation of all operations in civilian airspace within the United States with an emphasis on safety, coordination, and compliance.

“The tragic accident at DCA on January 29th and thirty near misses overall have revealed that the military’s current operations fall woefully short of keeping both military personnel and American civilians safe in Washington, D.C. airspace. Several briefings on this issue have highlighted the pressing need for clearer military flight protocols, enhanced training, and regular audits of flight operations and capabilities within the DoD. It is crucial that military personnel are given the tools and training they need to navigate this complex airspace and prevent accidents and miscommunications like these from ever happening again. The Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs remains committed to this investigation and is upholding its responsibility to conduct oversight of U.S. military operations to ensure that both members of the military and civilians remain safe when sharing the nation’s skies,” said the lawmakers.

Below are key findings from the report:

• Communication issues between the Black Hawk and the tower contributed to the January 29^th crash: On March 11, 2025, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report. The findings of this report indicate that discrepancies in altitudes were reported by the pilot and the instructor pilot of the Black Hawk. Similarly, the report mentions that seventeen seconds before the collision, the tower directed the Black Hawk to ‘pass behind the’ Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ). However, according to the helicopter’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR), a portion of ‘pass behind the’ may not have been heard by the crew.
• Night vision goggles (NVGs) limited the Black Hawk pilots’ ability to see the American Airlines plane on January 29th: NVGs make it especially difficult to see peripherally and during flights with excessive bright light, like that seen coming from Washington and DCA. In an investigative hearing held by NTSB, Dr. Stephen Casner, a human factors expert, testified that when an aircraft is approaching head-on, it will not appear to be moving closer, and this approaching aircraft often looks the same as buildings and other objects while wearing NVGs, making it extremely difficult for pilots to detect oncoming traffic. Likewise, NVGs make it nearly impossible to detect color, which is critical when trying to detect the red and green anti-collision lights positioned on the side of aircraft.
• Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out was not transmitting on the Black Hawk, preventing other aircraft and the public from detecting it on January 29^th: Rick Dressler of Metro Aviation, which operates medical helicopters, stated during the NTSB hearing that his company’s goal of maintaining “extra vigilance” while transporting critically ill passengers is “an extreme challenge when those aircraft [military helicopters] are not usually transmitting ADS-B” meaning the company “can’t see them on his traffic system” and has to rely on see and avoid methods. The NTSB’s investigation is still ongoing, and it is still being evaluated whether having ADS-B Out transmitting would have made a difference on the night of the January 29^th collision.
• The Army lacks certain knowledge of DCA airspace: Chief Warrant Officer Five David Van Vechten stated during the NTSB hearing that Army Black Hawk pilots are not trained on fixed-wing aircraft approaches to DCA runways, and this is based on “personal knowledge.” Additionally, when asked if there was a unit he was concerned about, Dressler of Metro Aviation, stated that when flying, the 12th Aviation Battalion, the unit of the U.S. Army Aviation Branch to which the Black Hawk was assigned, make his company “uncomfortable” due to what he described as “gross misunderstandings” of the airspace, including instances of military helicopters landing on MedSTAR helipads without prior notice.
• The DoD to DCA hotline was offline, preventing direct communication between the Pentagon and DCA, showing the broader breakdown of critical air traffic coordination: This hotline, maintained by DoD, was severed during the construction of a new air traffic control tower at the Pentagon. Previously, the hotline was used to allow for seamless communication between the Pentagon’s air traffic controllers and DCA’s. FAA Aviation officials only discovered the hotline was offline after the May 1 near miss incident, when two commercial jets were forced to abandon their approaches to DCA due to an Army Black Hawk occupying the airspace. 

Based on the findings, the Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs is recommending that the DoD Inspector General conduct a broad evaluation of the DoD’s use of U.S. civilian airspace and its adherence to established aviation safety protocols. Such an evaluation would provide Congress and the public with an independent assessment of risks and opportunities to strengthen safety in shared airspace. 

Read the report here.

Read the letter to Inspector General Moring here.