Wenstrup: COVID-19 Pandemic Highlights Urgent Need to Modernize, Improve Global Biosafety and Biosecurity Standards

WASHINGTON — Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Chairman Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio) opened today’s hearing titled “Strengthening Biosafety and Biosecurity Standards: Protecting Against Future Pandemics” by discussing whether current oversight of high-risk laboratories in the United States and abroad are effective, sufficient, and capable of protecting Americans from current and future biological threats. Chairman Wenstrup emphasized the need for global biosecurity and biosafety standards, noting that infectious diseases — such as COVID-19 and other dangerous coronaviruses — do not recognize borders. Considering COVID-19 likely occurred as the result of a lab related incident in Wuhan, proactively ensuring that oversight mechanisms for high-containment laboratories are improved and modernized ahead of a future health crisis is essential. Chairman Wenstrup concluded his opening remarks by highlighting the importance of interagency coordination and cooperation among credible state actors as lawmakers begin their discussion today on biosafety and biosecurity improvements.

Below are Select Subcommittee Chairman Wenstrup’s remarks as prepared for delivery.

Today the Select Subcommittee is holding a hearing to examine our country’s biosafety and biosecurity standards.

We’re not just examining whether they’re effective, but whether they are sufficient.

And whether they can protect us from biological threats—both domestically and abroad.

And what actions should be taken if these standards are insufficient, or outdated and need to be modernized.

This hearing is timely and forward looking.

On Monday, the public comment period ended on proposed changes to oversight policies of federally funded dual use research of concern and gain-of-function research of concern.

No one knows these proposed changes better, than our witness, Dr. Gerry Parker.

As we move forward, we must make sure that our standards and capabilities can effectively respond and assess risks related to new research and biotechnologies—including those capable of unleashing new pandemics.

In addition to pandemics, we must be prepared for a future public health attack—including the release of a biological weapon.

This is necessary to protect American lives and—because infectious diseases don’t recognize borders—lives of those around the world.

In the earliest stages of the pandemic, scientists and public health authorities raced to understand the novel coronavirus—to understand how it spread, who was at risk, and, most importantly, its origins.

Did it come from a natural spillover, transferred from a bat to an intermediate source to human?

Or was it the result of a laboratory or research related accident? In other words, did it come from a lab?

While there’s mounting evidence supporting the lab leak theory, we may never know with 100 percent certainty the origins of COVID-19. Especially when transparency is denied.

However, we do know some things for certain:

That in early 2018—before COVID-19 emerged—the U.S. State Department had serious biosafety concerns about the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Specifically, they warned that there was “a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate” the high-containment laboratory – concerns that continued through 2019 and into 2020.

They also warned that the WIV was conducting coronavirus research under inadequate biosafety levels, using reverse genetic engineering techniques to hide their work, and creating chimeric coronaviruses to test infectivity to humans.

Worse yet, we know now the American taxpayer was likely paying for it and we know, based on emails uncovered by this Subcommittee, that Dr. Fauci, himself, knew there was gain of function research happening in Wuhan before the pandemic broke out.

We know that this wouldn’t be the first time that a lab leak occurred:

We know that Smallpox escaped a laboratory in the UK in 1978;

We know that the former Soviet Union accidentally released anthrax from a military research facility;

We know that two separate lab related incidents led to the release of SARS from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention in 2004; 

Finally, we know that the United States isn’t immune to leaks:

There’s been lab related accidents involving H1N1, H5N1, smallpox, Tuberculosis and Zika—some as recently as 2016.

These lab leaks can occur for a multitude of reasons.

They can occur because of mishandled biological materials, escaped aerosols, laboratory design flaws, or human error—which can be as simple as failing to correctly wear protective equipment or accidentally puncturing a glove.

Such an accident could easily have occurred in Fresno County, California where we know a Chinese company operated an illegal laboratory where it conducted dangerous experiments involving COVID-19 and other viruses.

Inside this lab, authorities found hundreds of mice that had been genetically modified to catch and carry the COVID-19 virus.

Troublingly, as we already know. These lab-related incidents—if not contained—can cause predictable but disastrous consequences.

Desiring more laboratory safety and more oversight isn’t to chill the scientific community from engaging in research, but to ensure we’re taking every precaution necessary to protect the public from escaped pathogens—of which, we cannot control, nor fully understand the consequences until it’s too late.

It’s critically important that these issues be addressed proactively.

Scientists that are conducting their work safely and with the proper precautions should not have any concerns about more oversight on bad labs. This oversight should be welcomed.

In recent years, there’s been significant advancements in biotechnology—or dual-use technology—that makes it far easier to develop and genetically engineer dangerous viruses.

Advancements that could make a genetically altered virus indistinguishable from a naturally occurring virus.

This is one reason increased oversight into the experiments being conducted and the viral holdings of labs is vital to preventing a pandemic.

There’s also been a proliferation of high-containment labs throughout the world.

Left unchecked, this makes it conceivable, if not probable, that another pandemic could occur in the future because of a lab-related incident.

This is a matter of public health and national security that requires interagency coordination and international cooperation.

We are holding this hearing today to look at our current standards and circumstances to help prepare for a future pandemic.

To determine what went wrong and to recommend how to do it better.

I look forward to a strong, on topic, discussion today.

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